

Bertrand Russell's Philosophy and the Problem of Object: Logical Analysis versus Linguistic Analysis

Ouahiba Damouche * 

Department of English, Faculty of Letters and Languages, University of Mhamed Bougara, Boumerdes, Algeria

Received: 3/8/2023
Revised: 30/10/2023
Accepted: 27/2/2024
Published online: 2/2/2025

* Corresponding author:
o.damouche@univ-boumerdes.dz

Citation: Damouche, O. (2025).
Bertrand Russell's Philosophy and
the Problem of Object: Logical
Analysis versus Linguistic
Analysis. *Dirasat: Human and Social
Sciences*, 52(3), 5353.
<https://doi.org/10.35516/hum.v52i3.5353>



© 2025 DSR Publishers/ The University of Jordan.

This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY-NC) license
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>

Abstract

Objectives: This study discusses the content, the form, and the independence of the external objects. It also examines the object's relationship to other linguistic and scientific issues. Perceiving the object is what the words means. While what words refer to is the logical object, material objects are what constitute a fact. The role of the concepts of subject, object, logical form, universals, particulars, and relations in the solution of the problem of scientific knowledge are identified for the purpose of justifying the scientific knowledge.

Methods: A linguistic logical analysis method is used to examine sentence structure and word meaning, order and their role in concepts construction. Syntax is used to understand the linguistic and logical constructions by reducing them to symbols and logical forms and reconstruction process starting from empirical meaning to formal level exemplified in a proposition .

Results: Our findings show that the difficulty of distinguishing the form of the object from its empirical content leads to call objects facts. for the same reason, the object, which becomes a sense datum, also turns out to be a sensible percept. Therefore, the logical form is favored since it is presented as the basis of certainty.

Conclusions: The study shows that the logical objects became fused with Russell's objective in reconstructing mathematics by justifying its logical basis on one side, and renders the scientific philosophy to mathematical philosophy on the other side. Yet, metaphysics is used for justification, and every thing becomes an object; in the most general sense, it is an object-based metaphysics.

Keywords: Object; Senses; Language; Form; Perception.

فلسفة برتراند رسل ومشكلة الموضوع: التحليل المنطقي مقابل التحليل اللساني

وهيبة ديموش *

قسم اللغة الإنجليزية، كلية الآداب واللغات، جامعة محمد بوقرة، بومرداس، الجزائر

ملخص

الأهداف: تتمثل أهداف التحليل في التساؤل عن محتوى الموضوعات الخارجية واستقلاليتها وصورتها، إلى جانب البحث في علاقة الموضوع بالمشكلات اللغوية والعلمية. وبما أن إدراك الموضوع هو ما تعنيه الكلمة، وأن ما تشير إليه الكلمات يتمثل في الموضوع المنطقي، فإن الموضوعات المادية هي ما تؤسس الواقعة، إضافة إلى ذلك ما يتم به تحديد دور مفاهيم الذات، الموضوع، الصورة المنطقية، الكليات، الجزئيات والعلاقات في حل مشكلات المعرفة العلمية قد صيغت في إطار تبرير المعرفة العلمية.

المنهجية: تتبع هذه الدراسة منهج التحليل المنطقي الذي يرتبط بعلاقة وطيدة بالمنهج اللغوي، وذلك من أجل تحليل جمل وقضايا محددة. ومن أجل فحص بنية الجملة ومعاني الكلمات وترتيبها من خلال الدور الذي تلعبه في بناء التصورات، فإن علم التراكيب اللغوية يقوم بهذه المهام، ويساعد في فهم البناءات اللغوية والمنطقية. وردها إلى رموز وصور منطقية ثم إعادة تركيبها، وقد تمت بطريقة التدرج بحيث ينطلق من المحتوى التجريبي للجملة وتوضيح المعنى، لينتهى إلى المستوى الصوري للقضية.

النتائج: وتبين النتائج أن صعوبة التمييز بين صورة الموضوع ومحتواه التجريبي أدت إلى اعتبار الموضوعات وقائع، وللسبب نفسه فإن الموضوع كمعطى حسي يصبح مدرك حسي. وعليه الصورة المنطقية ستكتسي أولوية باعتبار أنها تقوم كقاعدة أو أساس لليقين.

الخلاصة: بينت الدراسة أن الموضوعات المنطقية أصبحت مندمجة مع هدف رسل في إعادة بناء الرياضيات عن طريق تبرير أسسها المنطقية من ناحية وتحويل الفلسفة العلمية إلى فلسفة رياضية من ناحية أخرى، هكذا تصبح الميتافيزيقا تستخدم للتبرير وإن كل شيء يصبح موضوعا على العموم، وإنها ميتافيزيقا مبنية على الموضوع. الكلمات الدالة: الموضوع، المحسوسات، اللغة، الصورة، الإدراك.

