

The Impact of Foreign Intervention in the Yemeni Crisis (2015-2020)

Rashed Ahmad Rashed Al-hinaiti* 

Social and legal sciences, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid, Spain.

Received: 6/10/2022
Revised: 8/11/2022
Accepted: 28/2/2023
Published: 30/11/2023

* Corresponding author:
abkel@hotmail.com

Citation: Al-hinaiti, R. A. R. (2023).
The Impact of Foreign Intervention
in the Yemeni Crisis (2015-
2020). *Dirasat: Human and Social
Sciences*, 50(6), 488–505.
<https://doi.org/10.35516/hum.v50i6.2597>

Abstract

Objectives: The research reviews the complications and effects of regional and international external interventions on the Yemeni crisis and determines its role in the crisis.

Methods: For this purpose, the study relied on collecting data in a detailed manner through interviews with influential figures in the Yemeni issue, which helped to have a comprehensive understanding of the research questions and answer them in a scientific, objective, and accurate manner. Furthermore, the study outlined all factors influencing the conflict in Yemen, detailing their roles in shaping the situation.

Results: The results indicated that the Saudi leadership showed greater resolve towards the Yemeni issue, while the Russian policy towards the Yemeni crisis was neutral. The UAE was the most active party in the Yemeni crisis, as it supported the loyal factions, and strongly supported the military formations it established. The study highlighted the danger of Iranian intervention in Yemen's internal affairs and its impact on the stability and security of the region's countries. The study highlighted the Saudi leadership's more decisive role in addressing the Yemeni issue compared to other critical foreign policy matters like those in Syria and Iraq.

Conclusions: The study found that the objectives of Saudi Arabia's military intervention in its southern neighbor, Yemen, remain unclear. Despite initially announced goals of altering the emergency, supporting President Hadi, and consolidating control, there seems to be a shift toward fostering a loosely unified state that accommodates various factions, including temporary support for separatists in the south without complete appeasement.

Keywords: Yemeni crisis, interventions, Yemeni conflict, international dimensions, regional dimensions.

أثر التدخل الأجنبي في الأزمة اليمنية (2015-2020)

راشد أحمد الحنيطي

قسم القانون العام، كلية العلوم القانونية والاجتماعية، جامعة خوان كارلوس، مدريد، إسبانيا.

ملخص

الأهداف: يستعرض البحث مضاعفات وأثار التدخلات الخارجية الإقليمية والدولية في الأزمة اليمنية وتحديد دورها في الأزمة. **المنهجية:** لهذه الغاية اعتمدت الدراسة على جمع البيانات بطريقة مفصلة عن طريق المقابلات مع شخصيات مؤثرة في الشأن اليمني، بما ساعد على فهم شامل لأسئلة البحث و الإجابة عنها على نحو علمي متجرد دقيق. كذلك جرى تفصيل جميع العوامل المؤثرة في النزاع على الساحة اليمنية وتحديد دورها في التأثير في الصراع على الساحة اليمنية.

النتائج: أشارت النتائج إلى أن القيادة السعودية أظهرت حسماً أكبر تجاه القضية اليمنية بينما كانت السياسة الروسية تجاه الأزمة اليمنية محايدة. وكانت الإمارات الطرف الأكثر فعالية في الأزمة اليمنية؛ حيث دعمت الفصائل الموالية، ودعمت بقوة التشكيلات العسكرية التي أنشأها. وضحت الدراسة خطر التدخل الإيراني في الشأن اليمني الداخلي وأثر ذلك في استقرار وأمن دول المنطقة. كذلك أشارت الدراسة إلى أن القيادة السعودية كان لها دور حاسم أكبر في التعامل مع القضية اليمنية مقارنة بقضايا السياسة الخارجية المهمة الأخرى، مثل الشؤون السورية والعراقية.

الخلاصة: خلصت الدراسة إلى أن الهدف النهائي للتدخل العسكري التي تقوده السعودية ضد جارتها الجنوبية لم يتضح بعد كما تشير أبرز ملاحظات المراقبين للشأن اليمني. الأهداف الرسمية التي أعلنها الناطق الرسمي للجيش السعودي عبر وسائل الإعلام الدولية كانت تغيير الوضع الطارئ ودعم الرئيس هادي وتعزيز سيطرته على البلاد بأكملها، ولكن يبدو أن المملكة تسعى الآن إلى ظهور دولة فضفاضة، إذا ما اتحدت قد تستوعب الحوثيين والانفصاليين في الجنوب، الذين وقفت الرياض معهم لفترة مؤقتة، ولكن دون استرضاءهم.

الكلمات الدالة: الأزمة اليمنية، التدخلات، الصراع اليمني، الأبعاد الدولية، الأبعاد الإقليمية.



© 2023 DSR Publishers/ The University of Jordan.

This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY-NC) license <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>

Introduction

Yemen, a small country that witnessed political struggle and upheaval since its politics was deposed in 2014 by the Houthis, a Shiite tribal minority. After then, foreign action against the Houthis started, with Saudi Arabia joining the conflict with the surviving Yemeni government authority. Iran started providing its partner the Houthis with material support and economic assistance in 2015, however not with the strong army engagement. What followed has been dubbed one of the worst philanthropic catastrophes of the modern era, and it still rages today. (Hezam, 2017)

Since 2011, the Arab world has seen the emergence of popular revolutions that have resulted in the overthrow of numerous ruling regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. In addition, the region has experienced a process of democratization that saw the overthrow of Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime in Yemen, which had ruled the country for more than three decades. In 2014, the Houthi uprising, which had Iranian support, put an end to it. With the involvement of the Arab coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in March 2015 on the presence of restoring legitimacy, Yemen was once again drawn into a civil war and turned into a theatre for regional and global conflicts. Consequently, the study's goal is to explore and evaluate the consequences and effects. (Laub, 2016)

The strategic location of Yemen constituted an arena for conflict, whether between local or international powers. From 1962 to 1970, the republicans fought a war against the supporters of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom, which had ruled northern Yemen since gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire in The war in North Yemen led to the proclamation of the Yemen Arab Republic in 1962, and South Yemen was under the protection of the British Empire between 1839 and 1967. And Ali Abdullah Saleh became president of North Yemen since 1978, to unify North and South Yemen. (Harden, 2019)

After that, he led efforts to support this attempt, and Saleh fought a civil war in 1994, during which he tried to secede from the south. The union and his local allies made a number of wars against the Houthis, but he did not succeed in defeating them. In 2011, a revolution erupted, demanding the overthrow of the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime, who stepped down as part of an agreement he reached with the Gulf Cooperation Council that granted him immunity from prosecution. Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi became president of Yemen in 2012, except as a result of Saleh's alliance with the Houthis and the takeover, and that this agreement reached by the Gulf Cooperation Council did not last long. (Allinson, 2019)

In September 2014, the capital, Sanaa, prompts the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to intervene in the framework of what is known as a "storm" Al-Hazm, which opened the way for regional and international interventions, and eventually led to the collapse of the Yemeni state. The external interventions and the dependence of local forces on them also led to the prolongation of the war, hence the importance of the study in realizing the dangers of external interventions in the instability of Yemen And its collapse, as Yemen faces its biggest crisis in decades, and the embargo that imposed an arms embargo, with devastating humanitarian consequences, has caused The displacement of more than a million people, imposed by Saudi Arabia, is an internal phenomenon, and it has led to an outbreak of cholera, a shortage of medicines and the threat of starvation. The United Nations describes the humanitarian crisis in In Yemen; it is considered the "worst in the world." Yemen enjoys an important strategic location, as it overlooks important shipping lines for international trade, and any collapse would lead to threaten these shipping lines, as Yemen neighbors the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which owns more than half of the world's oil reserves, the collapse of Yemen will lead to security breaches in these countries, which will affect the production of oil. Oil and its prices, and what may have its effects on international trade. It will prolong the war, which will help to strengthen the armed groups that are a major tool reflects regional and international conflicts. (Haykel, 2021)

Objectives of the Research

This research aims mainly to identify the complications and effects of external, regional and international interventions, on the Yemeni crisis, and this goal is achieved through achieving the following objectives:

1. Identifying the role of regional powers (Iran, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Sultanate of Oman) on the Yemeni crisis.
2. Identifying the role of the countries of the Horn of Africa on the Yemeni crisis.
3. Identifying the role of international powers (USA, Russia, and European countries) in the Yemeni crisis.

