

The Diplomacy of the Ottoman Empire in Dealing with the Egyptian Crisis (1248- 1256 AH / 1832-1840 AD) "A Study in the Light of the Ottoman Documents"

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Abstract

This study aims to shed light on the diplomacy of the Ottoman Empire in dealing with the Egyptian crisis 1832-1840 in the light of the Ottoman documents, i.e., relying on the Ottoman documents (the three reports: internal, external and excellent) and other printed sources. This also includes Ottoman diplomacy in the wake of the defeat of the Ottoman army in the Battle of Nasaybiin in July 1839 AD, the European diplomatic position in the wake of the defeat of the Ottoman army after the Battle of Nasaybiin and the decline of the activity of Ottoman diplomacy in the late Egyptian crisis. The study concludes that the Ottoman Empire resorted to diplomacy when it found that the military superiority of the Egyptian forces became a reality on the ground.

Keywords: Ottoman diplomacy, the Ottoman empire, European countries, the Egyptian crisis, Ottoman documents.

دبلوماسية الدولة العثمانية في التعامل مع الأزمة المصرية (1248-1256هـ/ 1832-1840م دراسة في ضوء الوثائق العثمانية

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ملخص

تهدف هذه الدراسة إلىلقاء الضوء على دبلوماسية الدولة العثمانية في التعامل مع الأزمة المصرية (1832-1840) بدراسة في ضوء الوثائق العثمانية، وتأتي أهمية الدراسة كونها تعتمد على الوثائق العثمانية، وكذلك المصادر العثمانية والأجنبية المطبوعة. وعالجت الدراسة تعريف الدبلوماسية، ودبلوماسية الدولة العثمانية منذ بداية الأزمة، ونشاطها في أعقاب معركة قونية سنة 1248هـ/ 1832م، وما تبعها من تطورات حتى هزيمة الجيش العثماني في معركة نرب تموز 1839م، وتراجع النشاط الدبلوماسي العثماني أواخر الأزمة المصرية. وخلصت الدراسة أنّ الدولة العثمانية لجأت للدبلوماسية نتيجة التفوق العسكري لقوات محمد علي في الشام والأناضول، واستخدامها كسلاح جديد للحصول على مساندة الدول الأوروبية. الكلمات الدالة: الدبلوماسية العثمانية، الدولة العثمانية، الدول الأوروبية، الأزمة المصرية، الوثائق العثمانية.

Introduction

Diplomacy is a Greek word derived from the word (diploma). It means the official document issued by political heads (Abd al-Rahman 2006). Diplomacy is a process of representation and negotiation that takes place between countries and deals with their relations, transactions, and interests (Abu Abah, 2009, p. 11). Diplomacy in its modern sense means a set of concepts, rules, procedures, decrees, institutions and international norms that regulate relations between states, international organizations and diplomatic representatives (ibid., p. 13-14). A country uses diplomacy to facilitate its relations with other parties and implement its foreign policy (Mansour 2017). The diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the European countries were characterized, in the beginning, by dealing, exchange and representation on a small scale. Afterwards, they are extended to the establishment of diplomatic and consular representation between the Ottomans and European countries. Such countries witnessed the exchange of embassies and consulates due to what is known as the foreign privileges granted to the foreigners by the Ottoman Empire (Omar 2000, p.12-13).

The beginning of diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and European countries dates back to the reign of Sultan Muhammad Shalabi I in 1408 AD. The first relation was with the government of Milan in the second half of the fifteenth century AD, followed with Poland in 1475 AD, Russia in 1497 CE, and France in 1525 CE and England In 1583 AD, and the Netherlands in 1612 AD. Later, the Ottoman Empire continued to strengthen diplomatic relations with European countries as it increased the exchange of ambassadors with these countries and established its relations with them (Mansour 2017, p.2801). The direction of the High Gate (*Al-Baab Al-'aali*) was towards the necessity of sending scientific scholarships to Europe to study and learn about the experiences of European societies, which led to the opening of a formal window by adopting important permanent Ottoman embassies in 1793 CE in European capitals, the first of which was London in King George III (1738-1820) (Vanadolina 1999, p.85).

The importance of Ottoman diplomacy:

The importance of the Ottoman-European relations emerged during the reign of Sultan Mustafa III (1757-1774 AD). The Greatest Sader was the one who received the members of diplomatic missions (Kinzov, 2005, p. 747). With the increase in foreign relations, the need for experts and translators who in turn provided the state with political, historical, social and religious information on all European countries became urgent (Kinzov, 2005, p. 747). The circumstances experienced by the Ottoman Empire especially with respect to the change from a state of strength to weakness made it aspire to establish diplomatic relations with Europe aiming at protecting itself from the weakness that it had reached. This also would benefit it from the civilized development that Europe had reached at the time. Furthermore, this made the Ottoman Empire keep pace with modernity while preserving originality, and this openness affected the state. However, this was the beginning of European intervention and penetration into the Ottoman Empire (Sudrik 2000, p.141-145).

The Europeans called Salim III (1761 - 1807 AD) a "reformer", the leader of the Liberals and an ally of Europe. During his reign, the British and French experts spread throughout the Ottoman Empire, as he was the first Sultan to introduce the system of permanent Ottoman embassies in European countries, hence these ambassadors could explore the aspects of European progress and transfer them to the Ottoman Empire. The first Ottoman embassy was opened in the capitals of European countries in London in 1793 AD, followed by the opening of embassies in Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and other European cities ((Mansour 2017, p. 2794-2795).