1-Introduction:

A number of researchers, namely Omar Nasim, Alexander Dolnick, Edmund Lee Gettier, Mustapha Mansour, Moris Weitz, and Elizabeth Randson Eanes, have dealt with the problem of the object in Russell's theory of knowledge. Some of their views will be used here as an introduction to our analysis of the problem.

Omar Nasim from the University of Toronto, Canada, made a study on this problem in his book " *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers: Reconstructing the World*, which linked it to Russell's new realism. Nasim advocates a logical view of the problem of the object. In addition to that, he claims that there are two kinds of material objects: physical and sensible objects. Furthermore, Nasim leads us, at several passages of Russell's writings, to understand that the central point is that the physical and sensible objects are logical constructions; yet, elsewhere, some passages' suggest the incompatibility of the two worlds, indicating that Nasim may be ambivalent on this point. I might argue that in the clash between the logical and the physical objects, Russell wants us to favor the physical objects since they are presented as the basis of certainty (objectivity). Despite the fact that Nasim believes sense data to be the basis for the logical construction of physical objects and space, Russell's findings regarding sensory data and the logical form of every object suggest that the contrast between these two incompatible realms may be deeper than it first appears. Nasim offers solid support for the logical constructions; however, his support cannot be used to show that the issue with external objects can be solved by logical objects [Nasim, 2008, 122]. Thus, Nasim is correct that the constructions are described in terms of sense data and sensibilia, [132], but his assertion that the nature of sensory objects is limited to sense data raises more questions. The alternative explanation is that the physical objects are either sensations, sensible objects, or percepts. Percepts or sensible objects are simply occurrences or events.

Another comparative study entitled Russell's *Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment*, written by Alexander Dolnick, is concerned with the problem of the object of knowledge in the framework of judgment and belief. In discussions of the problem, one controversial issue was raised. On the one hand, Dolnick argues that his primary aim is to carry out an investigation of the evolution of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment. On the other hand, he contends that the study is partial and restricted to a short period (1910–1913). Moreover, the study is presented in a comparative form between Russell and Wittgenstein. [Dolnick, 2011, 27] Dolnick illustrates: Russell's restrictive attitude toward our acquaintance with ordinary concrete objects contrasts quite dramatically with the considerable laxity of his attitude towards our acquaintance with abstract objects. [145] Yet, Dolnick advocates a logical view of the theory of objects when he claims that the theory of acquaintance imposes no independent constraints upon Russell's theorizing about abstract objects. [146] And while Dolnick claims that Russell's theorizing about objects requires that we be acquainted with objects of a certain kind, that means that we are acquainted with objects of that kind. The notion of acquaintance comes to dominate his analysis concerning all kinds of objects. As a result, the kind of abstract objects we are comfortable with remain extremely dubious assumptions.

Edmund Lee Gettier also presented a study entitled "Russell's Theories of Belief, in which he elaborated in detail on the logical object. As a result, he categorized and criticized harshly two theories of belief, accusing Russell of being in blatant contradiction in advance of an alternative explanation of what should be the logical object of belief. In fact, in dealing with the criticism, he argues that both theories are inadequate. In the first theory, he maintains that belief is an act of a person that takes a proposition as its object. In the second theory, belief is a multiple rather than a diametric relation. While Russell asserts that the object of a belief is prior to the whole complex, the author claims that Russell is inconsistent when arguing that the object of any particular belief could exist if it were not the object of that particular belief; [Gettier, 1961, 17] in addition to that, he declares, If Russell is to hold on to the second alternative, that a belief has the same object regardless of whether it is true or false, then he must also alter his account of what it is for a belief to be true or false. [32]; hence, if the second alternative were adopted to make a false belief possible, Russell would have to give up. [32] Russell's earliest theory of belief argues that the object of a belief is a complex called a proposition. Thus, the complex exists to be the object of s's belief no matter whether it is true or false; when it is false, Russell calls it an objective non-fact: the objects of false beliefs are objective non-facts. [227], but the multiple relation theory can account for beliefs only when the proposition believed is atomic. Hence, the theory, according to Lee, is incomplete in a most unacceptable way. [229]. Although Lee

addresses the problem of objects as a partial and specific matter in the problem of knowledge, he limits and restricts it to a short period (1910–1912). In addition to that, the focus is on the abstract logical analysis, assuming that it clarifies. Was it really a valid analysis?

Even though Lee's study is expected to increase clarity about both theories and increase accuracy, there has been a lot of abstract logical analysis, which led him to neglect the empirical content of the object and conclude that both are contradictory theories. As a result, this neglect renders his analysis extremely incomplete. We conclude, therefore, that true analysis cannot be guaranteed, mainly when it is based only on the logical form. In other words, it would require a considerable effort to accurately analyze the item using Lee's extremely abstract logical approach. However, Russell's theory of descriptions and types would presumably offer a clearer justification for both the logical structure and the empirical content.