Research Problem

External interventions contribute significantly in the formation and continuation of the crisis of the modern Yemeni

state since its inception. This role ranged between direct and indirect interference, as well as the diversity of its dimensions between political, economic, security, social and religious. So, the main problem of this study represented in the impact of external, regional and international interventions on the Yemeni crisis.

This problem will be addressed through two main axes: The first axis analyzes the nature the Yemeni crisis, its causes and consequences. The second axes focus on examining the roles of the regional and international powers on the Yemeni crisis: Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Sultanate of Oman, and the countries of the Horn of Africa.

The research hypothesis:

1. The regional forces of Iran Saudi Arabia and United Arab of Emirates affect the Yemeni Crisis positively.
2. The international forces of USA helped in diminishing the Yemeni crisis.

Methodology:

The research uses the descriptive-analytical approach: it is the method used to describe a phenomenon or a specific case as it is, analyze it, interpret what it came with, and collect the information needed to analyze it in a close proximity to the phenomenon.

Literature review:

1. The Nature of the Yemeni Crisis, Its Causes and Repercussions

The Yemeni crisis is a crisis of a state, institutions, leadership and policies. The Yemeni state is characterized, like most of the third world countries, even if it exceeds others, especially in terms of the degree of fragility, weak institutionalization and corruption. The Republic of Yemen is also distinguished from many of the countries of the third world in that it represents, on the one hand, a product of the random unification of two countries, each of which had its own economic system and its ideological orientation and ideological orientation, on the one hand, and the ideological capital of the South on the other hand. (IISS. 2019)

The Republic of Yemen has adopted since its residence, as it had the case in the two countries, on a promotional economy distributed to the player and play an important role in the purchase of statements, and the formation of alliances supporting the authority and keeping the relative stability, last decade, and then to a greater extent during the first half of the current decade. But government policies, perhaps due to the growth of corruption and the tyranny of considerations of survival in power over other priorities and necessities, failed to develop the sectors of the infrastructure and the environment in order to achieve growth and investment. (Nußberger, 2017)

Yemen's economic problems exacerbated with the gradual depletion of oil reserves and the decline in oil prices in international markets. Although the Yemeni government during the days of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh was betting on gas exports, but those revenues were much less than to cover the resulting deficit in oil revenues. On the political level, the northern and southern ruling elites adopted a constitution that included many democratic principles that aimed to institutionalize and manage the struggle for power in a peaceful manner. (Esfandiary, 2016)

The Yemenis looks out with the values of the one and the promises of the vulnerability to the democracy to exceed the past development in the conflict on the authority, which was based on the one on the attempt of every sociological or the region of Al -Hayamin on power, wealth, and the subjugation of other groups, and from the other ones, and the other groups. Controlling and trying to replace it or independence from the central authority and establish its own entities and then try to expand in the lands of other entities adjacent to it. (Esfandiary, 2016)

In addition, the current Yemeni crisis is characterized by its multiplicity of components, which simultaneously include political, economic, social and security aspects that reinforce each other and threaten the Yemeni state, which is inherently weak and by its nature collapsing. Since 2004, in the far north of the country, the Yemeni army has fought intermittent wars with the so-called Houthi rebellion, especially in the Saada region. And in the southern and eastern governorates, which represent more than two-thirds of the country's area. (Esfandiary, 2016)

The Yemeni crisis is witnessing fluctuations that can be described as twisted developments in it, predicting that Yemen stands at a crossroads whose fates and possibilities of fluctuations are multiplied in many of its sources. For several things:

The first: the lack of an accurate description of what Yemeni society revolves around, and thus ignorance of the details of its social fabric and coloring, at a time when many of those interested in studying it believed - and it is not clear that the difference is. He confines them - ignores the problem, socially or almost. (Hezam, 2017)

The second: neglecting the intervention of the actors in the Yemeni crisis, its workers, and the captains of its complexity, as it is a problem in the girls of the region and the last places, and the third. They all have purposes, goals and purpose. (Hezam, 2017)

The third: Yemen's poverty and weak national income, made Yemen a theater for the ambitions of global and regional actors, especially the global actors who made Yemen revolve in their orbits, harnessed to implement the strategy of Yemen in the region. (Hezam, 2017)

Likewise, the poverty of Yemen and the weakness of its capabilities have pushed the door of Yemen wide open to regional forces to penetrate into Yemeni society under the guise of cultural aid and the attempts to insinuate it usually without ignoring attempts to invade it.

The internal Yemeni war and external military intervention are a natural result of the failure of the Yemeni political elites to embody the popular will in achieving democratic change and the growing severity of regional contradictions, which were directly reflected in the internal and internal transition of the united country. (Hezam, 2017)

The transitional period, as is well known, came as a result of the February 2011 revolution against the regime of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. At the beginning of this revolution, it was returned to 2005 when the protests and the wide popular appearances that included the enemy from the cities of Yemen for the first time and in a chained form without any participants before the opposition parties because of the lifting of the world, which was not a matter of the extent of the time, which is the one who has been in the interest of the oil, which has lost the time, which has been in the interest of Individuals, unemployment, the widening of poverty and the spread of corruption in all parts of the state. (Laub, 2016)

The Yemeni crisis is a complex, multi-faceted and intertwined structure, and consists of internal and external strife; the first part is the struggle for power between the Yemeni political forces that do not have a common national project. The continued absence of this project makes resolving the crisis more complex and achieving lasting stability unattainable.

The second is embodied in the regional contradictions and conflicts, especially between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which are competing for the regional role and seeking to extend their strategies in light of international data and developments and the unprecedented increase in security challenges in the Arab region.

The sides of the Yemeni political conflict include forces, groups and political entities, multiple ideologies and sects, and unequal in terms of capabilities and capabilities, but they share a lack of readiness to build a civil state, a state of equal opportunities, equality, stability, social justice, and equality. Regarding the political developments in Yemen, the GCC countries followed a unified position until the Ansar Allah movement (Houthis) took control of the levers of power in Yemen and imposed its authority on the practical reality. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with Bahrain and Kuwait, preferred reforming the political system in Yemen over liberal democratic changes, but without enabling the Yemeni Assembly for Reform to manage the next stage, and to serve this purpose, the United Arab Emirates sought to establish "the United Arab Emirates" party gradually. At the forefront of the previous president of Abdullah, if the kingdom did not accept, who is at the same time, the head of the conference is the conference with the Ansar Allah group (Al -Houthis). Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and made him abandon his old and partisan relationship with former President Saleh and adopt an independent position, though not free from flexibility and rapprochement with the political leadership in Riyadh, while Qatar, which aspires to be a pivotal country in the region, supported the reformist party, the reformist party in Islam, such as the six countries Al-Arabi and tried to contain the Ansar Allah group "Ansar Allah (Houthis). (Horton, 2020)

The different positions of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries regarding the political developments in Yemen, in addition to the efforts of some Yemeni political forces prevent any real democratic changes. The keenness of some forces to maintain power and the absence of a specific and clear United Nations strategy for the transitional phase, despite the unified and firm position of the Security Council regarding the political future of Yemen, greatly affected the failure to achieve the transitional and transitional initiative in Yemen. It not only affected the deterioration of the general situation in

Yemen and it's out of control to dangerous levels, but it also gave an appropriate opportunity for Iran to interfere in the security process. (Global Conflict Tracker, 2022)

2. The International Dimensions of the Yemeni Crisis

The security vacuum in Yemen reflects international fears of losing control of the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab Strait and turning them into dangers of terrorist operations and maritime piracy. Perhaps it is notable in this context that the resurgence of the phenomenon of maritime piracy in this vital region of the world, has given the Yemeni crisis international dimensions in addition to its regional dimensions, as some observers see that the international trade movement, such as piracy, will threaten the situation mentioned through the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the resurgence of maritime piracy will also lead to an increase in insurance costs for shipping companies. (Rotberg, 2016)

3. Repercussions of the Yemeni Crisis

There are a number of clear repercussions of the Yemeni crisis, not only on Yemen and the Gulf states, but on the Arab regional system as a whole. The most prominent of these repercussions are the following:

Growing Iranian influence in the region:

Iran took advantage of the chance to strengthen relationships with Yemen and increase its presence there after the country's unification in 1990 and in light of the strained relations between Yemen and the GCC nations as a result of the Yemeni regime's backing for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. During the time of the international sanctions on Iraq, Iran expanded its efforts to support the Shiite Twelver sect in Yemen through certain Iraqi Shiites who resided in this nation. Iran stepped up its efforts to preserve positive links with the Zaidi factions of the Shiite community by, among other things, encouraging them to participate in conferences, commemorate the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution, and closely examine Iran's experiences and other issues.

