The Dilemma of Resilience for the Donors and the Hosts in Response for the Syrian Refugee Crisis: Evidence from Jordan and the European Union

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Abstract

Objectives: The study aimed to identify the dilemma of resilience for the donors and the hosts in response for the Syrian refugee crisis in the case of Jordan and the European Union (EU) and how Jordan and the EU attempt to tackle it.

Methods: The study was conducted and built primarily upon textual analysis of secondary data of various texts from official European and Jordanian websites, news reports, and scholarly literature on resilience, as well as document analysis of different EU-Jordan official policies including their bilateral and multilateral agreements to trace the goals for Jordan and the EU within these policies, the shift towards resilience as a priority for the EU, the new mechanisms and tools the EU uses to build resilience in Jordan, and how it might be a better strategy, at the same time, dilemma for them both.

Results: The results of the study showed that resilience may appear as a dilemma; however, the EU and Jordan are working to resolve it through focusing on its bright side. More importantly, its role in preserving Jordan’s social cohesion and its stability makes it a better security strategy than providing humanitarian assistance.

Conclusions: The study recommends the need for strategies to enhance resilience in both Jordan and the EU. Jordan can boost exports to the EU by raising awareness about the rules of origin scheme, especially among remote area industries. The EU should find a balance between its humanitarian and political efforts in the region.

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**Introduction**

One of the most drastic humanitarian crises the world is witnessing is the Syrian crisis. The prolonged war, since 2011, has not only left the country completely ruined, but additionally, 400 thousand people have been killed, 13 million people became internally displaced, out of those, 5.6 million people are registered with The United Nation Refugee Agency (UNHCR). What is more, the (UNHCR) has registered over 5.6 million Syrian refugees, mostly in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022).

Thus, the whole region is affected by the crisis, including Jordan. It has an impact even on the (EU), as it is contributed to Europe 2015-2016 Migrant Crisis. In 2015 only, the EU received more than 1.2 million asylum seekers, from which 334,820 were Syrians. This number represents 28% of all those asylum seekers (Eurostat, 2017).

This crisis prevails the need to revise the EU's migration policy, as it seems incapable to respond to such a crisis. Hence, the EU adopted different security strategy to respond to its current crises including the Syrian refugee crisis. For this reason, state and societal resilience has become the EU's new security strategy. In the European Union Global Strategy of 2016, resilience as defined as the ability of the states, societies, communities and individuals to manage, tackle, adapt, and recover from shocks and crises has become one of the EU's five priorities of its foreign and security policy (European Union External Action, 2016).

Yet, it may represent a dilemma for the EU and Jordan. Some scholars like Giulia Sinatti and Rosanne Anholt argue that the EU, with its focus on resilience building of the country hosts, could jeopardize the stability of those states (Anholt & Sinatti, 2019). These already burdened states with its own problems cannot handle more refugees. In addition, refugees are facing many difficulties including their labor, hence, they are struggling to find their way to Europe. As a result, resilience may seem threatening rather than safeguarding the security of Europe and Jordan, and here lays the dilemma.

**Study Problem and Questions**

The problem of this study revolves around the dilemma of resilience, as it represents a real challenge for the donors and the hosts of Syrian refugees, specially, as resilience has become a security strategy to support those refugees and their country hosts.

For this reason, the study attempts to answer the following questions:

- Why might resilience appear as dilemma for the donors and the hosts of the Syrian refugees in the case of the EU and Jordan?
- How are the donors and the hosts working together to resolve this dilemma?

In order to answer these questions, the study will proceed as follows: the theoretical framework; then, the Syrian refugee crisis as a challenge for Jordan and the EU. The following section deals with their approach to the crisis, clarifying the role they both play, Jordan, as a host and a transit country and the EU as a main donor and increasingly reluctant host, then, it provides empirical insights of the EU's resilience building in Jordan. The next section clarifies the dilemma of resilience for Jordan and the EU and how they are trying to resolve it. Finally, the conclusion, the implications for policy makers and the upcoming research in regard this dilemma.