The increase in the diplomatic missions of European countries by the Ottoman Empire was a focal point in the history of the Ottoman Empire. That is because the European countries took advantage of their diplomatic relations with it, and then resorted to political (diplomatic) consultations along with military preparations after the Ottoman Empire went through a weak phase (Abu Aba 2016). The diplomacy of the Ottoman Empire differs from one stage to another in regulating its relations as well as the nature of the situations that occur with other countries. Therefore, the objectives of this study revolve around analyzing the Ottoman state's diplomacy in dealing with the Egyptian crisis, replying on Ottoman documents and relevant sources and references. To achieve the goal of the study, the researcher followed the descriptive historical analysis. The importance of the study lies in its implications to conduct more academic research on the nature, conditions and course of Ottoman state diplomacy

with European countries.

Second: The Ottoman Empire's diplomacy towards the Egyptian crisis at the beginning of the year 1248 AH / 1832 CE:

The successive defeats of the Ottoman army in the Levant were evident for the Egyptian army. They led the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839 AD) move towards diplomacy, so as solve the crisis, as another weapon in his hand to obtain political gains and an alternative for war to persuade European countries to stand by his side politically in order to put pressure on Muhammad Ali to accept reconciliation with the Ottoman Empire.¹

Meanwhile, Sultan Mahmud received a Russian offer made by Caesar Nicola First (1825-1855 AD) to provide assistance to the Sultan. However, the latter was reluctant to accept it, fearing the dangers of Russian interference in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire² and to curb its ambitions to control Istanbul which was the most important center to control over the world hen. Any control over Istanbul was necessary to control the straits (the Bosphorus and, the Dardanelles) and all the shores of the Black Sea.³

In light of the fears of Sultan Mahmud II of the dangers of Russian interference in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, he looked to Britain to stand with him and asked Palmerston⁴, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, to support and support him against Pasha of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, after the defeats of his forces in the Levant. The British Minister of Foreign Affairs was convinced with the fact that the Ottoman forces were not able to withstand the well-prepared and modernized Egyptian forces, (Vendolina, p. 88-90; Marriott, op.cit, p. 232-234). But Palmerston was cautious about that and because of his conviction that the Ottoman position was a loser in front of the Egyptian forces, he therefore refrained from entering into any alliance with the Ottoman Empire.⁵ Despite the British rejection of any alliance with the Ottoman Empire, the latter rushed to send Namik Pasha on a diplomatic mission to Britain to persuade it in a joint alliance, but Britain refused to restrict itself to any written agreement with the Ottoman Empire, so the Sultan's envoy returned after his mission had failed.⁶

In the wake of the British rejection, the Sultan asked his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Rashid Pasha⁷ to work towards pursuing diplomatic activity and intensifying it to resolve the crisis, albeit temporarily, to avoid losing more Ottoman lands in the wake of the sweeping progress of the Egyptian forces in the Levant.⁸ Meanwhile, the Greater Gate sent a note, to the European and Russian diplomatic missions accredited to Istanbul, accusing Muhammad Ali Pasha and his son Ibrahim⁹ that they do not want peace and continue threatening the state. The Great Gate called on friendly European countries to cut all diplomatic relations with them.¹⁰

Despite the diplomatic effort carried out by the Ottoman Empire and the provocative propaganda against the ruler of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, in order to put more pressure on him and pit the European powers against him, it mobilized all of its military capabilities in preparation for the next stage, which might be military.¹¹ On the diplomatic level, the Ottoman Empire accepted the Russian assistance, which made the British diplomat Palmerston send a memorandum of

¹ See Humayun Line, Dossiye No. 353, document No. 19861, 1247 AH / 1831 CE. See also Research Portfolios, Portfolio No. 231, Abdeen, 18 Jumada II, 1247 AH / 1831AD and Epicarius (1910).

² Hat Hamaun ,Misir Meselesi,Dosya ,No.365,Gomlek NO,201176,1248,p.1

³ Marriott, The Eastern Question An Historical Study In European Diplomacy, (Oxford; At Larendon press (1940, p. 232).

⁴ Palmerston: A famous British diplomat, born in 1784 AD, held various political positions, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs between the years of my age (1830-1851 AD), and played a major role in British politics during the period of Egyptian control of the Levant. See: William Benton, The New Encyclopedia Britatannica, vol.13, (USA): International copyright Union, 1971), p. 187-190.

⁵ Humayun Line, Dosia No. 360, document No. 20057, dated 1248 AH / 1832 CE.

⁶ Humayun Line, Dosia No. 360, document No. 20057, dated 1248 AH / 1832 CE.

⁷ Muhammad Rashid Pasha was born in Istanbul and educated in its religious schools. He held many government positions, including an ambassador for several times, a grandeur, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had a role in the reforms. See also Al-Nuaimi (1990, p. 18).

⁸ Misir Meselsi ,Dosya ,No.20196,1248,p.29.

⁹ Ibrahim Pasha: 1790-1848 CE Ibn Muhammad Ali Pasha Adoption, the Commander of the Egyptian campaign against the Levant in 1247 AH / 1831 AD, assumed power in Egypt in 1264 AH / 1848 CE, died in Cairo and was buried there. See Khair al-Din Al-Zarkali, Al-Alam (Dictionary of Translations), Part One, First Edition, (Beirut: Dar Al-Alam for Millions, 1979 AD), p. 70.

¹⁰ Hat Hamaun,Misir Meselsi,Dosya No,378,Gomlek 20502,1249

¹¹ Humayun Line, File No. 20196, Istanbul, Istanbul Archives, 29 Dhu al-Hijjah 1248 AH / 1832 CE.

protest against the aforementioned alliance between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, and tried all available means to foil it (Hurewitz 1956, p. 105). The British rejection of the alliance with the Ottoman Empire was governed by several factors, including the successive defeats of the Ottoman army against the Egyptian army in the battles it fought on the ground as well as the significance of its rejection of the Ottoman-Russian alliance because such an alliance was a greater opportunity to increase the Russian interference in the affairs of the state. This would affect its interests inside Ottoman Empire (Hajjar, p. 106-108).