Iran has extended its influence in Yemen between 2004 and 2010 by aiding the Houthis in their military war with the Yemeni government. The revolt in 2011 against Ali Abdullah Saleh's government, however, was the most significant change in Iran's position in Yemen. Due to Yemen's unstable condition, the impasse in the political transition, and the weakness of the Yemeni government in failing to address the country's political, security, economic, and social issues, the Iranian influence there has grown since that time. Iran expanded its ideological and sectarian ties with the Houthi rebels in this area and intensified its political, media, financial, and military backing for them.

The exacerbation of the stress:

This matter is clear from the way to the conflict between the base in Yemen and the group of supporters of God (the Houthis), so they led them to Sana'a to the escalation of a risk and activity that the "base", as well as the rest of the terrorism, is the same, as it is the same. Before the Yemenis, by appearing as a defender of the Sunnis against the Ansar Allah (Houthis) the Shiites, and from here, the organization is fighting on the other fronts against the Houthis and the Houthis against the Houthis in the two fronts. (IISS. 2019)

The Yemeni government has reinstated one of the incidents of stress that had been in Yemen since the second of 1996 and until the first of 2003, and it was among the most prominent terrorist incidents that left an influential in the form of the security, the first was the first of the destroyers (Cole) in the first of the destroyers (Cole). As the destroyer was inflicted on the destruction of evil sailors and the injury of 28 lasts and a material, and the second accident was the severity of the French oil carrier "Lambij" in the port of Makla in the governorate of Harmout in the first of the first, the first of the year. (IISS. 2019)

4. The Repercussions of the Yemeni Crisis on the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries since "2011"

The "Arabian Peninsula" is made up of the Republic of Yemen and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Yemen serves as the southern entry point to this large region, and the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council provide Yemen with strategic depth and stability and economic continuity assurances. Yemenis see the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as a secured creditor of the country's economic survival and stability through opening Gulf labor markets to Yemenis, or by providing aid and soft loans. These views differ from those of the Gulf countries, who have seen Yemen since the 1960s as a future threat that they should be wary of and discuss its direct and indirect risks. (IISS. 2019)

The authoritarian tribal and political social structure, the lack of a democratic culture, the worsening of the social, political, and economic conditions, the atmosphere of internal unrest, and the potential for this unrest to spread to the Gulf States are the factors that are impeding Yemen's democratic transition process, making it a source of concern. The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council were under a serious threat, which prompted them to participate in the Yemeni conflict and turn to military force through a combination led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Then, in a move akin to Desert Storm, Decisive Storm was launched against the Houthi militias and supporters of the overthrown Ali Saleh regime on the one hand, and diplomatic means through its most recent alliance with Saleh on the other. Then, on December 4, 2017, Ali Saleh was assassinated, giving the Yemeni crisis a new direction. (IISS. 2019)

5. The repercussions of foreign intervention in Yemen on the political, geostrategic and security situation

With the continuation and escalation of the Yemeni popular protests, the continuing confrontations between the pro-revolutionary army and the forces of President (Ali Abdullah Saleh), the entry of tribes into confrontations and the assassination of President (Ali Abdullah Saleh) in Al-Nahdeen Mosque in the presidential palace, and the possibility of the situation in Yemen deteriorating to the brink. A civil war with repercussions and impact extends to the Gulf countries, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Gulf Cooperation Council countries, led and blessed by Saudi Arabia, put forward an initiative on the third of April (to solve the political crisis in Yemen, and the initiative included the announcement of the Yemeni president to step down, and transfer his powers to his deputy (Abd Rabbo Mansour). Hadi), and emphasizing the safety and non-persecution of him and all his relatives and pillars of his regime, and the formation of a national unity government whose mission is to run the country's business for a limited period, and to prepare for a referendum on the constitution and parliamentary and presidential elections. Some texts of the initiative were amended on the tenth of April to the following formula :(That the President of the Republic announce the transfer of his powers to the Vice President of the Republic, and the formation of a government of national unity headed by the opposition, which has the right to Political, security, and economic matters, drafting a constitution and holding elections on the twenty-first of April. Another initiative known as (the third initiative) was presented that included many amendments that included (executive steps represented in handing over power to the representative after ()) days of signing it, and obligating the former government to head it. The opposition will provide the appropriate atmosphere to achieve national reconciliation, remove the elements of political and security tension, and grant immunity from legal and judicial prosecution of the president and those who worked with him during his rule.

It can be said that the calls put forward by the opposition in southern Yemen may escalate with the political transformations that Yemen is witnessing, the demise of the regime of former President (Ali Abdullah Saleh), and the emergence of a state of political instability as a result of the chaos that Yemen may witness with the advent of a government incapable of managing Responsibility and the continuation of the influence of the former regime after the participation of some of its ministers in the new government, and its repercussions on internal stability in Yemen. Among the other challenges that could face the new Yemeni government and have an impact on internal stability, are the Saada issue and the demands of the Houthi movement calling for reviving the idea of the Zaydi Imamate again and changing the system of government in Yemen. Badr al-Din al-Houthi (a famous religious scholar in Saada) is considered the spiritual father and leader. The founder of the Houthi movement, where he called for the revival of Zaidis since the seventies of the last century, and members of the Houthi family claim that they are descended from the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad or they are traced back).

The Role of Regional Powers in the Yemeni Crisis:

The conflict of regional powers in the Middle East is a struggle with historical roots and constants. As each country seeks to achieve its interests and impose its will on other Middle Eastern countries competing with it, especially after the revolutions of the Arab Spring; the role and influence of regional parties in Yemen also varies. This varies according to the behavior of regional actors; In terms of playing a role and standing in the region; therefore, we try, through this axis, to address the role of the active regional powers in the Yemeni crisis, represented in:

2.1 The Iranian role in the Yemeni crisis:

Historically; Iran was not an important factor in Yemeni affairs; It has long maintained a diplomatic presence in Sana'a; But during the six Saada wars between 2004 and 2010, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh asserted that Iran was supporting the Houthis; But US analysts have found little evidence to support his claims.

However, since 2011, Iran's role has begun to change in the Arab region. Tehran's support for the Houthis increased during that period; Although Iran was not a player in the negotiations that led to Saleh's resignation, after his overthrow, Saleh resorted to Iran while calculating the prospects of returning to power. The Iranians may have played a role in shaping the Houthi-Saleh partnership that led to the current civil war. Iran's support for the Houthis has also grown increasingly transparent after the successful military campaign by the Houthis and Saleh loyalists in the summer of 2014. (Maloney, 2016)

Military support: Evidence of Iranian interference in support of the Houthis began; including military aid to grow since 2012. In January 2013; captured by the US Navy in cooperation with the Yemeni Navy; on an Iranian dhow carrying about 40 tons of supplies destined for the Houthis; The shipment included Iranian missiles, which included: 16,723 blocks of explosives 0-4; 133 plastic containers of explosives equipped for a portable air defense system of type 9 11321 62040 rounds of 12.7 mm ammunition; 316000 rounds of 3 mm 100 rocket-propelled grenades; 18 Katyusha rockets (122 mm); 17 sights; 1615 boxes connected to improvised explosive devices; 10 laser rangefinders 1.1180 48 night vision goggles; 5 long range binoculars with mounts, 90 lens compass; 66 silencers and 800 electric detonators. (Maloney, 2016)

According to the United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, the Huns continued to damage Iraqi support such as assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank guided missiles, and more advanced missile systems. Some of these weapons have technical characteristics similar to those made in Iran; The Houthis use a variety of weapons to project power near and outside Yemen's land and sea borders, including:

- Short-range ballistic missiles: according to various sources; The Houthis have modified Iranian short-range Scud missiles to enhance their range in order to threaten Saudi cities; Such as the attack on the capital Riyadh on 05/25/2018; Where the US Department of State (Office of Foreign Assets Control 017/0) has identified five Iranian individuals who have provided technical expertise related to ballistic missiles to the Houthis in Yemen; They transported weapons not seen in Yemen prior to the current conflict.
- Drones: Beginning in 2018, the Houthis began using drones to deliver and detonate explosive payloads against Saudi government targets; The United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen reported in January 2019 that: "The committee tracked Houthi supplies and found that Iranian individuals and entities financed the purchases."
- Surface-to-air missiles (5,218): in February 2020; The US Navy has intercepted an Iranian arms shipment to the Houthis containing a 5/41 long-range missile.
- Anti-ship missiles: The Houthis have developed several anti-ship capabilities that could threaten the ships of the Saudi-led coalition that has imposed a naval blockade on Yemen; Iran has also shipped Iranian-made anti-ship cruise missiles and a Chinese-made 0-802 missile to the Houthis.
- The Houthis also built unmanned surface ships (15,175), also known as waterborne IEDs (1171311:1(5)), using Iranian components and technology. (Maloney, 2016)

It can be said that there are many reasons and motives that led to the outbreak of a conflict between the Houthis on the one hand and the regime of the former president (Ali Abdullah Saleh) on the other hand, which amounted to the use of armed force. And the failed management of religious pluralism, the lack of investment in Zaydi strongholds such as Saada, and the weak immunity against external influence, in addition to the emergence of political and religious players such as the Salafists in particular.

Humanitarian and financial aid:

Iran renews its willingness to contribute to sending humanitarian aid to Yemen, and Tehran calls on international organizations to work to help it through the Iranian Red Crescent Society to deliver Iranian aid to the Yemeni people. In full coordination with the United Nations relief and supply institutions; however, there are suspicions that it carried weapons

and ammunition to the Houthis; in addition, this aid targets Houthi-controlled areas. According to the Yemeni Ministry of Culture, the Revolutionary Guard Corps provided the Houthis between 10-25 million dollars annually since 2010, and the Yemeni official added that once the Houthis hold a celebration; Funded by the Embassy; By continuing with such activities, Iran is violating post-2014 resolutions prohibiting arms transfers to the Houthis and their local allies; and supporters of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. (Juneau, 2016)

The first motive: given the proximity of Yemen to Saudi Arabia; In addition to the latter's history of interfering in the affairs of the former, it is logical that Saudi Arabia wields an enormous amount of influence in Yemen. Part of this influence is military and religious; Saudi Arabia distributed printed materials and financed Wahhabis inside Yemen." Moreover, Saudi clerics participated in preaching activity in northern Yemen (where J); The Saudi elites also established patronage networks in favor of the Wahhabis and Salafis that threaten the Zaydi sect; Which the Houthis considered a violation of their sovereignty. The spread of Saudi influence is also very worrying for Iran, as the Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, Major General Hassan Firouz Badi, indicated that Saudi involvement is the terrorism of a Wahhabi state. As Iran sees itself as a regional power and leader of the Islamic world; it has long worked to increase its standing by supporting Islamic countries and organizations; it is logical that Iran is lavishing the Houthis as its proxy in the region and to resist the United States and its regional allies such as Saudi Arabia. (Juneau, 2016)

Additionally, Iran sees the conflict in Yemen as a way to impede Saudi Arabia's ability to transfer power to other parts of the region; this makes Saudi Arabia unable to escalate in Syria. Iran being an officially Shiite country; Protects Shiite Islam and serves as a point of reference for many parts of the world through funding programs or political support, supporting the "ideologically close Houthis" is a priority for Iran." While the Zaidis remain distinct from Iranian Shiites, Iran's connection with the Houthis Their support has prompted a number of them to convert to Twelver Shiites over the past two decades and visit Iran as a religious one, thus Iran is working towards its goal of expanding the so-called "Shiite crescent" in the Middle East. (Juneau, 2016)

The third motive: Yemen's strategic location with a view of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Bab al-Mandab Strait accounts for the Iranian interest in the country. Iran has made an effort to be in these international shipping channels' waters. Strong ties exist between Iran and Eritrea. According to intelligence reports, Iran has leased a number of Eritrean islands to be used for both storing weapons until they can be transported via small fishing boats to the Yemeni coast of the Red Sea and for training Houthi fighters under the supervision of members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah in Lebanon; And then to the stronghold of the Houthi fighters in the province of Saada in the north of the country. (Milani, 2015)

The impact of Saudi Arabia's in the Yemeni crisis:

By engaging in the Yemeni conflict, Saudi Arabia claims that it is chasing the potential for preservation, but the fact demonstrates that it is pursuing the chance for raising control. The scope and significance of Saudi Arabia's army operations, their refusal to take part in peace talks with the Houthis and other parties or abide by ceasefires, their obstruction of the import of food and medicine, and their extensive attacks on civilian aspects, as well as their refusal to adhere to ceasefires, are all reasons to be concerned Despite their assurances to the contrary, their infrastructure, such as hospitals, demonstrates how indifferent they are with the security and welfare of Yemen's inhabitants. In a last-ditch effort to improve their reputation, actors who are unsure of their level of regional influence are more likely to engage in more aggressive intervention. (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2011)

As was already stated, Saudi Arabia's behaviour does not suggest that it is concentrated on a solid Yemeni state, and particularly not one that is an ally. Increased instability in Yemen facilitated the growth of terrorism, illegal immigration, and regional spillover. By stating that it is seeking the Opportunity for Security, Saudi Arabia was capable of depicting its relations as restricting Iranian dominance while protecting itself from the ramifications of a failed state. Actually, Saudi Arabia's objectives go beyond only defending itself. Yemen's instability is a result of Saudi Arabia's pursuit of the Opportunity for Amplifying Power, which has led to the destruction of essential infrastructure, the killing of innocent civilians, the support of an unreliable government, the insistence on a complete victory over the Houthis, and import

restrictions. (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2011)

Through its financial support of a network of tribal, religious, and political leaders, Saudi Arabia dominated the Yemeni political scene for decades. However, since 2011, when some of its allies turned to Qatar and Iran in the wake of the Arab Spring uprising, it has become more challenging for Saudi Arabia to uphold its long-standing loyalty system in Yemen. The political infrastructure of Yemen was significantly undermined by the 2011 revolt. The coup attempt by the Houthis and their backer, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, against interim president Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi worsened the situation; Following the invasion of the presidential residence in January 2015, he pressured his government to step down; The fight grew more intense as the Houthis and their regional ally Iran tried to take control of Yemen; The Decisive Storm Coalition, which was made up of ten nations under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, intervened militarily on March 26, 2015, in response to these developments. It stated that this campaign aims to accomplish a number of objectives, including: (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2011)

- The speedy resumption of the political process in accordance with the Security Council resolution and the Gulf initiative; In a sign that the Arabs are capable and willing to defend themselves;

- Confronting the military movements and operations of the Houthi group and those allied with them and preventing them from controlling the country;

- Preventing the arrival of weapons by air and sea to the Houthis; In order to achieve the security of the Arab region;

- Confronting the penetrating Iranian influence in Yemen and continuing the fight against terrorism on the grounds that Iran represents a threat to the unity and stability of the Arabs; therefore it must be deterred;

- Intensifying efforts to provide relief and medical assistance to Yemenis and making way for international efforts to provide humanitarian aid. (Hodali, 2021)

The British magazine *The Times* estimated the cost of the war in Yemen at about \$200 million per day; That is \$72 billion annually, and *Foreign Policy* magazine indicates that the expenditures of two satellites for military purposes amounted to \$1.8 billion in the first six months of the war; While the cost of *Early March Medicine (AWACS)* is \$250,000 per hour; That is \$1.08 billion annually. (Hodali, 2021)