**Objective of the Study**

Starting from the assumption, that the regional impact of the EU's external migration policy can be better understood by exposing its dynamics with individual countries, the main objective of this case study is to contribute to the current debate about how transregional power dynamics, flowing from beyond, cooperate with and understand local dynamics. The study employs in-depth insights for the EU's refugee cooperation with Jordan, one of the key host states for displaced Syrians, to reveal their cooperation and illustrate the dilemma of resilience as a security strategy adopted by them both and how they seek to resolve this dilemma.
Importance of the Study

The importance of this study stems from different reasons. First, it addresses a relevant issue related to the on-going war in Syria. The prolonged war, with no foreseeable solution, has made the donors and the hosts of the Syrian refugees adopt resilience, as a better strategy to respond to the crisis. However, many challenges still exist for the refugees and the local communities, and its crucial to highlight these. This paper adds value and highlights these challenges. Second, the study’s findings would be of a great importance, as it suggests some scenarios that could make resilience more workable in the case of Jordan and the EU.

Methodology of the Study

As for the methodology, it’s a descriptive methodology builds primarily upon textual analysis of secondary data of various texts from official European and Jordanian websites, their reports, news reports, and scholarly literature on resilience, as well as document analysis for different EU-Jordan official policies including their bilateral and multilateral agreements, to trace the goals for Jordan and the EU within these policies, the shift towards resilience as a priority for the EU, the new mechanisms and tools the EU uses to build resilience in Jordan, and how it’s might be a better strategy, at the same time, it might be a dilemma for them both.

Terms of the Study:

- **Resilience:**
  Resilience, as a word, stems from the Latin word “resilire.” “Salire” means to leap or jump; the suffix “re” indicates repetition, or backward motion (Bourbeau, 2018). As for its origin, resilience is often traced back to the seventeenth century, however, the concept has flourished and been integrated into many scientific fields, with different meanings. Despite of this fact, all of them have something in common, which is resilience is about the ability to bounce back after crises. In the International Relations field, many scholars have attempted to conceptualize resilience. In the context of this study, resilience refers to “the process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks” (Bourbeau, 2013a, p. 53). The definition presented here presents resilience as a process of adjustment. It’s a dynamic process that makes resilience a systemic way of thinking to face internal and external adversities.

- **Dilemma:**
  Dilemma refers to a situation in which a difficult choice has to be made between two different things (Cambridge Dictionary, 2022). In the context of this study, the difficult situation, for the donors and the hosts of the Syrian refugees, is that they adopted resilience, as a better security strategy than providing humanitarian aid, yet, many challenges still remain for the refugees and the country hosts.

- **The Syrian Refugee Crisis:**
  It refers to the influx of the Syrian refugees to the neighboring countries, as a result of the on-going war in Syria since 2011. Regarding the countries of origin of refugees in the world, the Syrian refugees are at the top of the list till the mid of 2021. The (UNHCR) has registered over 5.6 million Syrian refugees, mostly in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022).

- **Security:**
  Security is generally seen as the freedom of any danger or threat. It is the state’s ability to maintain its sovereignty and independence, by identifying elements crucial to its survival against potential threats (Alougli, 2019).

Previous Studies

Following are some of the significant studies that dealt with the subject of resilience in the international security studies:

1. Bourbeau study, entitled “Resilience, Security, and World Politics,” which proposes a theory of resilience in world politics. He clarifies the major shift in how we understand and apply resilience in world politics arguing that there are three types of resilience that have different implications on policy making (Bourbeau, 2013a).
2. Elena Korosteleva and Trine Flockhart study, entitled "Resilience in EU and International Institutions: Redefining Local Ownership in a New Global Governance Agenda," which sets new directions for understanding resilience. They argue that in order for the EU and International institutions get the full protentional of resilience building, there should be a new understanding of resilience, both as a quality and a way of thinking, taking it to the level of ‘the person’ and ‘the local’. They argue that a more sustainable way to govern the world today is bottom-up and inside-out (Korosteleva & Flockhart, 2020).

3. Andrew Geddes study, entitled "Governing Migration from a Distance: Interactions between Climate, Migration, and Security in the South Mediterranean," analyses the international migration policy and the EU adopting resilience, as a response to waves of migrants. His broader analysis suggests that the EU migration policy seeks to keep migrants where they are by strengthening their capability to adapt in response for crises (Geddes, 2015).