It can be said that the Ottoman diplomacy did not succeed in persuading the European powers to take a unified position against the Egyptian interference in the Levant despite the unremitting efforts made by the Ottoman Empire since the beginning of the crisis. In addition, European diplomacy was variant in positions, goals and interests, which made it unable to take a unified position towards the Egyptian crisis. It appears that the Ottoman Sultan was forced to ally with Russia in light of the British rejection of any alliance with the Ottoman Empire, which was the weakest link in the conflict between the Ottoman and Egyptians. The Ottoman acceptance of the alliance with Russia was aimed primarily at sending a clear message to Muhammad Ali Pasha that there was a declared Ottoman-Russian alliance to repel any possible future attacks on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. This alliance was also a result of the changes that take place in the positions of the countries, e.g., the British-French rapprochement at the beginning of the crisis followed by a distance between them at the end of the crisis.

Third: The activity of Ottoman diplomacy in the aftermath of the losing the battle of Konya¹² at the end of the year 1248 AH / 1832 CE:

The defeat of the Ottoman army at the Battle of Konya on December 18, 1248 AH / 1832 CE was a setback for the Ottoman Empire. It lost new lands, causing it to send its special envoy "Namik Pasha"¹³ on a visit to Britain to agree with it in an alliance. Namik met with British officials. The meeting resulted in Britain's refusal to restrict itself to any agreement with the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴ In the wake of the British refusal, the Ottoman Empire returned to pursue its diplomatic activity, and asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Rashid Pasha, to play an active diplomatic role and to meet with the ambassadors of European countries which were active on the international stage in order to support the Ottoman position, given Muhammad Ali Pasha's intransigence in retaining the parts he controlled during his campaign against the Levant.¹⁵

This meeting was followed by the issuance of the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II order that it is necessary to agree with Britain, France and other European powers to provide diplomatic, military, and all necessary facilities to the nationals of those countries on the territory of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁶

Therefore, there is some belief that the goal of Sultan Mahmud from his diplomatic activity and movement is to win European public opinion and their future armies when the Egyptian-Ottoman conflict became severe.

One of the Ottoman documents indicates that a meeting between Muhammad Rashid Pasha and the British and French ambassadors resulted in an agreement between them that the Russian ships should be removed from the Dardanelles Straits and the Bosphorus whatever the reasons were.¹⁷ With Russia following its diplomatic activity and public interference with the Sultan, European powers (Britain and France) rushed to intervene and offer mediation. Their interference in persuading the parties of the conflict to accept an interim settlement culminated in the Kutahya Agreement¹⁸ on May 8, 1833AD,¹⁹

¹² Konya: Turkish town and state surrounded by mountains from all sides, with an area of 588,000 km², see: Shamsuddin Sami, Dictionary of Flags (History and Geography), Volume 5, (Istanbul: Mahran C Press, 1314 AH), p. 3782.

¹³ Namik Pasha: one of the leaders of the Ottoman army, has held several military ranks, the last of which is the rank of a team. Humayun Line, File No. 362, Document No. 20109, Istanbul, 15 Sha`ban 1248 AH / 1832 CE.

¹⁴ Humayun Line, File No. 362, Document No. 20109, previous source, 1248 AH / 1832 CE.

¹⁵ Humayun Line, Previous Source, File No. 365, Document No. 20109/1248 AH / 1832 CE.

¹⁶ Humayun Line, previous source, file No. 365, document 20183, 1248 AH / 1832 CE.

¹⁷ Humayun Line, File No. 362, Istanbul, Istanbul Archives, 1248 AH / 1832 CE.

¹⁸ Kutahya: It is located on a high, sloping ground that a river runs through and flows into the Black Sea. See: Sami, previous reference, P5, p. 3911.

¹⁹ Marriott, op.cit, p.235

which included a number of items. The most important item was that Muhammad Ali gave back Anatolia and his armies retreated beyond the Taurus Mountains (Ibid. p. 236). Diplomatic deliberations between the Ottoman Empire and the ambassadors of European countries to Istanbul reached their climax after the critical situation that the Ottoman Empire reached as its forces retreat in front of the Egyptian army in Kutahya, which made Russia want to participate in the war to the side of the Sultan if requested. But the ambassadors of Britain and France refused to the call of Russia to get involved (Omar 2017, p. 45-55).

After the signing of the Kutahya Agreement, the French policy at this stage seemed less severe and more moderate and dependent on diplomacy. It began to agree with Britain's policy on the necessity to end the conflict between Sultan Mahmud II and Muhammad Ali Pasha and to get Russia out of the Ottoman lands.²⁰

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire ordered active diplomat Mustafa Rashid Pasha to hold discussions with Austrian Chancellor Metternich (Vanadolina 1999, p.53) (1821-1848 AD) in Vienna, persuading him to gain his supportive position on the issues of Egypt and Algeria and take measures to turn public opinion against Muhammad Ali. Mustafa Rashid Pasha wrote in one of his reports sent to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs when he was an ambassador in Paris in 1834 CE "He took the position of the defender during the discussions that took place with the French statesmen about the approach of his government in the dispute that arose between them and between Egypt recently." He blamed the French ambassador, Roussin, for his weakening position at the decisive moment when the Ottoman Empire was busy settling its disputes with Egypt. This came in his speech on the Ottoman acceptance of Russian aid against the ruler of Egypt (Mansour 2017, p.21).

Since Mustafa Rachid Pasha was his country's ambassador to Paris, he used to send his diplomatic reports to his country, indicating civilized developments in the West, specifically France. Because he gained experience and skill in the diplomatic corps as an advantage, he had an effective and influential role in the Egyptian crisis.