Another study by Mustafa Mansour, "Russell's Theory of Descriptions," rejected the critiques of the theory of descriptions because it failed to distinguish between the statement's semantic and pragmatic meanings as well as the sentence's meaning and its assertion. That is between the logical object and the empirical object and therefore does not pose any threat to the theory of descriptions [Mansour,2012,191]. He defended Russell's theory as being analyzed in a correct semantic analysis, but despite his desperate defense of descriptive theory, his research did not meet the point of being an object in a logical linguistic framework that ignored the empirical material aspect.

Morris Weitz published a study entitled "*The Method of Analysis in the Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*", which analyzed the subject in the framework of the analytical method that uses definitions. In fact, the analysis was used to dismantle the logical and experimental objects and give them a structural formula rather than an epistemological one. [Weitz,1943,61]By the same token, he claims that Russell has confused constructivism with analysis, which may lead to some flaws in the analysis of the problem of object. Besides, Weitz claims that the method of construction with its maxim that all entities we choose to accept as 'real' be as empirical as possible, makes material analysis totally empirical. [25] As a matter of fact, Weitz sees, therefore, the ultimate material entities of the world of existence as against subsistence, and correspondingly, they become the ultimate empirical entities: sense-data and particulars who sense them.[24] and While Weitz's illustration particularly indicates that Russell is a causal dualist, our explanation for Russell's writings on the subject matter of the object shows that Russell reduces all the causal laws to physics. [161]But in the light of his treatment of formal objects, it is in the context of complete and incomplete symbols that was demonstrated, that is, descriptive, mathematical, and symbols of the natural sciences. Each of these for Russell is incomplete, as it doesn't have any meaning on its own. Unless it has to assign a sentential context or a linguistic context, [272] Henceforth, Weitz's analysis of the object was both incomplete, as it doesn't include Russell's latest book, *Human Knowledge*, for instance, and inadequate, as it neglected the object as being a core element of the problem of knowledge.

By Elizabeth Eanes once more. *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge* She meticulously documented the changes that took place in Russell's analysis of experience, including how feeling was handled, whether immediate knowledge was possible, and how perception related to sensation. Similar to this, there was a lot of discussion about the epistemological issue with data analysis as it evolved during Russell's empiricism. In actuality, the author's interpretation of Russell as a realist was greatly influenced by his views on the order of existence and the order of knowledge (whereas the scientific method's five postulates cast doubt on this). She claimed that there was no fundamental difference between feeling and perception. Giving up the relational concept of sensation as having a subject and a felt object entails doing this. (the problem of the relation of the object to the subject, which Russell has refused later [Ramson,1969,194])She also spoke about the connection between what was believed and the issue of belief. The dualism of subject and object is questioned with neutral nomism. As a result, the importance of credibility levels, behaviorism analysis, language levels, and postulates as solutions to the non-demonstrative inference problem can be attributed in part to the gap between knowledge and truth [194]. Furthermore, She discussed the relation of believing subject to what was believed. Coupled with the neutral nomism, the duality of subject and object is questioned. As a result, the importance of credibility levels, behaviorism, language analysis, and postulates as solutions to the non-demonstrative inference problem can be attributed to

the gap between knowledge and truth. .[197]

To point out, this comprehensive study did not start from the method but from the perceptual experience, making it essential in its comment on the object of knowledge. In particular, it was restricted to sense data, sense objects, and the temporal and spatial relations of the physical object. Likely to be the scientific and experimental aspect of the object. This may be due to its neglect of *Theory Knowledge (1913)*, which contains in large part a logical analysis of the object. To put it differently, Eanes deals with objects of knowledge throughout empiricism on one side and throughout the historical development of the notion on the other. By relying on the historical context, she seems to have ignored one important fact: the duality of subject and object. In addition to that, Eanes's position seems reasonable when she puts the problem of the object in its historical context, but claiming that the nature of the content and form of the object is restricted to human experience as a reflection of it is entirely questionable. In this case, her evaluation of personal experience to determine whether Russell is a realist or an empiricist remains on dubious ground too. As a completion to the studies mentioned above in this introduction, this research is intended to accomplish a more interesting study so that all aspects of the problem, whether logical, linguistic, or scientific, should be tackled.

The above-mentioned studies have had great merit in bringing understanding closer and opening up new horizons by re-formulating questions concerning the issue of knowledge in Russell's theory of knowledge. It's a study that seeks to be comprehensive so that it covers all the crumbs of his first, second, and third philosophy. And raise problems of central importance to the issue of the object. This research is not only limited to the issue of the object but also examines the object's relationship to other linguistic and scientific issues. And study it independently of the logical and scientific material effects to establish the concept of the object, but also examine the relationship of the object to other linguistic and scientific issues.