4. Jonathan Joseph and Ana Juncos study, entitled "A promise not fulfilled: The (non)implementation of the resilience turn in EU peacebuilding". In this study, they attempt to analyze the EU role in building resilience in different parts of the world, with a focus in Western Balkans. Their analysis considers the EU role as a promise not fulfilled indicating the lack of efficiency of the EU policies in building resilience (Joseph & Juncos, 2020).

5. Kevin Grove and David Chandler study, entitled "Introduction: Resilience and the Anthropocene: The Stakes of ‘Renaturalising’ Politics". In this study, they take the same track as Joseph and Juncos and criticize the concept inadequacy, challenging the idea of building societal resilience to achieve security. They stress that the unpredictability of crises makes adapting difficult to be achieved.

6. Roseanna Anholt and Giulia Sinatti study, entitled "Under the guise of resilience: The EU approach to migration and forced displacement in Jordan and Lebanon," study the implication of the EU building resilience to examine its implication as a security strategy for the EU. They conclude that such a policy may actually threaten rather secure Europe.

This study adds value and contributes to the current debate about the role of resilience building as a security strategy. The argument presented here would be different from previous arguments, as the author’s main claim may be seen as contrary to the former claims. The author argues that the EU resilience building, especially in response for migrant’s crisis, is more workable than presenting humanitarian aid and that what makes it efficient.

The Theoretical Framework

The contemporary world is facing many challenges including catastrophic climate change, terrorist attacks, financial crises, or prolonged wars. Different policies are put to manage these uncertainties. The one that is rapidly gaining currency is “resilience” (Davoudi, et al., 2012).

Since its integration within systems ecology in the 1970s, resilience, as an operational strategy of risk management, has flourished. In the recent years, the concept has become a regular term in discussions of economic policy, risk analysis, the psychology of trauma, development policy, and the broader national security (Walker & Cooper, 2011). As of the first decade of this century, the concept entered the security studies and started to be related to global governance, terrorism, migration and other issues related to security studies (Aradau, 2014). Several EUs' foreign policy subfields such as the state- and peace-building processes and development and humanitarian aid (de Coning, 2016).

Many international relation scholars attempt to theorize and conceptualize resilience in international security studies. Those scholars’ engagement in resilience aims to answer different questions, but mainly, what resilience means, how it is practiced, why it is good or bad to be resilient, resilient of what and against what and where resilient settles.

Concerning the first question, conceptualizing resilience attempts to deal with the confusion about it (Chandler, 2014). This confusion, which is caught between the abstraction and operationalization, directs the scholars to take a side with one of these approaches; the first one focuses on different qualities of an entity, including their robustness and even resistance to change to quite the opposite, their adaptability, reflexivity and responsiveness to change (Capano & Woo, 2017). The second approach argues that in a world of complexity and uncertainty, it is inefficient to focus only on the quality of an entity, rather, the focus should be directed toward the process of adaptation and self-governance (Walker & Cooper, 2011).
The questions of how and why analyze the practice for many policies that prioritize resilience, to the extent that resilience becomes the aim and the goal itself (Korosteleva & Flockhart, 2020). Other policies present resilience as a mean, only through which response to crises is possible. These policies aim at empowering local communities to be capable to respond to crises (Tocci, 2019). Other scholars criticize the concept inadequacy and challenges the idea of building societal resilience to achieve security stressing that the unpredictability of crises makes adapting difficult to be achieved through resilience policies (Grove & Chandler, 2016) (Joseph & Juncos, 2020).

As for the last question, where resilience is constituted, resilience is linked to the agent level. The analysis aims to understand the agents’ motivation for undertaking adaptive action to be resilient. In this respect, resilience is clarified as the interaction between patterns of power, principles, and practices. The cohesion between these elements is seen as crucial to take an adaptive which is crucial to achieve resilience (Korosteleva & Flockhart, 2020).

As illustrated, the literature concerns with the development of the conceptual, theoretical and empirical approaches of resilience. In this respect, Philippe Bourbeau contribution to the study of resilience in International Relations is crucial. His conceptual and theoretical approach of resilience and its typology will be a corner stone for this paper.