Using his reports to the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Rashid Pasha was able to pave the way for organizations. The Ottoman state entered the stage of renewal through developments in the West in general. Mustafa Rashid Pasha is considered the true founder of Ottoman diplomacy during the Egyptian crisis (35). Muhammad Rashid Pasha had previously obtained political and diplomatic experience as a result of his service as ambassador of his country to Paris, and this experience earned him a diplomatic skill in marketing his case in international forums, which was exactly what he did after assuming the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Among the Ottoman diplomats who had a diplomatic role during the Egyptian crisis was Nuri Effendi²¹, who was the ambassador of his country in London in 1835 AD. In the middle of 1836 AD, Mustafa Rashid Pasha assumed the position of the ambassador of the Ottoman Empire to Paris.²²

The Ottoman Empire continued its diplomatic pressure to resolve the Egyptian crisis. In a secret note sent by the British Consul Campbell in Cairo²³ to the Ottoman ambassador in London Nuri Effendi on October 10, 1836 AD, he states that "England is the only force that can confront Muhammad Ali Pasha, in terms of strength and firmness, and working as much as possible to carry our direct negotiations. The topic of correspondence and movements of each of the Great Gate²⁴, and Muhammad Ali ultimately does not care about the general diplomatic course to resolve the crisis" (Hajjar 1976).

The policy of stability in the eastern crisis allowed the Great Gate and European countries to implement their strategy. Therefore, this period was a period of stagnation for diplomatic activity that lasted several months (Hajjar 1976). Later, a new stage of diplomatic relations between the European powers and the Ottoman Empire started regarding the Egyptian crisis.

²⁰ Metternich: (1773-1859 AD) Austrian politician, and ambassador to Austria in Paris in 1806 AD, he was among the powerful advisers of Austria, had an influential role in the Egyptian question. Raabaha Belabid, Ottoman reforms and their impact on the Levant countries 1808-1861 AD, Master Thesis, College of Humanities and Social Sciences And Islamic Sciences, Adrar University, Algeria, 2014, p. 42.

²¹ Nuri Effendi was an Ottoman diplomat, appointed as an ambassador of his state in Paris in 1836. He continued in his position until 1840. See: Excellent Decree, File No. 2, Document No. 436, dated 21 Dhu al-Hijjah 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

²² Humayun Line, File No. 365, Document No. 20192, Istanbul, 29 Dhu al-Hijjah 1248 AH / May 19, 1833AD.

²³ Campbell was a British diplomat, appointed as a consul general to Alexandria during the period 1833-1839. F.o78, vol. 226, 14 January 1833

²⁴ The Great Gate was the Official Place of the Grand Vizier. See: Najati (1986, p. 14).

Fourth: Ottoman diplomacy in the aftermath of the defeat of the Ottoman army in the Battle of Nusaybin (40) 1839 AD:

The Ottoman diplomacy did not stop its activity but carried out more diplomatic work despite the state of diplomatic stagnation witnessed in the period following the signing of the aforementioned Kutahya Agreement. The matter differed after the loss of the Ottoman army in the Battle of Nusaybin²⁵ on June 24, 1839 AD. After the battle, the new Ottoman Sultan Abdul Majeed I (1839-1861) who took power after the death of his father, Mahmoud II, dispatched his envoy to London to establish a joint alliance with Britain.²⁶ However, Britain refused to link it to any military agreement, but agreed to hold joint exercises between the British and Ottoman fleets in the Mediterranean without entering into a defense agreement.²⁷

After the British rejection, the Ottoman Empire realized that it could not confront Muhammad Ali without the help of European powers and that diplomacy was its only option, so it continued to pursue its diplomatic activity and opened new channels of dialogue with Muhammad Ali Pasha. That is because Ottomans believed that opening new channels of diplomatic dialogue may lead to a solution to the crisis peacefully, something that was wanted by France which was Muhammad Ali's ally. The Sultan sent an envoy to visit France, and he was received by French officials. Discussions were held between the two sides on the Egyptian issue with the understanding to resolve them peacefully between the conflicting parties.²⁸

Meanwhile, the Sultan sent Khosrow Pasha,²⁹ a special delegate, to Muhammad Ali Pasha carrying an official letter telling that Sultan Abdul Majid I took the throne of the Sultanate. The tone of the speech was friendly, and it includes a pardon by the new sultan for the behavior of Pasha Muhammad Ali towards his father, the late Sultan II, promising that the blessings be bestowed upon him, and he will be the King of Egypt. This ruling will be an inheritance among members of his family. The new Sultan appealed to Paşa Egypt to help promote the Ottoman Empire and increase its prosperity.³⁰

On June 30, 1839 AD, the Ottoman head of foreign affairs, Muhammad Rashid Pasha, received a letter from the French Ambassador to Istanbul, Roussin,³¹ regarding France's desire to help to solve the crisis. If the need arises, France will stand next to allies to stop the progress of the Egyptian forces if they cross Nusaybin.³²

Consequently, the Ottoman Empire invited the ambassadors of Britain, France, Russia and Borussia to a meeting on the Egyptian issue. The representative of the Sultan gave a speech in which he thanked the countries that provided the assistance, and the Sultan was confident that all countries will commit themselves to providing this assistance in the future without interfering in internal affairs. Also, the Sultan will make every effort to comfort the citizens of these countries, improving their lives. Additionally, the conditions in Eyilat, Egypt, have returned to their natural course not considering the faults of Muhammad Ali, and the latter must submit the duties of obedience.³³ However, the Ottoman proposal did not bear fruit as matters remained unchanged, which led the Sultan to issue a warning to Muhammad Ali Pasha to leave the Levant, and he should examine the warning addressed to him from European powers.³⁴ On October 31, the ambassadors of European countries to Istanbul exchanged talks with Ottoman officials concerning putting an end to the Egyptian issue as well as the necessity of holding a special conference on this issue to study the procedures should be taken accordingly.³⁵

We note from the above that the Ottoman Empire realized that it had no ability to stop the Egyptian army's progress after its loss in the Battle of Nusaybin. Diplomacy for it was its last option to end the crisis and restore the lands it had recently

²⁵ External Will, Previous source, File No. 1, Document No. 522,1255 AH / 1839 AD.