The problem of the object will be the primary focus of this essay, which will also cover two other types of objects that Russell used to bolster his theory of knowledge: the object of perceptual knowledge and the object of formal knowledge. The epistemological issue with the analysis of logical objects as it emerged throughout Russell's theory of knowing will be discussed as the article comes to a close. Russell contends that the fundamental building blocks for the reconstruction of physical objects should be the real sense data that has been observed.

2: The Problem of Physical Objects

The problem of object lies in the possibility of whether knowing objects is independent of us, or whether our acquaintance with them appears to us as they really are or as they seem to us. The answer to this question needs to focus on the analysis of the relation of physical objects to percepts and sense data. Furthermore, is our knowledge of objects obtained through perception? Provided that our analysis of sense data as the components of the physical world leads to the concept of the appearing object. So then, how does the independence of the physical object require its separation from perception on the one hand and from sense data on the other?

2-1: The Nature of Physical Objects and the Problem of Independence

Russell's objectives have always sought to obtain a firm justification for our scientific knowledge through its basic elements, namely the objects. He has always been skeptical, not in the sense that he denies the existence of physical objects but in the sense that he questions the content and form of these objects.

As a matter of fact, the important question concerning the nature of the object of knowledge, which depends on the analysis of perceptual knowledge, was headed, on the one hand, towards validating the experience and, on the other hand, finding in it the causes of our knowledge. This analysis is linked to the validation of empirical knowledge. So, then, how could man be able to know external objects while his connection to the world is short and limited? On the other hand, Russell's main focus is the justification of scientific knowledge. As a result, Russell begins with the common-sense conviction that there are permanent material objects, and a significant portion of his philosophical investigation is devoted to exploring the potential applications of this postulate.

In *The Problems of Philosophy (1912)*, Russell expresses his position towards scientific knowledge and the problem of

material objects. [Russell, 1997,21-3]. Russell continues by asserting that although sense data are undeniably certain, material objects are not. [Russell, 1954,21-2] So we obtain our knowledge of those objects through sensations and sense data. [Russell,1997,17] So, does Russell have a justification for considering our sense data to be proof that there are actual physical objects?

According to Russell, all of our knowledge of the table is actually knowledge of truths rather than the table itself. The most credible statistics are those obtained from our senses because we are already familiar with the information related to these particular things.[27]. These perceptible events can serve as evidence for the presence of strong physical objects. According to the Philosophical Problems, the regularity and durability of human perceptions are caused by material objects. His causal theory of perception is actually presented to explain this consistency and persistence. Only a sequence of events causally connected to the object's perceptions can result in a permanent material object.

Russell can only infer a limited amount about the nature of material objects, despite supposing their existence. If there is a discrepancy between sense data and actual objects, we can infer that it must be at the level of correspondence. Since physics is regarded as the foundation of science, Russell urges us to support physics-based viewpoints. According to physics, a complex process that includes, among other things, a sense organ produces the sense datum. Russell asserts that physical objects are creations of physical laws, notwithstanding his argument that permanent material objects are certain and undeniable. This position demonstrates how an actual object approaches a fictitious thing. [Russell,1954,133]

Contrarily, according to Russell, our understanding of the table as a physical thing is not direct knowledge. The physical object is what generates certain sense data. He also argues that the first theory of truth, which recognizes the existence of truth's antithesis, falsehood, and the second theory, which not only makes truth a property of beliefs but also makes it entirely dependent upon the relationship of the beliefs to outside things, i.e., physical objects, are the theories of truth that should be pursued. [Russell,1997,123]

Russell, for instance, argues that we cannot claim that Othello believes wrongly that Desdemona likes Cassio and that this view is based on a one object, "Desdemona's passion for Cassio." [124] Desdemona and Cassio are the two objects in this sentence, together with their loving relationship and the relationship of the belief to the separate physical objects. (Desdemona and Othello). According to Russell, "the relation called 'believing' is knitting together the four terms: Othello, Desdemona, loving, and Cassio into one complex whole at the time when Othello is entertaining his belief." [126] In other words, the independence of those objects of the outside world is to be identified with a logical basis. That is, to guarantee its persistence, he has to establish the postulate of the independence of the physical objects.

What does Russell mean by acquaintance with an object? As has been noted, Russell has to find an alternative truth theory that keeps this relationship of acquaintance as a fundamental one and that relates the self with physical objects. This position has two different directions. Assuming that it will keep the balance between two parallel fundamental worlds: the logical world and the physical world. Yet, On the one hand, In *On The Nature of Acquaintance*, in *Logic and Knowledge* (1914), Russell supports the dual relationship between a subject and an object that he refers to as acquaintance as a component of experience. Outside of introspection, the object is not understood to be mental, whereas the subject is understood to be mental. The object could also be at any point in time, including the past, present, or future. It might be a logical fact that is abstract, a general principle, or a reasonable specific There must be some level of familiarity in every relationship. In light of this, Russell's theory of description tackles the problem of acquaintance in the case of missing items. [Russell,1994,127] So, Russell solves the problem of acquaintance in the case of absent objects throughout the theory of description.