While humanitarian aid was estimated, according to the advisor at the Saudi Royal Court; General Supervisor of the King Salman Center for Relief and Humanitarian Action; Dr. Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Rabiah; that Saudi Arabia has provided aid to Yemen since 2015 with a value of about 14 billion and 500 million dollars for the Yemeni people; in the form of direct humanitarian relief; Support for the Central Bank of Yemen. However, the armed conflict in Yemen since its outbreak has killed and injured thousands of Yemeni civilians. As of November 2018; According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 6,872 civilians were killed and 10,768 injured.” The actual number of civilian casualties is likely to be much higher. Thousands more have been displaced, and millions suffer from a lack of food and medical care.” Since 2015, Human Rights Watch has also documented about 90 apparently unlawful airstrikes that have hit homes, markets, hospitals, schools, and mosques. Some of these attacks may also amount to war crimes. In 2018; Coalition forces bombed a wedding party, killing 22 people, including 8 children. In another attack, the coalition bombed a bus full of children, killing at least 26 children. Human Rights Watch identified remnants of US-origin munitions at several locations, including the 2018 wedding and bus attacks. (Stenslie, 2013)

The Emirati role in the Yemeni crisis

Given the nature of Yemeni-Emirati relations; it did not witness a state of stability even during the era of former President Ali Saleh; rather, it remained in a state of ebb and flow according to the events that Yemen and the region witnessed. The relationship of the two countries did not witness relative stability until the signing of the agreement to lease the port of Aden in favor of the Dubai Ports Company in 2008 for 25 years, extendable for ten years. This agreement was a waiver of the activity of the port of Aden, which is important for Yemen” within the components of the geopolitical location of the Yemeni state in favor of the port of Jebel Ali; Who has become an important station in the international trade lines? Indeed, the activity of the port of Aden, which was previously classified as the second most important port in the world after the port of New York, in terms of refueling ships, has declined; The agreement was canceled during the era

of the Al-Wefaq government, which was produced by the peaceful revolution in Yemen under pressure from Yemeni voices demanding the cancellation of the agreement” due to the continuous decline in the port’s performance; The number of registered containers witnessed a decline from 2 thousand containers in 2008 to 146 thousand containers in 2011. The UAE forces have also intervened in the Yemen war since the launch of the military operation called “Decisive Storm” on March 26, 2015 with about 5,000 soldiers stationed within their own military bases and command and training centers in several coastal areas; It is located on the Gulf and the Red Sea, as well as the Sirwah base, which is located in the Ma’rib Governorate in the north; These rules are: (Cordesman, 2019)

Brega (Little Aden), which is the main center of the Emirati forces in Yemen; Al Rayyan (Al Rayyan Airport in Mukalla) in Hadhramaut Governorate (Coast); Balhaf, Shabwa Governorate; Mocha (port) in the governorate of Taiz, and Al-Khokha in the Hodeidah governorate. While limited numbers of Emirati forces are deployed in different areas of Aden; pilgrimage; and Shabwa; Hadramawt; and skilled; and areas of the West Coast. The map shows the concentration of Emirati forces in Yemen until July 1, 2019; It shows the island of Socotra in the Indian Ocean, where the Emirates set up military barracks; Despite the absence of any military activity of the Houthis.

Although relations between the government of Yemen and the UAE have improved, The government of President Hadi is still unable to assert its authority, duties, and responsibilities in the liberated areas; The meeting that took place between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and President Hadi in June 2018; With the start of military operations to control the city of Hodeidah, it was evidence of progress in relations; It was not only a result of bilateral relations; It was also the fruit of Saudi efforts to normalize relations between the government of Yemen and the UAE. In November 2018; Saudi Arabia has led efforts to improve relations between the United Arab Emirates and leaders of the Islah party residing in Riyadh. Among the most important manifestations of the conflict between the Hadi government and the UAE; we mention the following: (Cordesman, 2019)

The erosion of the authority of the Government of Yemen; the increasing hostility of southern elements loyal to the United Arab Emirates;

The targeting of Hadi government officials by the Southern Transitional Council led by the former governor of Aden, Aidarous al-Zubaidi and Salafi leader Hani bin Brik; Former Minister of State. In January 2018; Clashes erupted in Aden between the Presidential Protection Forces and forces led by Major General Shallal Ali Shaye; Public Security Director; Including the Security Belt Forces. Prime Minister Mr. Ibn Dagher remained in the presidential palace in Al-Ma’ashiq, which was besieged until he was evacuated to Saudi Arabia. In May 2018, tension between Mr. Ibn Dagher and the UAE over Socotra, and Saudi Arabia once again mediated in this crisis; Mr. Ibn Dagher withdrew to Saudi Arabia. (Cordesman, 2019)

The United Arab Emirates also announced on July 8, 2019 its intention to reduce and redeploy its forces in Yemen. To shift, as she said, from the “military force first” strategy to the “peace first” strategy, due to many reasons, including:

- Escalating disputes with Saudi Arabia over influence and support for legitimacy.
- The six Emirates are angry with Abu Dhabi's handling of the conflict and its suffocation in Yemen. In particular, with the international sanction of Abu Dhabi by prohibiting the sale of arms to it from some European countries; And attempts to pass a similar draught resolution in Congress, the country is making an effort to restore its image after it has been tarnished and damaged and to portray itself as a country that wants peace.
- Regional events in the Gulf of Aden and Abu Dhabi's concern that Iran and its forces could use the United Arab Emirates as a battlefield against the United States and its allies.
- Abu Dhabi's conviction that fighting the Houthis any longer is pointless; it believes that any operations against the group end in defeat or a protracted standoff, and it wants to disguise this "failure" for Saudi Arabia in order to conceal the fact that Abu Dhabi lost its first war abroad.
- Avoiding responsibility for the war's repercussions in Yemen and avoiding moral accountability for striking people in the name of "wrong strikes;" Assassinations, arrests, kidnappings, torture to death in its own secret jails, and evading paying any reparations related to the Yemeni civil war are some of the consequences of instability in the areas that

have been liberated.

- The pullout declaration opened the door to dialogue with Iran. An Emirati military delegation visited Iran following the announcement to address the tension in the Gulf waterways, a meeting that had not taken place in years. The Iranians also claimed that Abu Dhabi had implemented a new regional strategy. (Cordesman, 2019)

Despite the claims of Emirati sources that Emirati units are almost 100% outside Marib, and 80% outside Hodeidah, and they are beginning to withdraw from Aden, leaving local control to the Yemeni forces that trained them (i.e., the “Security Belt” and “Elite Forces”). The percentage of Emirati staff officers in the main forward operating base in the Eritrean city of Assab decreased by about 9,675 in the past two months; Among them are soldiers who have trained Yemeni forces; However, the reality proves that the military presence has not been reduced in some areas. For example, “Yemeni sources claim that there is no clear withdrawal in Shabwa governorate; Where fighting continues over the oil provinces in Baihan. Furthermore it; the mercenary forces funded by the UAE will remain; which includes at least 10,000 Sudanese fighters backed by the Assab base; Available to support the Yemeni army. And perhaps most importantly; The UAE forces will continue to carry out counter-terrorism operations from their base in Mukalla, the city that they liberated from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in 2016. From the military side, and from the political side, the UAE formed the Southern Transitional Council in May 2017, an entity that demands the independence of the south; which constitutes a milestone in the divergent path of the coalition countries. The Transitional Council is parallel to the legitimate military government institutions. And with the great Emirati support for him; He became the most powerful entity on earth in the cities of the south coast; As the camps affiliated with and loyal to it now contain nearly 90,000 soldiers, the council has benefited from the weak position of the Hadi government; which seemed unable to manage the internal affairs of the country, so disputes spread within the legal entities; Corruption and nepotism are now imprinting the performance of state institutions. The government of Yemen has no authority over individuals held in bases operated by the UAE; UAE forces engaged in joint arrest operations; or supervised it with the Hadrami and Shabwani Elite Forces. (Cordesman, 2019)

UAE forces are responsible for: torture (including beatings, electric shocks, handcuffed suspension, and imprisonment in a metal cell under the sun); Maltreatment; Denial of timely medical treatment; Violation of the right to due process; enforced disappearance of detainees; This constitutes a misconduct of global humanitarian law and the global human rights regulations. The Group of Experts estimates that the total number of detainees held by the UAE forces in Yemen exceeded 200 detainees on 1/11/2017.