²⁶ An External Will, Ottoman Document No. 52,1255 AH / 1839 AD.

²⁷ An External Will, File No. 1, Document 53,23 Muharram 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

²⁸ Excellent Decree, Dossier No. 1, Document No. 9, 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

²⁹ Khusraw Pasha worked as an employee in the Royal Court and held many political positions, including the position of the highest rank. He was promoted to the highest military ranks.

³⁰ Excellent Decree, File No. 1, Document No. 3, Istanbul, on Rabi` al-Thani 24, 1255 AH / 11 July 1839AD.

³¹ Rossin served as his country's ambassador to Istanbul during the period 1833-1839. Documents Diplomatiques, Tome 23, p. 36, Tome 24, p. 100,360,440

³² Excellent Decree, Dossier No. 1, Document No. 4, 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

³³ Excellent Decree, Previous Source, Dawiyyah No. 1, Document No. 4, 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

³⁴ Excellent decree, File No. 1, Document No. 2,24 Rabi` al-Thani 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

³⁵ Excellent decree, File No. 1, Document No.24. Rabi` al-Thani 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

lost, so it intensified its diplomatic activity with the ambassadors of European countries to find a way out of the crisis and solve it by peaceful means.

Fifth: European diplomatic activity after Nusaybin battle:

The defeat of the Ottoman army by the Egyptian forces in Nusaybin was an appropriate opportunity for diplomatic intervention. Immediately the British politician Palmerston continued his diplomatic contacts with the French government. Despite his announced diplomacy, he did not exclude the military option if necessary in the event that the Egyptian army did not stop at Nzab, and the Russian fleet entered the Bosphorus and Astana.³⁶

After Ibrahim Pasha's swift victories over the Ottoman army and its arrival in the heart of Anatolia, the European countries realized the truth of the danger to the Ottoman throne. So Britain and France tried to work to reform the relation between the Sultan and Muhammad Ali Pasha, while Russia, Austria, and Prussia were afraid of the aggravation of the situation and the spread of insurrection movements (Al-Badri 2001). They considered the movement of Muhammad Ali Pasha not legitimate and a victory for France's policy and interests in the East.³⁷ Palmerston summarized his country's position after Nusaybin battle in one of his speeches to his country's ambassador to Vienna, Lamb, (1833-1839AD) on June 30, 1839AD. This position was to mediate between the Sultan and Muhammad Ali Pasha. He added that the major powers have the right to interfere between the Sultan and Muhammad Ali Pasha as the existing competition between them would create great and immediate risks for the interests of European powers and public peace in Europe, and that preserving the Ottoman Empire is the primary goal of European powers at this stage. This conflict can only be achieved by dropping the opportunities for collision between the Sultan and Muhammad Ali Pasha and replacing diplomacy instead of war. As long as Muhammad Ali Pasha continues to occupy the Levant, the chances of a clash will continue, hence Muhammad Ali Pasha should agree to grant Syria to the Ottoman Sultan in exchange for granting some advantages to his family in Egypt, including the hereditary rule.³⁸ The British position was crystallized in the aftermath of the Battle of Nusaybin and the resulting defeat of the Ottoman Empire. In a letter, Palmerston sent a letter to his country's ambassador to Vienna Lamb on June 30, 1839 AD, stating the right of European powers to intervene in the Egyptian issue to find a peaceful solution to that issue (Palmerston from lambe, 30 june 1839). Emphasis must be placed at this stage on preserving the Ottoman Empire, which is the goal of all European countries. Work must also be done to put an end to the conflict between the Sultan and Muhammad Ali and to replace diplomacy with war. (f.o 78, palmerston, 30 june 1839)

In light of the European diplomatic transformation supporting the Ottoman diplomacy, a meeting was held between the Ottoman Foreign Counselor, the head of the embassies department, Nuri Effendi, and Ottoman officials to discuss the Sultan's warning to withdraw from the Levant in addition to discuss the warning addressed to him from European powers. The option of war was discussed against. The meeting was attended by one of the leaders of the Himalayan army, Field Marshal Izzat Pasha, in addition to the clerk of the Greet Gate, Akef Effendi.³⁹ On the initiative of the Ottoman Empire, the Grand Vizier Khosrow Pasha sent a special delegate to the Pasha of Egypt and carried an official letter promoting Sultan Abdul Majid II to the throne of the Sultanate. The tone of the speech was friendly, and it includes a pardon by the new sultan for the behavior of Pasha Muhammad Ali towards his father, the late Sultan II, promising that the blessings be bestowed upon him, and he will be the King of Egypt. This ruling will be an inheritance among members of his family. The new Sultan appealed to Paşa Egypt to help promote the Ottoman Empire and increase its prosperity.⁴⁰

On July 28, 1839 AD, the major countries namely Britain, France, Austria, and Russia asked their ambassadors to Istanbul to hold a meeting between them and send a signed memorandum to the Ottoman Sultan, according to which they asked him not to approve anything concerning the Egyptian issue only when they are informed with it. The Sultan and the Great Gate

³⁶ See marcheal soult Au Baron Roussin, paris, le 17 June 1839, p.252

³⁷ Documents Diplomatiques, Tome 25, p.258, Excellent Decree, Dossier No. 1, Document No. 21, 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

³⁸ F.O 78.vol.357, from palmerston to lord privy seal, 30 June 1839

³⁹ Excellent decree, File No. 1, Document No. 3, 24 Rabi` al-Thani 1255 AH / 1839AD Excellent Decree, Previous Source, 25 Rabi` al-Thani 1255 AH / 1839AD.