According to Russell, the definition of knowledge by description should be changed to knowledge by acquaintance in the sense that everything we can know must be created from sense data that we are familiar with. [46] The distinction between hard and soft data is made by Bertrand Russell in his book *Our Knowledge of the External World*. This distinction shows how reliable certain claims are, making them seem more or less credible to us. [Russell,1954,xix].

Russell makes a distinction between what he calls hard and soft data. This distinction reflects levels of credibility of objects, which, under distinction, become to our minds more or less doubtful. [Russell,2009,56]. In *Mysticism and Logic*,

Russell contrasts physical sense data, which are actually perceived, with sensibilia (physical sense data that exist but are not actually perceived by anyone). Objects are to be constructed from two levels of sense data. It is taken for granted that some physical objects sense data.

Russell promotes viewpoints in *Analysis of Mind* that appear to reconcile physical and psychological objects, according to which the world's matter is neither mental nor physical but a neutral substance. [Russell,1986,143] Moreover, with the intention of advocating scientific knowledge through postulating the existence of physical objects, the causal theory of perception failed to satisfy his needs for justification; it neither confirms nor refutes that there is one cause for each sensation about the physical object.

Russell's study of perceptions and physical objects was thus primarily concerned with the issue of separating appearance from reality. This aim would be hard to achieve, mainly when considering objects themselves as part of our knowledge of experience. In fact, this end requires accurate criteria to distinguish between the perception of objects in awareness and in dreams. In fact, all these subject matters push us to argue that our scientific beliefs about things overcome the perceptual experience itself. In addition to that, the experience has content, and the content of these percepts, which are called 'sensational properties, may make the distinction of perception from other psychological operations possible.

The physiological and physical analysis of the percepts that Russell claims positions sense data on two sides: on the one hand, a part of it exists as an effect of the nerves that transmit in a person's brain, and the other part is supposed to appear as positioned with the external object. Indeed, this may lead to physiological and physical subjectivity. The causal theory of perception makes sensible objects the causes, and the physiological interpretations of the percepts correlate these percepts with their causes through transmissive nerves. In this case, perceptions would be included in the theory as results of external causes, which must be external. Certainly, the percepts would be in the person's brain and must be separated from their external causes at the same time as the effect follows the cause. Though this analysis may be adequate for the causality of perception, it is not in accordance with his principle of the independence of external objects.

2-2: Physical Objects and Sense Data:

Three contexts were used to discuss this matter, the first of which dealt with the philosophical questions of mysticism, logic, and our understanding of the outer world. The second part involved studying the philosophical ideas of logical atomism, the analysis of thought, and the analysis of matter. The third session would look at human knowledge, its limitations, and its scope, as well as a discussion of truth and meaning.

Russell's use of physics, psychology, and mathematics in relation to the problem of objects' independence from the subject and the ability of language and logic to express that remains largely related to its position with regards to sense data. The sense data itself is located near the sensation, as a subject matter of psychology. It is also positioned close to perception, [Russell,1997,12], which is a major part of physics. As for its positioning in logic and mathematics, it holds an upper position [Russell, 1954,101-29]. Within this analytical track, the sensible object or sense datum, which emanated from sensibilia, became the object of the mental event and is physical. And in *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, the datum is said to be the center of sensation. [Russell,1992,97]. In Russell's view, data are referred to as percepts and premises of our knowledge. Hence, objects are sensed as data while perceiving them. In addition, Russell's referring to objects as logical data is an attempt to keep the balance between psychological, physical, and linguistic objects. Thus, those separate meanings make the idea of considering logical data, sensations, and perceptions as premises of all our knowledge more complicated.

Hence, Sensation is no longer knowledge but a source that leads to knowledge. Thus, it becomes closely attached to perception, and by being defined by it, it becomes wider than sensation. Russell actually categorizes those items into two levels: all unsensed data (which are not data to the perceiver) and sense data and sensibilia (which contain sense data.). [Russell, 1971,143-8] As can be seen, Russell's sensibilia raises serious problems with the existence of unperceived physical objects.

The foundation of knowledge is data. They may, on the one hand, be premises. They might also be conclusions, though. With this distinction, we may identify three different interpretations of the data. (1) Sensible data are the sensations that

can be quickly recognized, such as colors, sounds, and odors. (2) Logical objects are what is referred to as logical data in *The Theory of Knowledge* (1913). (3) Perceptible data is what is mentioned as percepts in *Experience*. [Russell,1992, 97].

The original definition of data refers to it in relation to sensation, in which seeing a color offers a sensation of color, although a color is a sense and not a sensation. Data is defined as items given by our sensations. That which our feelings let us believe we know for [Russell,2009,51] classify the levels of trust in our knowledge, Russell establishes a distinction between derived knowledge and intuitive knowledge. The highest level of self-evidence, intuitive knowledge, is a more accurate predictor of reality than the lower levels, which correspond to all preceding degrees. [Russell, 1997,118] After considering the philosophical concerns, Russell decides to substitute intuition with acquaintance out of concern that it would result in subjective knowledge.