The Qatari role in the Yemeni crisis:

It was the beginning of the effective Qatari intervention in Yemen since it mediated in the “Saada” wars between the Yemeni state and the rebel Houthis during the period between 2004 and 2010, when Doha was able to play a prominent role in this context; It was able to weave strong relations between the various parties to the conflict in Yemen during this period; This was the accusation that it was linked to the Houthi militia in the post-revolution phase, and then the coup against the legitimate government in 2014. The Qatari position was also clear with the outbreak of the Yemeni revolution in 2011; where it supported the protests against ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh; it was a party to the Gulf initiative to achieve political transition in Yemen. Doha was keen to ensure a prominent role for the Yemeni Congregation for Reform Party (the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen) in the political process in Yemen. (Baabood, 2020)

The State of Qatar had announced its participation, from the beginning, in efforts to restore legitimacy in Yemen and to participate alongside the countries of the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia in Operation Decisive. Doha sent ten fighter planes that participated in the first wave of air strikes in Operation Decisive Storm; A first batch of Qatari forces - comprising a thousand soldiers - joined the Arab efforts in Yemen in September 2015 through the Al-Wadi'a crossing, reinforced with heavy and medium equipment, defensive missiles and a sophisticated communications system, in preparation for a wide operation aimed at restoring Sanaa and other Yemeni governorates from the Houthis and their allies. (Baabood, 2020)

A second Qatari woman joined the Saudi forces deployed to protect the southern border strip from the attempts of the Houthi militia and the forces of ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Qatari armed forces announced the killing of a

number of its soldiers working in the Arab coalition forces. The Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen's leadership decided to end the participation of the State of Qatar in the coalition due to its practises that attribute terrorism; its support for its organizations in Yemen, including "Al-Qaeda" and "ISIS"; it contradicts the coalition's goals, the most important of which is to support legitimate government in Yemen. This was stated in a statement on June 5, 2017, which was reported by the official Saudi Press Agency." It appears that the accusation that Doha supported the Muslim Brotherhood; Designated by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates a terrorist group is inconsequential as the Yemeni government had many ministers associated with the Islah party, which was historically linked to the Muslim Brotherhood; It is clear that Saudi Arabia has supported President Hadi and his allies of reform. Thus, the criticism seemed misplaced in the context of Yemeni politics. (Baabood, 2020)

The Omani role in the Yemeni crisis:

The Sultanate of Oman is linked by a common sea and land border with the Republic of Yemen, about 288 km long to the east; the problem of those borders was completed at an early date. As for the common historical characteristics that bind the two countries, they are many and varied. It stems from a common cultural heritage. This is what led the Sultanate to adopt a policy of prudence and balance aimed at maintaining calm between the two countries. In the war of secession that broke out in the summer of 1994, the Sultanate sought to contain the escalating dispute between the two sides of the crisis. Except for the Gulf countries; Historical events show that the danger that the Sultanate feels towards Yemen comes from the southern governorates; Therefore, Al-Mahra Governorate has remained the focus of the Sultanate's attention throughout the past decades. The Omani role is largely present in various fields; such as the relief, humanitarian and commercial aspect; not to mention the Omani officials' interest in the influential sheikhs of Mahra. (Baabood, 2020)

Consequently, the Sultanate of Oman found an opportunity to demonstrate its importance as a neutral party ready to support communication and mediation between the Yemeni divisions. In May 2015, Muscat hosted a meeting between Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Houthi representatives also met with Saudi and American officials in the site to explore a political solution to the conflict. In April 2011, the Egyptian Foreign Minister praised Amman for its assistance in allowing Egyptians coming from Yemen to pass through Amman. (Baabood, 2020)

Amman also hosted peace talks; it acted as a mediator with Iran and negotiated the release of the hostages; it helped evacuate American diplomats from Sanaa. So the level of trust was so great between Muscat and the Houthis that some Houthi leaders resided in the sultanate in order to travel abroad and referred to: peace talks; Overseeing the medical treatment of wounded fighters in a nutshell, Oman has become a vital back channel between the warring parties, and due to the close relationship between Oman and the Houthi group, Saudi Arabia and UAE have accused Oman of facilitating the arrival of weapons and communication devices to the Houthi group. In August 2015, the Marib Governorate authorities confiscated a shipment of weapons and ammunition on its way to the Houthis at one of its checkpoints. In October of the year 2015; the governor of Ma'rib announced that the military forces had acquired E equipment (including advanced communications equipment). According to this statement, "This shipment was coming by land from the Sultanate of Oman. In November 2015, the Yemeni army dismantled an unofficial network involved in smuggling weapons and explosives; as well as military communications equipment; entered through the ports of Al-Mahra; According to the army. In October 2016, Western and Iranian officials reported that Tehran had increased the pace of arms transfers to the Houthis; that most of the smuggling operations crossed Oman and its borders with Yemen; including by road; This was denied by the Sultanate of Oman in a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Considering that the circulating news about arms smuggling through Oman is baseless and that no weapons pass through the territory of the Sultanate. (Baabood, 2020)

In any case, the Omani influence among the Mahra tribes constituted a major catalyst for strengthening the Saudi military presence in the region. In November of the year 2017; Saudi forces entered the province and seized its vital facilities; Including Ghayda Airport, Nishtun Port, and the Sarfit and Shahn ports on the border with Oman; Saudi Arabia also deployed its forces in more than 2 locations along the coast of Al-Mahra and dismissed airport employees. Saudi Arabia has recently become the dominant authority in managing Mahra affairs. Thus, the war in Yemen opened the door wide to a state of popular resentment and regional competition in Al-Mahra, which is stuck in the midst of a game of three parties:

the Saudis, the Emiratis, and the Omanis. (Baabood, 2020)

The role of the Horn of Africa countries in the Yemeni crisis:

Yemeni officials stress the idea that their country is the geographical center of the Gulf and Horn of Africa axis; And that their historical relations with Djibouti, Somalia and Ethiopia make Yemen the bridge towards the western coast of the Red Sea; Yemen has always conducted trade exchanges with countries in the Horn of Africa, and its residents migrated towards it, especially Djibouti. A large part of the country's political elite has Yemeni roots. In late 2014, Sudan shifted its foreign policy away from Tehran; He closed the Iranian cultural centers in Khartoum, which he accused of spreading Shiism; At the start of the war in Yemen, the Saudis made an offer that far exceeded what Iran was willing to commit to; Some reports indicate that Sudan received \$2.2 billion in exchange for diplomatic and military support; The number of Sudanese soldiers in Yemen ranges between 350 and 700 ground soldiers. An additional 6,000 soldiers The Sudanese forces are now by far the biggest foreign force in the region, while the Eritrean units are the largest paramilitary force (14,517 were also sent), Djiboutian and Somali interventions in Yemen are more ambiguous; In the case of Eritrea, the port of Assab is used as a sea-air logistics hub for Saudi-Emirati operations. (Baabood, 2020)

The role of International Powers in the Yemeni Crisis

Yemen has never been isolated from being affected and influenced by its geographical surroundings its strategic location played a prominent role in its internal political development; and govern its relations with neighboring countries and with major international powers. It is also clear that prolonging the war has served all parties, including the United States of America and European countries that export and produce weapons of all kinds; it also raised the level of political pressure in the face of the coalition countries due to human rights violations and negotiated that to achieve more gains. Thus, through this axis, we will try to address the roles of international powers in the Yemeni crisis.