Bourbeau, after studying resilience in the IR, defines it “as the process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks” (Bourbeau, 2013a, p. 53). The definition presented here presents resilience as a process of adjustment. It’s a dynamic process that makes resilience a systemic way of thinking to face internal and external adversities. This definition suits perfectly this paper, as the author also believes that resilience is a continuous process of adjustment and adaptation that aims to enhance the capacities before, during or after the crisis. This would perfectly suit this paper’s context as it aims to give empirical insights of resilience building in response for the Syrian refugee crisis and how it aims to enhance the capacities of refugees and the most vulnerable of the Jordanian communities during the crisis.

After defining resilience, Bourbeau echoes three strands, through which resilience scholars in International Relations present three main perspectives and he comes with his own typology of resilience (Bourbeau, 2013b).

The first perspective is the engineering perspective focusing on systems’ stability. The adjustment of existing policies is what can be seen through this perspective. Only the instrument settings for a policy are changed. The second perspective is an ecological perspective, this approach considers adaptive changes for policy making. As such, instrument settings and the instruments themselves are changed. The final perspective is the evolutionary perspective. Focusing on reflexive renewal basis, an ontological acceptance of crisis as unpredictable and uncontrollable. This type considers paradigmatic policy change, whereby all three components of a policy: the instrument settings, the instruments, and the hierarchy of goals as a wholesale are to be changed (Bourbeau, 2013a).

Reflecting on these perspectives, Bourbeau distinguishes three types of resilience: the first type related to engineering resilience and called Maintenance. In this type, the society aims to maintain the existence of one equilibrium and preserve the status quo. Hence, the main goal is to ensure that the system can bounce to an original equilibrium state after crisis. In order to emphasize the significance of preserving the status quo and how threatening the crisis is, there will be a possible alignment between security discourses and security practices (Bourbeau, 2013a).

In the context of international migration, the influx of refugees is seen as a threat to societies. Thus, policies aim to preserve social cohesion and national security in front of refugees, consequently, more stricter measures will be taken to secure countries’ border (Bourbeau, 2013c) (Geddes, 2015).

The second type, related to ecological resilience, is Marginal Resilience. It refers to the ability of the society to adapt after crisis. This type is characterized by responses that bring changes at the margins, but that do not challenge the basis of a policy. The nature and importance of the problem will often be presented as being less threatening than with the first type, but an effort to acknowledge the issue and to recognize that marginal adjustment is needed will be made. However, since the problem is presented as less threatening, discourse practices and security practices are unaligned (Bourbeau, 2013a).

At last, there is Renewal Resilience, which is related to socio-ecological resilience. This type is characterized by responses that transform basic policy assumptions and potentially remodel social
The Dilemma of Resilience

Lina Aleassa

structures. It implies basically changing existing policies and set new directions for governance. In this type crises are seen positively that aim to build the capacities of local communities (Bourbeau, 2013c).

However, in this study, the author argues that resilience building is not either Maintenance, Marginal or Renewal, rather, mixing more than one of those types. The researcher argues that the EU's contribution in resilience building is not only one of those types, rather, the three or two of them can be found together. EU resilience building aims to renew the policies dealing with refugees, at the same time, it aims to maintain the social cohesion, the political, social and economic stability. Moreover, it might be also marginal, that aims to bring marginal changes to some of the existing policies dealing with those refugees.

Thus, this study would be empirical research that aims for the development of this typology, by examining the EU's resilience building in Jordan. It aims to examine if it is only Maintenance, Marginal, or Renewal or the three types, at least two, can be found in one case.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis, the Challenge for Jordan and the European Union

The Syrian crisis represents a real challenge for Jordan. Jordan's stability can never be separated from such a crisis. As a neighboring country, Jordan has received hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees who have fled from Syria. The influx of refugees has intensified the country's problems, as Jordan is a middle-low class country with limited resources, and an increasing rate of poverty and unemployment (Alougili, 2019). Those refugees have imposed financial, social, and institutional strains on Jordan as a host. By September 2021, the (UNHCR) has registered 670,637 Syrian refugees and asylum seekers in Jordan (Operational Data Portal Refugee Situation, 2021a). However, the total of Syrians is estimated by 1.3 million, considering the unregistered refugees (Alougili, 2019). The majority of those refugees live out of the Syrian refugees’ official camps; Zaatari, Margeeb Alfhood, and Azraq as the figure shows:

![Figure 1. UNHCR Registered Persons of Concern Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Jordan as of August 2021 (Operational Data Portal Refugee Situation, 2021a).](image)

The fact, that the main distribution of those refugees is within local communities and not the Syrian main camps, makes those refugees a greater challenge to the country's social cohesion.