Another meaning of data occurs when the theory of perception is involved in gathering, classifying, and analyzing all physical objects. A relationship between sensible objects and physical objects is also involved in this case. Data are still determined as the start of the epistemological relationship and as the end of it. The meaning of data as certain refers to the objects of our knowledge, which are, in fact, the causes of our knowledge. These include sensations as the common sources of our knowledge. And sensations, in turn, refer to events inside and outside the nervous system. Russell makes a distinction between a datum, which is private, and a datum, which varies from one individual to another. Nevertheless, this distinction between public and private data is one that Russell considers difficult to make precise. [Russell,2010,61] These data would constitute both the grounds for and the content of our knowledge.

Objects are sense objects insofar as they are the outcome of direct acquaintance, percepts insofar as they are the reasons for further inferences, and logical data insofar as they can be used as the premises of additional conclusions. However, there were discrepancies between how objects were understood with reference to the data. However, in human knowledge, there is a line drawn between ideas that occur naturally and beliefs for which no other explanation is possible. The latter category of beliefs is crucial for the theory of knowledge. Therefore, it is unclear how these two types of beliefs differ from one another. [181] So how do we distinguish between beliefs that are based on data and those that are not? So how do we tell which views are based on data and which are not? Data are divided into hard data and soft data, both of which are more or less speculative in people's [Russell, 2009,56]

Reduce the facts to an endless number of logical entities in *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*. He separates facts into specific facts like "this white" and general facts like "all men are mortal" in order to maintain the dualism of this universe. [Russell,2010,08] The physical object becomes then a constituent for both the fact and the proposition. At the beginning, sensation was considered an epistemic relationship. However, this relation must be acquired by acquaintance." [Russell,1997,50] As a result, physical objects can be inferred from sensations.

Studies on animal behavior give a sustainer for his advocacy for scientific knowledge. [Russell, 1954, 74-86] Therefore, to distinguish physical objects from perceptual objects, Russell needs to apply all methods used in the study of animal behavior. So, a distinction could be reached between physical objects and sensible objects. Russell claims that the whole of our cognitive life is biologically considered part of the process of adaptation to facts. Since there is no sharp frontier anywhere between the lowest animal and the most profound philosopher, the passage from mere animal behavior to something deserving to be dignified by the name of knowledge cannot be precisely determined. [Russell,2010,160] Mainly, when we talk about animal memory, which may allow discussing what can be called animal knowledge,

Although this may be true, Russell is still unable to establish an accurate meaning for both sensible and logical objects. So, further explanations and comparisons between animal and human memory and experience should be recommended.

2-3: The Problem of the Object in the Context of Theoretical Physics

According to Russell, the analysis of the problem of physical objects in our knowledge can only be accomplished through two important data: time and space. In either case, it is supposed to be included in the relativity theory of perspectives in theoretical physics. Evidently, a system of existing things rather than a single existing object can be used to determine what can be known experimentally about a piece of matter. [Russell, 1954,76] Additionally, relationships seem to be a major issue. Temporal and spatial interactions are two of the most significant matters. According to Russell, there

is a difference between perceived and implied space relations. The perspective to which the aspect belongs is the location from which it is viewed. The location of the thing to which the aspect pertains is where [Russell,1927,215] The perceived space relations are not identical with those that physics creates to depict the supposed identical and independent physical

In *The Analysis of Matter*, he asserts that although private and public areas have the same structure, their logical or mathematical qualities differ. [Russell,1927,251] Another key point in this matter is to connect the notions of time and space, as mathematical notions, to continuity, which is partly philosophical. [Russell,2009,104] If the space of perception becomes a unity consisting of small space unities, then the objects of physics correspond with the objects of perception only in a manner that preserves their logical structure. Hence, Russell's suggestion of the analysis of physical objects into structures of unities implies that objects' Structures lead to abstraction, which in turn leads to the process of turning physics into mathematics and then into logic.

To sum up, despite time relations that express and design space organizations, such as comparison and similarity, there are also time relations such as simultaneity, past, and future that can be more important in all relations designed to form the object, whenever these properties of percepts are derived from senses. That is to say, sensations derived from various senses are formed in one organized time-space format coupled with time experience, which starts from sensation and awareness of it. Yet, the relation of acquaintance exists between the world of objects and the subject, or the self. In fact, self-awareness is direct and obvious. In particular, the simultaneous relation is the most important relation, as it makes the existence of the process of unification of time and space of the objects in the context of a unified world as a whole possible.