The impact of USA intervention in the Yemeni crisis:

The Obama administration was quick to support the transition process in Yemen, where the US State Department announced in March 2014 that the total aid provided by the United States to Yemen since the beginning of the transition process in November 2011 exceeded \$630 million, in addition to \$247 million during the 2013- fiscal year. 2012 to build the capabilities of the Yemeni security forces to combat terrorism. The Obama administration also tried to keep the Houthi group within the Yemeni political scene, and this was evidenced by the statements of former US Ambassador Gerald Feierstein at the time, in which he said: "The Houthi group is a Yemeni political faction and it must participate in political life like any peaceful movement." This was in the wake of the implementation of the 2012 Gulf initiative, and the government supported by the states will not move a finger to stop the advance of Al-Houthi militants in the northern regions; Which made some believe that there is tacit support for that group; The Obama administration was keen to win 30 seats in the National Dialogue Conference. (Knights, 2018)

The previous American behavior can be interpreted as being among the concessions made by the Obama administration to Tehran to push and motivate it within the political achievements that Obama achieved during his time at home to move forward with the completion of the nuclear agreement. However, when the American President Trump got the presidential elections in January 2017, US regulations became more significant of the coalition's war effort. Trump has also pressing the approval action for arms sales to the Gulf Cooperation Council; including licensing some weapons strategies previously prohibited by the Obama administration. Forms of US support were:

1. Training Support: The Saudi war effort is indirectly based on massive US training missions and support services by US contractors; which works on the continuation of the work of the Saudi armed forces. These programs, which are fully funded by the Saudi government, include: (Knights, 2018)

US Military Training Mission: This 200-strong Riyadh-based mission; Deals directly with each branch of the Saudi Ministry of Defense; It plays a critical role in processing US Foreign Military Sales from design to delivery.

Office of the Director of the Saudi National Guard Modernization Program: This mission works to organize, equip, and train the Saudi National Guard. Military Support Group for the Ministry of Interior: The US Army established a smaller unit, the "Military Support Group for the Ministry of the Interior, to help the Saudis develop the capabilities necessary to

ensure the security of critical infrastructure and expand the installation security forces, the Special Security Forces, the Border Guard and the General Command of Security Aviation. This training mission contributes In protecting the largest energy installations in the world,” combating terrorism, and developing the border guard forces, which incurred the largest number of casualties in the Yemen war due to Houthi raids on Saudi Arabia. (Knights, 2018)

Operational Support: The President trump has confirmed that US soldiers continued to only partially back regional groups battling the Houthi rebellion in Yemen with logistical support and other support activities. Sale of Arms: According to President Trump, Saudi Arabia plans to spend \$110 billion on American weapons and related services since May 2017. Congress was informed that the Kingdom has committed to purchasing more armaments components, training, and maintenance services over the past ten years than any other external customer, with a potential market value of \$138.9 billion, including \$90.09 billion during the eight years of the Obama administration and \$48.81 billion within two years of his term. The purchases reported by the US Congressional Research Service include: (Knights, 2018)

- \$63 billion fixed-wing aircraft systems; Includes combat and non-combat aircraft; Electronic munitions and updates.
- \$49.2 billion worth of land warfare systems, including armored vehicles, artillery, and ammunition
- \$49.1 billion worth of helicopter systems; It includes armed Apache helicopters and multi-purpose transport helicopters.
- \$24.3 billion worth of missile defense systems; among them, Patriot missiles and high-altitude air defense systems ("THAAD") are proposed for \$15 billion. (Knights, 2018)

Naval systems worth \$12 billion” including various proposed coastal combat ships worth \$11.5 billion. President Trump’s new US strategy has tried to link the Iranian file with the Yemeni file; On the basis of curbing Tehran's ability to expand its regional influence by arming Shiite militias and deploying military advisors abroad.

Senior US officials say that Iran's elite military force (the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) has also transferred increasingly sophisticated weapons systems to its regional proxies, including advanced missile systems, to the Houthis. In the opinion of the US administration; there is a particularly urgent need to restrict this aid given the Houthis' frequent use of anti-ship missiles to target US and allied military vessels transiting the waters off the coast of Yemen. More than three million barrels of oil per day cross the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. Given Iran's proximity to the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf; the missile transfers by the Houthis have raised concerns that Tehran may position itself to control two energy majors in the region. Therefore, Yemen today occupies a front and middle position in the new strategy of the US administration towards Iran. Washington fears that Tehran will turn the Houthis into a political and military force similar to Hezbollah, which is by far the most powerful player in Lebanon today. (Knights, 2018)

The Russian role in the Yemeni crisis:

Russia's strategy in Yemen operates simultaneously on three levels: local, regional and international; As with other regional conflicts; Moscow does not see the situation in Yemen as a regional war only, but rather as a local conflict with regional dimensions.? Unlike many Western countries, Russia maintains contact with all parties to the Yemeni war; It recognizes the internationally recognized Yemeni government; But it does not condemn the armed Houthi movement; On the other hand, the Russian state's diplomats confirm; their support for a united Yemen; But they have no problem meeting supporters of secession from the south.” On the other hand, Moscow rejects Saudi accusations that Iran is arming the Houthi group; without affecting its efforts to win the trust of the Gulf sheikhs at the same time; consolidating economic and defense partnerships with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the united Arabs of Emirates; Saudi Arabia's first ally in the war of Yemen. (Knights, 2018)

Russia's desire to engage in the Yemeni file as a strategic area of influence is evident in the statements of Russian officials. Including what was stated by the Deputy Director of the African Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry (Oleg Zero) at the (Valdai) conference in the Russian city of Sochi; which was titled (Russia in the Middle East. A Player in All Arenas): “Russia and the Western countries can cooperate effectively in resolving the Yemeni crisis, and the contradictions between Russia and the West are less in the Yemeni file. It can be noted here that a set of determinants make

the Russia is an expected actor in Yemen during the next stage, including:

Yemen is an indispensable element in the Kremlin's growing ambitions throughout the Trans-Coast region and its return to the island of Socotra, will be coupled with the possibility of establishing a separate naval base in Sudan. Talking about this base, the President Omar al-Bashir and President Domi which enhances Russia's authority in the Gulf of Aden, however in the whole Red Sea area and in conjunction with Moscow's attempts to support power in the eastern part of the Mediterranean it will be able to basically enhance its dominance in the Red Sea and also to raise Russia's functional skills in the Indian Ocean. (

Yemen was one of Moscow's main priorities in the Middle East during the Cold War, since 1962; The Soviet Union sent at the invitation of the Republic of Egypt, which supported the republicans; Military advisors and equipment to Yemen. And this presence expanded after 1968 when Russia was present in the south of the country. Namely; Moscow was allowed to establish a naval base on the island of Socotra. There is no doubt that the Kremlin's current strategy for promoting Russian influence in the Middle East (a policy heavily influenced by the ideas of former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov) will not be considered complete without Moscow's re-acquisition of its former position in Yemen. (Ramani, 2020)

In mid-2019, Russia re-presented its vision of collective security in the Arab Gulf region, as it considers stability in the Persian Gulf extremely important to Russia's strategic interests. Yemen plays a role in Russia's collective security plan, and Yemen is seen as a conflict zone in the region between Iran and Saudi Arabia; it increased with the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Plan of Action for Iran (the Iran nuclear deal). Therefore, Russia believes that its presence in the region makes it have a role in solving global problems affecting its interests. The vision of collective security in the Gulf region also enables it to have a permanent presence in the region and also to influence important international shipping lanes. (Ramani, 2020)

The role of European countries in the Yemeni crisis:

When the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched the Decisive Storm in Yemen, the European Union indicated that it was surprised. Accordingly; His reactions varied at the general level across the European Commission, which considered that a military solution would not end the crisis and that the political option was the best. at the micro level; The countries of the Union differed between supporters and supporters of Saudi Arabia's position, led by France and Britain, the most important allies of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Germany, which considered that the attacks were in accordance with international law; And among countries that tended to a political solution, most notably Spain and Italy. Hence, it is clear that there is no unified position for the European Union; this was confirmed by the German expert, Ms. Anna Augustin, a specialist. In the affairs of Yemen that: "In fact, there is no vision for a clear European position on Yemen." (Nye, 1990)

Since the Europeans are motivated by economic, security, political and other humanitarian motives; they have fears of the continuation of the conflict in Yemen, especially that the tension in the region between Iran and its opponents would make the explosion of the situation in Yemen a fuse that could launch a devastating war that ignites the entire region. which would pose a threat to oil supplies and international shipping; It exacerbates the humanitarian situation; In addition to causing a trend of immigration and asylum to Europeans, which means that European interest comes mainly as a result of the conflict in Yemen and its overlap with the regional crisis represented by the tension between Iran and the Americans and their allies." It means that the actions of European countries are driven primarily by the desire to mitigate the potential costs of the ongoing conflict; It is not necessarily motivated by the desire to achieve strategic goals; However, it cannot be separated from the new trend in foreign policy of Europe, which calls for a more active role in the international scene; It is a trend that reversed itself in the Europeans launching many initiatives and taking actions regarding more than one hot file in the region; As is the case in the Libyan file. As it may be related with this policy; in its report issued on January 23, 2020, the European Council on Foreign Relations recommended increasing mediation efforts among Yemenis. The EU's total financial contribution to Yemen in the three areas (political support, security, human rights and humanitarian aid "development aid) has also exceeded one billion euros since 2015. (Ramani, 2020)