It would be beyond the study's scope to cover in details the impact of refugees on Jordan. The socio-economic impacts of massive number of refugees are catastrophic. As mentioned, Jordan has a high rate of poverty and unemployment and among the poorest country in the world when it comes to water (Al-Junaidi, 2021), thus, more refugees mean a greater
pressure on the poor infrastructure and a greater competition within the labor sector between Jordanians and Syrians (Seeberg, 2020). Further, there are political and security impacts. Jordan is a main member of the international coalition to fight ISIS, at the same time, it combats extremist radical ideologies. This makes the country always a target for radical groups. This was the case in 2016 when the country suffered from an attack on the borders between Jordan and Syria, known as al Rukban attacks (BBC NEWS, 2016). This reason forced Jordan to adopt different policy to respond to security challenges.

When it comes to the EU, it is impossible to isolate the Syrian refugees from its 2015-2016 Europe migrant crisis, as illustrated earlier. During these two years, the EU received the highest number of asylum seekers within two decades. In 2015, almost 1.255 million asylum seekers applied for the EU, 28% were Syrians, the highest share of all applicants as these figures illustrates:

![Figure 2: Asylum application(non-EU) in the EU member states 2008-2020 (Eurostat, 2021).](image)

![Figure 3: First time asylum seekers in the EU Member States by country of citizenship, 2015 (Eurostat, 2016).](image)

The prolonged war with no foreseeable solution makes a new wave of refugees to Europe is possible. In addition, the EU has securitized those refugees. According to the Securitization theory, an issue is securitized once it is introduced as a threat to the national security (Eroukhmanoff, 2018). This implies that those refugees are presented as a threat to Europe (Crone, 2017) as they might affect its social cohesion, there are fears of disguised terrorists among those refugees or terrorist attacks. All these fears have intensified the need to secure its borders before a new wave of refugees occurs.

Accordingly, Jordan and the EU work hard to preserve their security, but how security is interpreted. Security is generally seen as the freedom of any danger or threat. It is the state’s ability to maintain its sovereignty and independence, by identifying elements crucial to its survival against potential threats (Alougili, 2019). Yet, the broader view in the literature is that security is an essentially contested concept (Connolly, 1999). This is the main claim that introduces many articles
and books on security studies nowadays.

It is beyond the scope of this study to conceptualize security and the different theories used to illustrate it, yet, within the context of this paper, security can be understood only in the context of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Through which it expanded the definition of security for a wide range of security areas: Economic security including the creation of employment and measures against poverty; Food security: measures against hunger and famine; Health security: measures against disease, unsafe food, and lack of access to basic health care; Environmental security: measures against, resource depletion, natural disasters and pollution; Personal security: measures against physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence and child labor; Community security: measures against inter-ethnic, religious and other identity tensions and Political security: measures against political repression and human rights abuses (Alougili, 2019).

Security, as it seen here, made them both, adopt different policies that could better tackle the refugee’s challenge. The following section addresses their different policies ending with resilience building.

**Jordan’s and the European Union Response for the Crisis**

Jordan has always been a safe haven for refugees. Although Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugees Convention and its 1967 Protocol, it has received different waves of refugees. Firstly, there were the Palestinians whom Jordan has received since the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948. The Second wave was the Lebanese refugees, who came during the 1975 civil war. The Iraqis came in two waves; the 1991 Gulf War and after the American invasion in 2003, and finally, there were the Syrian refugees (Aleassa, 2020).

As mentioned earlier, the last wave has added burden on the country. However, to a certain extent, Jordan, with the support of the intranational community including the EU, was capable to contain the crisis, due to the government’s adoption of a flexible approach.