3. Linguistic and Logical Analysis of the Problem of Formal Object:

3-1: The Nature of Formal Objects:

What does Russell mean by acquaintance with logical objects? It is put into a set of questions about the existence of logical objects: what are the components of logical objects? What role do the concepts of subject, object, logical form, universals, particulars, and relations play in the solution of the problems of scientific knowledge?

At the beginning, in *Principles of Mathematics*, 1903, Russell used relation and the term to analyze the formal object similarly this two term relation is a concept that appears in a proposition where the two terms do not appear as concepts. [Russell,1938,64-5]

The formal outcome of a logical construction, the persistence of things (objects) over time, should be understood rather than necessarily implying practical persistence. The same rationale also justifies the split of things into instant and point particles.. [Russell,2009,120] Formal objects with a final extension are less certain. Geometrical and other point-based theories will refer to actual objects in the real world, allowing us to apply mathematical theories to the relationships between those items. Such objects must be related to sense items in some way—they must be correlated with sensible objects—if they are to be validated. Some reasonable things are actual, while others are not. When an object of sensation has a link to other objects of sense that we have come to accept as usual, we refer to that object as being "real." When an object of sensation has a relationship to other objects of sense that we have come to perceive as typical, we refer to that item as being "real." [Russell,2009,68-7]

Russell analyzes material objects by means of logical constructions [Russell,2009,71-2] to show that logical objects are elements of the construction. Due to the presence of unobserved objects, these constructs of points and instants are obviously not interpretations of sensible objects. Russell contends that logical constructs, which were crucial to his examination of mathematics, are an elementary component of the answer to the conundrum of inference to material objects.

It might be concluded that in the clash between the logical and physical problems of the object, Russell wants us to favor the logical form since it is presented as the basis of certainty. For the purpose of justifying scientific knowledge, he reduces physical objects to constant logical objects, jumping up to higher levels of abstraction and formality. Henceforth, the mind and the subject will be able to be acquitted with sense data on one side and with logical objects on the other.

3-2: Logical Analysis of the Problem of Formal Object

A proposition's physical references to concepts or things are truly part of the proposition. A physical object can be the

subject of a proposition, which it is a constituent of; such a proposition is a complex formed from such objects. But the relationship between subject and object is ambiguous. In his theory of objects, Russell introduces a general term that can be used to refer to any of these objects. He uses the terms "unit, individual, entity," and "thing" as synonyms for it. [Russell,1938,44,-5]But regarding physical objects, we can only be acquainted with particulars, not with physical objects as unities. Since the term is devoid of material content, physical objects become entities in terms of metaphysics that include particulars. Russell uses metaphysics for justification, and everything becomes an object; in the most general sense, it is an object-based metaphysics.

When physical objects serve as the subjects of a statement, the subject in the associated sentence is a proper name that identifies the specific physical object that is a part of the proposition. Russell explains that the class of all classes that are identical to the given class is what is meant by the number of words in a given class. [Russell,2009,164]

Material objects become incomplete terms, and proper names have only meaning when they denote particular objects. Thus, if physical objects were entities, they would have meaning when denoting objects. But according to Russell, some entities cannot be known or inferred with certainty, and his analysis shows that it is possible to think of these things as imperfect symbols. Furthermore, since Russell defined classes as incomplete symbols that contain incomplete objects, it would be impossible to claim that the incomplete object designates a class of appearances or events.. Now that knowledge as logically validated has been attempted, Russell will likely turn his attention to knowledge as linguistically formed.

Russell advocates a logical view of the problem of objects. With this intention and from the standpoint of formal logic, the object will no longer have the ontological property that necessarily requires its existence. In addition, the object will refer to only one individual, which is a variable. Thus, the object and the subject become in the same ontological position, provided that both themselves are objects to the subject, which is ontologically not determined.

3-3: The Linguistic Analysis of the Problem of the Formal Object

At several places in Russell's writings, He leads us to understand that the aim of linguistic analysis is to reduce what is complex to what is simple. Yet, to clarify, definitions containing series of words form the principle structures for analysis seeking symbolism at the highest possible levels or the daily life expressions at the lower level. Additionally, Occam's razor was used to cut down on the quantity of words and symbols in order to obtain greater clarity and precision by using fewer images as a foundation for reassembling the object's concept.