⁴⁰ Excellent decree, previous source, File No. 1, Document No. 4, Rabi` al-Thani 25, 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

accepted this memorandum by the ambassadors of European countries.⁴¹ European powers were afraid to reach a peaceful solution to the Egyptian issue without their direct intervention, and this was confirmed by French Marshal Soult to his country's ambassador in London two days after the defeat of the Ottoman army, saying: "The speed of the events makes us fear a solution to the crisis that leaves no room for European countries to interfere as this would not take sufficiently into account the basic interests of the public policy (Hajjar 2001, p.167). The signing of the Great Gate to the aforementioned memorandum on July 28, 1839 CE was a turning point in the subsequent negotiations between the Great Gate and Muhammad Ali, as the Great Gate renounced every right to a diplomatic initiative. The Ottoman-Egyptian conflict became the prerogative of the five major powers (Hajjar 2001, p.167).

It seems that Britain decided to put an end to the crisis, and that it had a head start so as to serve its interests in the region. The events have been moving towards establishing a common alliance with European powers affecting the international scene.

Therefore, diplomacy of Palmerston became active after the July Memorandum as he worked to widen the chasm of discord between Muhammad Ali Pasha and France, and demanded the French government take a joint British and French action, to besiege the Muhammad Ali Pasha fleet on Egyptian beaches and to use force against it to force it to return the Ottoman fleet to the Sultan (Hurewits, 1956, p.113). Palmerston's proposal coincided with the opinion of Metternich who met the Ottoman ambassador to Vienna Raafat Bey and held a meeting where they discussed the withdrawal of Muhammad Ali Pasha's forces from the areas controlled by his forces, the issue of returning the Egyptian fleet, and resolving the crisis peacefully.⁴² In an interesting statement by Palmerston on 17, September 1839 addressing the French Ambassador in London, Se Bastiaani that Russia has abandoned its uniqueness in protecting Istanbul, which is a key to the entire Ottoman issue, which contributes to its peaceful settlement away from the war (64).

Palmerston also sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France (Soul) during his negotiations with the Russian envoy (Brinnur) urging him to enter into the European collective action. This coincided with the message he sent to his country's embassy in Paris on September 24, 1839 CE explaining to him that the British Council's direction is to approve joint work with the three powers (Russia, Austria, and Prussia) whether France joined it or not (Hajjar 2001, p.167). On the other hand, Palmerston held consultations with European foreign ministers about a mechanism for establishing an alliance between them to put pressure on Muhammad Ali Pasha to settle the Egyptian issue diplomatically. This indicated at the same time that Britain did not agree to use its warships in Ottoman waters. On the other hand, Palmerston consulted with his European counterparts about the future of the planned alliance and the means of its intervention to settle the Egyptian issue diplomatically, so he explained to Austria's Metternich adviser that Britain would not accept Russia's use of its war fleets in the Ottoman Empire without Britain's consent. On the other hand, Metternich in turn conveyed this to Prienor, who was on a visit to Austria, and the Russian envoy expressed readiness for his country's equal acceptance of the fleets of the three countries in the straits of the Ottoman Empire. This was a recognition by Russia for the first time of European interests in the Ottoman Empire and the division of roles between them (Al-Badri 2001, p.173).

In light of this progress made at the Russian and Austrian diplomatic levels, Palmerston decided that the time had come to build the European alliance against Egypt's Pasha officially and therefore decide what should be given to Muhammad Ali Pasha. The British and Austrian ambassadors to Istanbul expressed the necessity of returning the Levant to the Ottoman Empire, but the French and Russian ambassadors opposed this, proposing that Muhammad Ali Pasha be granted with the four representatives of the Levant (Damascus, Aleppo, Tripoli and Saida). The Russian ambassador Konegsmark sided with the first opinion. In the meantime, Metternich, the Chancellor of Austria, proposed that an international conference be held in Vienna or London to complete the talks on the Egyptian issue.⁴³

The Ottoman Foreign Ministry invited the ambassadors of a number of European countries (Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Hungary) to discuss the latest developments related to the Egyptian issue, and the representative of the Ottoman Sultan gave a speech in which he thanked the countries that assisted him, and that the Sultan is confident that all countries

⁴¹ F.O, 78, vol. 374, from campell to palmerston, 11 July 1839

⁴² Excellent Decree, File No. 1, Document No. 6, 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

⁴³ Internal decree, The Egyptian Question, File No. 1, Document No. 31, Istanbul, 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

will abide by this help without interfering in the internal affairs of the state. He will do his utmost to comfort the citizens of these countries and improve their lives. He may go beyond the mistakes of Muhammad Ali Pasha and forgive him, provided that he submits obedience duties to his master, i.e., the Ottoman Sultan.⁴⁴

It follows from the above that Ottoman diplomacy continued its activity despite the opposition of the European powers to any diplomatic solution that came from the Ottoman state without having a major role in resolving the crisis.

On September 29, 1839 AD, diplomatic talks took place between Britain and France on the Egyptian issue, and Russia participated in it. Britain's opinion was the elimination of Muhammad Ali Pasha, while France was considering Muhammad Ali Pasha rule in Egypt only under the tutelage of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state was informed of the content of this discussions without being officially a member of it.⁴⁵

The announcement of the reformist organizations in the era of the new sultan was a new diplomatic weapon used by the Sultan for the Egyptian issue to defend his new interests and to friendliness of European countries. In October 1839 AD, the ambassadors of European countries (Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria) with Ottoman officials exchanged talks about putting an end to the Egyptian issue and the necessity of holding a special conference on this issue to study the procedures and alerts that must be taken on this issue. They agreed that the presence of Muhammad Ali's forces in the newly-controlled areas exceeded is illegal, and there had to be an official decision or warning to the forces of Muhammad Ali Pasha to withdraw from these areas.⁴⁶