At the beginning of the conflict, Jordan has adopted an open-door policy, by building camps for refugees. First, it opened the first official Syrian camp, Al Za’atari, in July 2012. Then, Mrajeeb Al Fhood in April 2013, and Al Azraq was opened in April 2014 (Rasheed & Beaujouan, 2020). It was thought that authorizing building camps could shed the light on the crisis and attract international aids.

However, securitizing Syrian refugees began in 2013. The escalation of the conflict resulted at the continuous flooding of the refugees to Jordan. Thus, in order to control the refugees’ movements inside and outside the camps, the government established the Syrian Refugee Camp Directorate in 2014 (Rasheed & Beaujouan, 2020).

Establishing this directorate was not contradictory to Jordan’s legal framework for dealing with refugees. This framework is based on its 1998 Memorandum of Understanding signed with UNHCR. Based on it, Jordan recognizes the definition of “refugee” and their rights as stated in the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol (Saliba, 2016). Nonetheless, the inadequacy of this framework appeared gradually. Thus, there was an urgent need to establish a better legal framework. As a result, in June 2014, the National Resilience Plan (NRP) was launched, a three years programme of high priority investments to better respond to the impact of the refugees. According to this plan, Jordan planned to invest US$2.41 billion in local institutions and host communities’ various sectors including health, education, employment, energy, and housing (Jordan kam Portal, 2016).

Another plan, the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) was launched in December 2014. A one-year programme planned between the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the UN (Rasheed & Beaujouan, 2020). This plan represents a new approach to the crisis. Previously, the main focus of the Jordanian government was providing humanitarian relief. Yet, from 2014, resilience building of refugees and local communities became the main theme. It aims to achieve a long-term sustainable development, social integration, and capacity building (Jordan kam Portal, 2016).

With the continuous flooding of refugees, the emphasis on a more long-term resilient planning became fundamental. therefore, the JRP was extended until 2020 in two phases: from 2016–2018 and 2018–2020. Then, it was renewed for additional two years (Rasheed & Beaujouan, 2020). The shift of the JRP to cover two years indicates a convergence from...
emergency intervention into a more sustainable long-term resilience planning.

Moreover, to avoid the tension between refugees and local communities, two pillars were added to the 2016 JRP, refugees and resilience. This aims at tackling the needs of both refugees and host communities (Jordan kam Portal, 2016).

At last, in order to achieve a regional coherent process that fosters refugees' and hosts capacities, Jordan signed the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), a jointly-led plan by the (UNHCR) and the United Nation Development Programme in 2015. It is a regional plan, covering the hosts of the Syrian refugees, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq. Each country includes its national response plan for the Syrian refugee crisis. The long-run goal of this plan is achieving strategic regional cooperation, humanitarian assistance and resilience for refugees and their host communities (Rasheed & Beauguon, 2020).

These policies illustrate Jordan's flexible approach. In addition, it confirms how Jordan changes its priorities based on the need of each phase of the Syrian crisis. Thus, the country managed to better respond to the crisis.

As for the EU, it has adopted an approach made of two pillars. The first one is the political-security pillar. It is made of the EU's strategy on Syria, adopted by the EU Council in 2017. This strategy is part of the EU's regional strategy for Syria and Iraq. The key objectives of this strategy are summed up by: ending the war, through a peaceful political transition, providing humanitarian needs, promoting democracy, accountability for war crimes, and fostering resilience of the Syrian population. Further, in order to exert influence on the Syrian regime, the EU has adopted different restrictive measures including sanctions on 270 Syrian individuals and 70 entities and withdrawing from the EU-Syrian partnership (European Council, 2020).

The second pillar is the humanitarian one, the EU and its member states are main donors to support the Syrians. Since 2011, they have provided €17 billion to support the Syrians, both within and outside Syria (European Council, 2020).

This goes in parallel with the EU's position as a generous donor and a reluctant host. As mentioned, almost 5.5 million Syrian refugees live in the neighboring countries. Yet, Syrians have sought asylums in 130 countries. The European countries receive over 1 million of them. 70 percent were received only in two countries: Germany (59 percent) and Sweden (11 percent). Other European countries including Austria, Greece, and France receive between 2 to 5 percent, while the rest of the European countries host below 2 percent (The UN Refugee Agency, 2021b).