The problem of the object owes much to the views of logical grammar. Therefore, Russell gives a new definition of propositions of atomic form and molecular propositions. In fact, Russell describes object language as the first level of language. So if 'p' is a sentence of the primary level, 'not p' is a sentence of the secondary level. The object language does not contain the words true and 'false', or logical worlds such as 'not' 'or' 'some' or 'all'. [Russell,1995,77].The level of logical words is a second linguistic level that Russell refers to as a secondary language. Concepts like "true" and "false" are relevant here, as are logical connectives like "and" and "or." Additionally, all of the objects that are typically given proper names are complex entities on the surface. ;[63]

A one-to-one correlation between a notion and a fact is no longer helpful in the Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. Making this primary language have a limited vocabulary can help reduce the complexity of the language when it is subjected to Occam's razor. [Russell,1995,]number of object words was aimed at reducing errors within the method of construction. Additionally, is there a distinction between comprehending a pure form, such as "something has some relation to something," and knowing a more complex form? and being acquainted with this object is left unsolved mainly when the subject and the object are combined [xxx]. As a result, the logical data and the physical data become identical. The general relation of acquaintance is avoided and replaced by various kinds of acquaintance, on which knowledge of particulars appears to be based. Thus, various ways are introduced to experience those particular objects. [79]. That is to say, linguistic analysis of the object coupled with physics and logic has not clarified enough ambiguities in Russell's concept of logical and physical objects. To put it another way, the inclusion of linguistic concepts in analysis helps a lot to reduce the gap between the two worlds. However, a somehow clear distinction between data, sensation, and object is still unreachable.

The hypothetical world constituted by data from psychology and physics is what Russell has achieved.

[Russell,2009,78] Russell calls even concepts objects, which expresses his intention to shift from the real physical world to the hypothetical logical world. The object becomes what the word means, so perceiving the object is what the word means. What words refer to is the logical object, whereas material objects are what constitute a fact.

To summarize, the statements that refer to sense data also refer to real entities, and for the purpose of rendering these statements meaningful, it is necessary to show what they refer to as having really or possibly existed. And as has been noted above, the application of Occam's razor guarantees a smaller number of words, which must correspond to a smaller number of objects and sensibilia. Comparatively, with the one method in which he starts with propositions containing objects less exposed to doubt, he is trying to reconstruct the edifice of science with a smaller number of hypotheses. As a result, his constructions take the form of analysis.

4-Conclusion:

In conclusion, Russell's claims about complex entities lead to epistemological problems in dealing with the relationship between logical and physical objects. The difficulty of distinguishing the form of the object from its empirical content leads Russell to call objects facts. For the same reason, the object, which becomes a sense datum, also turns out to be a sensible percept; that is, objects are sense data while perceiving them. Through the analysis of levels of language, Russell's view about sentences and propositions leads to epistemological problems concerning the relation between ideas and objects.

In the final analysis, logical objects and their position in the theory of knowledge become fused with Russell's aim to reconstruct mathematics by justifying its logical basis on the one hand and to turn scientific philosophy into mathematical philosophy on the other, as objects and relations hold an important position in this construction.

Assuming that sense data is the raw material for our knowledge, which consists of mental events in various experiences of different people and is made up of sense data as perceived by one person, this actually means that we are dependent on this person, which leads to subjectivity that Russell tried hard to avoid. Russell's idea that sense information stands in opposition to self-awareness as external objects in the context of sensation necessitates complete separation from the person who perceives them and sees them as external. Russell's claim of sense data to be mental and psychological events in the brain is not meant to be a collection of what is in the sensation at the same time, but a part of the whole selected by attention, which makes it a psychological property, giving different levels of clarity in the mind of the person.

REFERENCES

- Nasim, O. (2008) *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers; Constructing the World*. UK: Mac Millan Company.
- Dolnick, A. (2011). *Russell's Multiple Theory of Judgment; Evolution & Demise*. Unpublished phd dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA.
- Gettier, E. (1961). *Theories of Belief*. Canada: Cornell University.
- Mansour, M. (2012). *Bertrand Russell's Theory of Definite Discriptions*. Unpublished phd Dissertation, Canada, university of Calgary.
- Ramdson, E. (1969). *Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge*. London: George Allen and Unwin ltd.
- Russell, B. (1997). *The Problems of Philosophy*. New York-USA: Oxford University Press.
- Russell, B. (1954). *Analysis of Mind*. New York-USA: Dover publications.
- Russell, B. (1954). *Analysis of Matter*. New York-USA: Dover Publications, INC.
- Russell, B. (1994). *On The Nature of Acquaintance in Logic & Knowledge*. London: New York. Routledge.
- Russell, B. (2009). *Our Knowledge of the External World*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Russell, B. (1986). *Mysticism & Logic*. London-UK: George Allen & Unwin.
- Russell, B. (1992). *Theory of knowledge*. London & New York: Routledge. Russell, B. (1995). *Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*. London: Routledge, & New York: Unwin Hyman ltd.

- Russell, B. (1971). *Mysticism & Logic*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Russell, B. (2010). *Human Knowledge, its Scope and Limits*. London: Routledge.
- Russell, B. (2010). *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*. London & New York: Routledge Classics.
- Russell, B. (1927). *Analysis of Matter*. London & New York: Kegan Paul.
- Russell, B. (1938). *Principles of Mathematics*. New York: Norton & Company.
- Russell, B., & Whitehead, A. (1910). *Principia Mathematica*. Cambridge.
- Weitz, M. (1943). *The Method of Analysis in the Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*. Phd dissertation, University of Michigan.