The ambassadors of the Ottoman Empire to the capitals of European countries that act on the international stage held diplomatic consultations with the governments of Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria to discuss the real efforts to solve the Egyptian issue and the need to exchange views and issue a warning to Muhammad Ali Pasha to withdraw his forces from the controlled areas.⁴⁷

Muhammad Ali Pasha had felt confident that no military action was taken against him, but he was nonetheless troubled by the European move to put an end to the Egyptian crisis. Consequently, he ordered the recall of four thousand soldiers from the Hijaz to Egypt and strengthened his defenses to face any emergency.⁴⁸

In light of the European agreement, even formally, to resolve the Egyptian crisis, Russia agreed to abandon its unilateral stance with the help of the Ottoman state in accordance with the previous Hankyar Askle-C agreement and to agree to the terms of Palmerston, who demanded that the Russian fleets and European naval forces be allowed simultaneous access to the Marmara Sea as an exceptional measure when the lands of the Ottoman Empire are threatened. Palmerston accepted the Russian condition that European powers work harmoniously in the Egyptian and Ottoman conflict.⁴⁹

In the wake of this agreement, Britain invited Russia, Austria and Russia to hold talks between them in order to reach a formula for joint cooperation between them to settle the Egyptian issue. They met in Broadland⁵⁰. France was also invited to participate in it as Palmerston and Metternich were eager to bring France into the alliance in any way so as not to hinder

⁴⁴ Internal Decree, The Egyptian Question, previous source, document No. 1056, 20 Rajab 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

⁴⁵ Humayun Line, The Egyptian Question, previous source, Dossia No. 379, document No. 20502, 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

⁴⁶ Reformist organizations: They are called "Kalkhana Line". Kalkhana is a Turkish word that consists of two syllables "kal", which means rose, and "khana" means "house of roses", meaning rose garden. The regulations were issued during the reign of Sultan Abdul Majid I and drafted by the Ottoman head of foreign affairs, Muhammad Rashid Pasha, and the issuance of the decree was prepared to announce the declaration of the era of organizations in the Ottoman Empire. Abdul Aziz Awad, the Ottoman Administration in Syria (1864-1914 AD), (Cairo: Department of Education, 1969 AD), pp. 41-42, Khalaf bin Dablan Al-Wadhablan, the Ottoman Empire and intellectual conquest until the year 1327 AH / 1909 CE (Makkah Al-Mukarramah, 1999 AD), P. 339.

⁴⁷ Internal decree, the Egyptian question, previous source, file No. 1, 20 Rajab 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

⁴⁸ Internal Decree, The Egyptian Question, File No. 1, Document No. 20, Istanbul, 10 Sha`ban 1255 AH / October 19, 1839AD.

⁴⁹ Internal decree, The Egyptian Question, File No. 1, Document No. 20, Istanbul, 10 Sha`ban 1255 AH / 1839AD.

Henry Lytton Bulwer, The life of Henry John Temple, Viscount palmerston, vol. 2, (London: leipizing Bernhard tauchnitz, 1871), p. 287
Excellent Decree, File No. 2, Document No. 31, 14 Shawwal 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

⁵⁰ It was stated in Broadland meetings that any settlement between the Sultan and Muhammad Ali Pasha must be within the framework of supporting European countries in view of the danger that Muhammad Ali represents to the European system, and the alliance can grant Muhammad Ali the hereditary rule in Egypt provided that he accepts the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. Muhammad Ali must deliver the Ottoman fleet immediately, and so on. See: Al-Badri, previous reference, pp. 187-188.

European work in the future (Al-Badri 2001, p.206). Austria decided its military participation with the Allies, but Metternich did not abandon his traditional policy. He worked to open communication channels with France to resolve the crisis without entering into any war (Al-Badri, 2001, pp. 206-207).

Faced with this serious situation on the part of the European powers, Muhammad Ali Pasha took this into account, believing that the war between him and the Ottoman Empire and its allies was inevitable, so he strengthened his army and raised its number to four hundred thousand fighters. At the same time, he wrote to Ibrahim Pasha calling on him to prepare to defend the rest of the Egyptian property and collect the weapons that had been distributed by Prince Bashir Al-Shihabi⁵¹ to the Christians of Mount Lebanon during the Druze Revolution.⁵² Things did not go in favor of Muhammad Ali Pasha. European states stood against him, including his ally France, and the Allied forces attacked Beirut and his forces retreated, and in the face of this difficult situation, Muhammad Ali decided to withdraw from the Levant in 1840 CE and returned to Egypt.⁵³

Therefore, we can claim that British diplomacy succeeded in bringing together European countries and coming up with a unified position to resolve the crisis peacefully and avoid resorting to the military option in order to preserve the balance of powers in the region. The British diplomacy also succeeded in convincing the influential European countries to work to solve the Egyptian issue, something that was culminated in holding the London Conference in 1840 AD.

Sixth: Ottoman diplomacy activity during the late Egyptian crisis and its decline:

The late Egyptian era witnessed diplomatic activity by the Ottoman Empire's ambassadors in European capitals, and they held many diplomatic consultations with European diplomats to discuss real efforts to solve the Egyptian issue by peaceful means. Ottoman documents indicate that the ambassadors of the Ottoman Empire abroad played a large role in promoting the Egyptian crisis in international forums, particularly in their places of service as diplomats in the Ottoman embassies and as representatives of their state in the capitals of European countries. One of the documents indicates that the ambassadors of the Ottoman Empire to the capitals of European countries have held many diplomatic consultations with the governments of Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria to discuss the real efforts to resolve the Egyptian issue by peaceful means and the need to exchange views and to issue a warning to Muhammad Ali Pasha to withdraw his forces from the regions captured by him in the Levant.⁵⁴