The EU's migration crisis illustrates the inadequacy of the EU's migration policy. The influx of refugees has sparked a political crisis within the EU. There was a clear political dispute among the member states on how to better respond to the refugees' flooding. While some countries welcomed them, others closed their borders (Evans, 2020).

Beside the political crisis, it has created a humanitarian one. Thousands have died attempting to reach the EU's shores. As a result, its strict policy in dealing with refugees has put the EU under a big criticism. The former UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon openly criticized it in front of the Australian Parliament in April, 2016. He clarified that the EU's policies negatively affect the obligation of member states under international humanitarian law (The Guardian, 2016).

It is beyond the scope of this study to cover the EU's migration policy and its fears that make the EU adopt such a strict policy. Yet, this illustration was essential to understand the EU's role as a reluctant host.

For this reason, the EU thought of a better policy to support those refugees. The main goal of this policy is to support Syrian refugees and their hosts, keep them where they are and prevent their flooding into Europe in the long run. Thus, in order to translate this on the ground, the EU is a main international donor and a major player in resilience building of those Syrians and the hosts including Jordan (Fakhoury, 2019).

The EU has realized the importance of increasing its support for Jordan, considering Jordan's position, its crucial role in promoting stability, moderation and inter-faith tolerance in the region. Thus, it has been working for the advancement of its relation with Jordan. To ensure that, the EU Delegation for Jordan works on the implementation, the following up and the advancement of their bilateral relations in different fields including politics, economy, trade, security, rule of law, and external assistance (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2021).

As a donor and a member of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), the EU's support has been directed to resilience building after 2015, after it was directed to providing humanitarian assistance (Fakhoury, 2019).
The EU’s support is on different directions; politically and economically. In the first aspect, the EU puts its efforts to enhance the international community’s support to Jordan. It has always emphasized that Jordan should not be left alone and the international community has a duty toward such a main host. Thus, since 2017, the EU has been co-hosting Brussels Conferences for Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region. These conferences bring together world leaders, international and local organizations, and private sectors to address the Syrian crisis. More importantly, these conferences are not only about raising funding, but they aim to set ambition plans to integrate humanitarian and sustainable development axes for both the refugees and the hosts (The National Archives, 2017).

As for its economic support, the EU is a main donor in supporting Jordan. Since 2011, It has pledged nearly €3.2 billion through different instruments; humanitarian aid (€392 million) (European Commission, 2021a) bilateral assistance (€1080 million) (European Commission, 2021b) and resilience assistance (€1728 million) as the table shows:

Table 1. EU Financial Support to Jordan in Response for the Crisis since 2011 in millions € (European Commission, 2021a) (European Commission, 2021b).

![Graph showing EU financial support to Jordan](image)

The humanitarian aid addresses basic needs as healthcare, food, and shelter, for refugees and vulnerable Jordanian families. However, in order to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development nexus, the EU created the Regional Trust Fund in Response for the Syrian Crisis ‘MADAD in 2014’. This instrument, mainly tackles longer term resilience and recovery needs of Syrian refugees and the hosts. Its efforts cover Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt and Iraq. Regarding Jordan, the EU has committed €300 million as a resilience support (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2021). The aim of this fund, by focusing on education, livelihood, water and health, is helping refugees and the vulnerable Jordanians to live in dignity as much as possible.

Dealing with poverty and unemployment is the goal of the bilateral assistance. It is mobilized through the Macro Financial Assistance (MFA) instrument. It seeks to foster Jordan’s economic growth and its economic reforms. The EU has renewed this program for Jordan three times; the first MFA was signed in March 2014, in a programme of €180 million. the MFA II was renewed in September 2017 to pledge an additional €200 million. Finally, the MFA III, totaling EUR 500 million, was adopted on 15 January 2020 (European Commission, 2021b).

However, due to Covid 19, the EU has approved another MFA programme, EUR 200 million to reinforce the resources available under MFA III. It aims to help Jordan curbs the economic fallout of the pandemic. As of November 2020, the EU pledged EUR 250 million of macro-financial assistance, EUR 150 million came from this programme (European Commission, 2021b).