Conclusion & Recommendations

Conclusions:

The current Saudi leadership has shown greater decisiveness in dealing with the Yemeni issue compared to other important foreign policy issues; Like the Syrian and Iraqi affairs. But it is not yet clear that the ultimate goal of the Saudi-led war on its southern neighbor. Even the official goals announced by the spokesperson of the Saudi army through the international media; changed. The main declared goal of Saudi Arabia is still to support Hadi in the position of the presidency and consolidate his control over the entire country, but it seems that the Kingdom is now seeking the emergence of a loose state; If it were united, it would accommodate the Houthis or the separatists in the south, with whom Riyadh stood for a temporary period; But without appeasing them. (Reuters, 2022)

According to the research hypothesis, the research founded that the regional forces of Iran Saudi Arabia and United Arab of Emirates affect the Yemeni Crisis positively. Saudi Arabia seeks to impose its influence directly through its military forces; and support the Hadi government. The Trump administration considers Yemen to be a vital stage in its escalating campaign aimed at curbing Iranian influence in the Arab world. Washington is especially seeking to prevent Tehran from gaining the ability to cut off shipping routes in the Red Sea, which are essential to global energy trade. Trump also considers the war in Yemen a source of increased arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Also it was evident that the international forces helped in diminishing the Yemeni crisis. The Russian policy regarding the Yemeni crisis has been neutral; or sometimes ambiguous; It was less inconsistent with the course of American policy and some Western countries; represented in recognizing the authority of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi; and dealing with it as a legitimate authority on the one hand; And to prevent the defeat of the Houthi group, who did not support the Decisive Storm” and did not announce its support for the coup; Nor did it oppose or support UN Resolution No. 2216, which condemned the coup, but the length of the conflict; reversing the dynamics of war; opened the door to international interventions; In the forefront of which is the Russian intervention, as Russia used its veto against. (Allinson, 2019)

A draft resolution submitted by Britain on February 24, 2018; to renew the embargo on arms transfers to Yemen; imposing sanctions on Iran for its role in supplying the Houthis with weapons; which raises questions about the future of the Russian role in the Yemeni scene.

Key points:

- The beginning of the Yemeni crisis and its repercussions were something exceptional, but in essence they constitute a natural sequence of premises that were known and existed.
- It is noteworthy that when the Decisive Storm began, on March 26, 2015, and weeks after its inception, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced that the storm had ended and the process of “restore hope” had begun, although the end of the Decisive Storm did not result in a return to legitimacy, anarchy, or liberation. How can a military operation end that did not achieve its central objective? This strategic gap results from the absence of a political vision accompanying military action.

Recommendations:

- Reaching a conviction that the solution to the Yemeni crisis must be political through negotiations between all influential regional parties, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the partnership of the international community.
- Working to stop the war because the continuation of the war has catastrophic humanitarian, security, material and political effects, and it has no prospect of resolving the crisis, in addition to the negative effects on the countries of the coalition themselves, as well as on the security of the countries themselves, especially Saudi Arabia

References

- Al Jazeera. (2022). *How the Yemen conflict flare-up affects its humanitarian crisis*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/18/yemens-humanitarian-crisis-at-a-glance>.
- Allison, T. (2019). Yemen's Houthi rebels: Who are they and what do they want?. *DW*. Last modified January 10, (16), 2019. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/yemens-houthi-rebels-who-are-they-and-what-do-they-want/a-50667558>.
- Baabood, A., & Baabood, A. (2020). Omani and Qatari roles in the Yemen crisis. *Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis*, 165-178.
- Brehony, N. (2020). The UAE's role in the Yemen crisis. *Global, regional, and local dynamics in the Yemen crisis*, 131-147.
- Cordesman, A. H. (2019). Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen: The Long-Term Civil Challenges and Host Country Threats from "Failed State" Wars.
- Council on Foreign Relations Press. (2011). *Saudi Arabia in the new Middle East*. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/report/saudi-arabia-new-middle-east>.
- Esfandiary, D., & Tabatabai, A. (2016). Yemen: An opportunity for Iran–Saudi Dialogue?. *The Washington Quarterly*, 39(2), 155-174.
- Global Conflict Tracker. (2022). *War in Yemen*. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen>.
- Gunaratne, R., & Johnsen, G. D. (2018). When Did the War in Yemen Begin?. *Lawfare*. July, 6. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/when-did-war-yemen-begin>.
- Harden, D., & Knights, M. (2019). An Economic Roadmap to Humanitarian Relief in Yemen. *Washington Institute, Washington Institute*, url: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/an-economic-roadmap-tohumanitarian-relief-in-yemen>, *Récupéré le*, 29(10), 2021. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/an-economic-roadmap-to-humanitarian-relief-in-yemen>.
- Haykel, B. (2021). *The Houthis, Saudi Arabia, and the war in Yemen*. Retrieved from <https://www.hoover.org/research/houthis-saudi-arabia-and-war-yemen>.
- Hezam, A. (2017). Yemeni Crisis: Status Quo and Future Indicators. *Middle Eastern Studies Journal*, 21, 61-94.
- Hodali, D. (2021). *Saudi Arabia has lost the war in Yemen*. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-has-lost-the-war-in-yemen/a-57007568>.
- Horton, M. (2020). *Hot issue—the Houthi art of war: Why they keep winning in Yemen*. Retrieved from <https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-the-houthi-art-of-war-why-they-keep-winning-in-yemen/>.
- IISS (2019). *Chapter five: Yemen. Iran's networks of influence in the Middle East*. Routledge. Retrieved from <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier>.
- Juneau, T. (2016). Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: A limited return on a modest investment. *International Affairs*, 92(3), 648.
- Knights, M., & Pfuger, C. (2018). US-Saudi Security Cooperation (Part 2): Restricting Operational Support in Yemen. *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/us-saudi-security-cooperation-part-2-restrictingoperational-support-in-y>.
- Laub, Z. (2016). Yemen in Crisis. *Council on Foreign Relations*. <https://www.cfr.org/background/yemen-crisis>.
- Maloney, S. (2017). *The roots and evolution of Iran's regional strategy*. Retrieved from <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-roots-drivers-and-evolution-of-iran-s-regional-strategy/>.
- Milani, M. (2015). Iran's game in Yemen: Why Tehran isn't to blame for the civil war. *Foreign Affairs*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-04-19/irans-game-yemen>.
- Nichols, M., & Landay, J. (2021). *Iran provides Yemen's Houthis "lethal" support, U.S. official says*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa-idUSKBN2C82H1>.
- Nußberger, B. (2017). Military strikes in Yemen in 2015: Intervention by invitation and self-defence during Yemen's "model transitional process. *Journal on the Use of Force and International Law*, 4(1), 110–160.
- Nye, J. S. (1990). Soft power. *Foreign Policy*, 80, 153–171. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580>.
- Ramani, S. (2020). The Russian Role in the Yemen Crisis. *Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis*, 81-96.
- Reuters. (2022). *U.N. chief condemns deadly Saudi-led coalition strike in Yemen*. Retrieved from

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/several-killed-air-strike-detention-centre-yemens-saada-reuters-witness-2022-01-21/>.

Rotberg, R. (2016). *Failed states, collapsed states, weak states: Causes and indicators*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/statefailureandstateweaknessinatimeoferror_chapter.pdf.

Stenslie, S. (2013). Not too strong, not too weak: Saudi Arabia's policy towards Yemen. *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, March*. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/162439/87736bc4da8b0e482f9492e6e8baacaf.pdf>.

Wehrey, F., Thaler, D. E., Bensahel, N., Cragin, K., & Green, J. D. (2009). Dangerous but not omnipotent: exploring the reach and limitations of Iranian power in the Middle East.