According to the information of one of the Ottoman documents that the state assigned Mr. Talat Effendi as a head of the advisers' body and delivered him the reports received from the embassies of the Ottoman Empire abroad. Talat Effendi was among the Ottoman politicians at the time with administrative experience. Accordingly, the King of Britain William IV bestowed on him a medal given his efforts. The Ottoman diplomats were active in the meantime, with reports of Ottoman military buildup in the Nazzab region.⁵⁵ One of the Ottoman documents indicates that the Ottoman Foreign Adviser and the Ottoman Ambassador to Austria Raafat Bey attended a side of the talks that took place between the French and British ambassadors to Vienna on the subject of Egypt. Russia participated in the meeting, and it was found that each country had a different opinion.⁵⁶

In the meantime, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested its embassies abroad, including its embassy in Vienna to participate in the meetings invited by the ambassadors of European countries. In a report sent by the Ottoman Ambassador in Vienna on 7 July 1839 CE to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, there was a statement that he attended a meeting that took place between the ambassadors of Britain, France, and Russia, and it became clear through the meeting that each state has a different opinion and position. The meeting came out with several suggestions, including that Britain is demanding the elimination of Muhammad Ali Pasha, while France believes that Muhammad Ali remains in Egypt under the tutelage of the

⁵¹ Bashir Al-Shihabi: 1760-1850 A.H., Crown Prince of Mount Lebanon in 1203 AH / 1788AD, Muhammad Ali supported his campaign against the Levant, the Allies exiled him to Malta in 1256 AH / 1840AD.

⁵² Le comte de pontois Au Thiers Documents Diplomatiques ,tome 25,Nombre 72 ,Le 7 novembre 1840.

⁵³ Orders and letters issued by the Guardian of Blessings Muhammad Ali Pasha, Volume II, 3 Shawwal 1256 AH / 1840 CE.

⁵⁴ Excellent Decree, File No. 1, Document No. 20, Istanbul, 24 Shaaban 1255 AH / October 31, 1839 AD.

⁵⁵ (81 Internal decree, previous source, Rabi` al-Thani 20, 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

⁵⁶ (82) Excellent Decree, Dossia No. 1, Document No. 9, 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

Ottoman Empire.⁵⁷

The Ottoman embassy in Paris, for example, became active during the Egyptian crisis, and sent a flood of diplomatic reports and messages to the ambassadors of European countries. As a result of this activity, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris Nuri was called to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which gathered ambassadors of the five major countries at the time (Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria), and on Wednesday 1839 AD, the Ottoman Ambassador to Paris Nuri Effendi was called to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and met with the ambassadors of the five countries (Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and Austria). After the end of the talks between the ambassadors of the countries, it was decided that a summary of the talks that were taking place would be sent to the Great Gate on Saturday for approval. The Great Gate had to issue a decree to do so and be registered with the Royal Court.⁵⁸ In a report sent by the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris, "Nuri Effendi," it says:

"In order to enhance the embassy's role and intensify its diplomatic activity, its budget has been monitored to better play its role in the counter and hostile media of Pasha Egypt. I have asked the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs to increase its expenses more than what is scheduled annually, amounting to (1700) Ottoman lira." The embassy has increased its expenses more than before, and it amounted to (1700) liras, because the amount allocated⁵⁹ eighty four thousand French francs. This amount does not meet the requirements as we borrowed, because the situation requires more expenses due to the large number of advertisements by the governor Muhammad Ali in the newspapers, the French media, and some organizations loyal to Muhammad Ali, which compels us to follow his example in responding to him so that we can influence his propaganda as citizens and the state in France are inclined towards it. The total expenses have reached (1700) liras, and upon request we will provide you with a statement of accounts. Note that the Ottoman embassy in London reached its expenses (4,600) liras internally and externally.⁶⁰

Conclusion

We can say after this presentation of the Ottoman Empire's diplomacy in dealing with the Egyptian crisis from (1832-1840 AD) with the following:

- 1- The military superiority of the Egyptian forces in the Levant and Anatolia regions at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.
- 2- The Ottoman Empire sought diplomacy as a new weapon to obtain the support of European countries in their conflict with the Pasha of Egypt (Muhammad Ali).
- 3- The Ottoman Empire resorted to diplomatic maneuvers with European countries during the Egyptian crisis, after it went through a period of weakness, and the loss of more of its lands by the Egyptian forces.
- 4- The Ottoman embassies abroad played a large role in influencing the positions of the major countries to win their positions on the side of their state against Muhammad Ali.
- 5- The Ottoman diplomacy got behind during the Egyptian crisis in favor of European diplomacy, which led to the loss of its actual influence in the international decisions taken regarding the Egyptian crisis, and the British diplomacy interfered in taking the initiative to end the Egyptian-Ottoman crisis.
- 6- The early French diplomatic move to protect its colonial interests in Syria with the help of Britain and agreeing with its policy on the necessity of working to end the conflict between the Sultan and Muhammad Ali, then moving towards confronting Russian ambitions.
- 7- Britain was the largest European country influencing European policy during the Egyptian crisis, and it worked to enhance its influence within the Ottoman Empire. Its influence became more powerful after its success in ending the crisis and the departure of Muhammad Ali Pasha from the Levant.
- 8- Russia has supported the Ottoman Empire militarily, diplomatically and militarily since the beginning of the Egyptian-

⁵⁷ Excellent Decree, Dossia No. 1, Document 14, 1255 AH / 1839 AD, same source, Document No. 21, 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

⁵⁸ Excellent Decree, Dossia No. 1, Document 2, 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

⁵⁹ Internal Decree, Dossia No. 1, previous source, 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

⁶⁰ Internal decree, op. Cit., 1255 AH / 1839 CE.

Ottoman crisis.

9- The Ottoman-Russian discussions resulted in the signing of the Hankyar Eskyleh C agreement in 1833.

10- Russian diplomacy encouraged the late Egyptian crisis to be resolved by peaceful means to avoid a clash between the Ottoman and Egyptian sides.

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