The 2016 EU-Jordan Compact is a great leap in the EU-Jordan thinking about resilience and instrumentalizing the refugees as a development opportunity. The agreement was concluded in February 2016. Through it, the EU approves to pledge multi-year grants and concessional loans; $700 million, as annual grant loans for three years, and concessional loans
of $1.9 billion. (Aleassa, 2020).

Further, to facilitate Jordan access to the EU’s market, the parties agreed on a special trade regime through which the EU simplifies rules of origin for 52 product categories. This scheme has incentivized Jordanian companies to diversify their products and to create decent jobs for Jordanians and Syrians. Hence, since 2016, 15 companies have applied to get benefit of this agreement. While 13 companies have already obtained the approval to export to the EU, 6 of those have exported a value of €19.26 million (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2021).

However, Jordan has to meet certain targets considering those refugees. First, Jordan has to facilitate their labor market access. To achieve this, it has to issue 200,000 work permits for refugees in specified sectors. Moreover, the country must employ certain quotas of those refugees in different businesses, working on the investment climate, and legitimize Syrian businesses in the country. The second target is related to their education. Jordan is committed to increase the enrollment of the Syrian children at the public schools and to increase their work training opportunities (Aleassa, 2020).

The implications for such a significance agreement can never be underestimated. First, it transfers the nature of response from humanitarian aid to the development nexus. Second, it is believed that facilitating their access into labor market contributes to their self-reliance and the host communities ‘development.

Nonetheless, there are many aspects which have been criticized, making resilience to be considered as a dilemma for the EU and Jordan. The following section addresses this dilemma and how they are trying to address it.

**Resilience the Dilemma and Resolving it**

To clarify how resilience might be a dilemma for the EU, considering the EU’s approach in its response for the crisis is essential. As illustrated, this approach is made of two pillars, through it, it aims to bring an end to the conflict and enable the Syrians to live in peace in their own country.

Yet, this approach seems insufficient and there is imbalance between the political and humanitarian efforts. By its efforts to exert influence against the Assad regime, as mentioned earlier, the EU has actually decreased its influence leading to political disengagement and less presence in the region (Turkmani & Haid, 2016).

In addition, those restrictive measures are not playing a key role, till now, to end the conflict or to facilitate the peaceful transition. Hence, focusing on the humanitarian response with such a political dis- engagement is eventually forcing the EU to pay a higher humanitarian cost.

Moreover, the EU has been criticized for its strict policy in dealing with refugees. As illustrated, the former UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon expressed, in front of the Australian Parliament in April, 2016 that EU’s policies have a negative impact on the member states’ obligation under international humanitarian law (The Guardian, 2016). Hence, resilience, which the EU uses as a compensation for its strict policy, seems insufficient and the EU is expected to do more.

Further, resilience as a containment policy, does not seem to bring an end to the refugees’ suffering at the host countries. What’s more, the economic downturn, which is intensified by the Covid pandemic, is making the refugees’ situation even worse. There has been a limitation to their access to healthcare and education. In addition, for many Jordanians, those refugees are competitors for them in the Jordanian labor market. Hence, there is a strong desire for the Syrians to leave Jordan (Harpviken & Schirmer-Nilsen, 2021).

Jordan, as a host, does not seem to be at a better position either. Resilience is incapable to address the country's challenges. Economic social strains and dissatisfaction with the government policies have put the country’s social cohesion on the edge. The king himself has been criticized for being so generous with refugees, at the expense of his people (Harpviken & Schirmer-Nilsen, 2021).

Moreover, the country is uncapable of fully making its commitments under the compact. It is not to say that there is not progress, but the challenges remain. In education, out of the 238,038 refugee children at school age, only 143,765 enrolled to formal education (The UN Refugee Agency, 2021a). Regarding labor market access, the authorities have issued more work permits, yet, refugees have limited access to the labor market.

Still, Jordan is trying to make resilience workable as much as possible. Preserving Jordan’s social cohesion has always
been a priority; thus, many initiatives aim to address this issue. In education, for instance, there are many projects. One of these initiatives is Generations for Peace which has been running since 2015. With the aim of reducing violence at schools, they have different after-school activities that bring Syrian and Jordanian students together (Salem & Morrice, 2019).

Further, Jordan is obliging aid organizations to target both refugees and host communities. Through this, the country is trying to decrease the competition between refugees and local communities. Adding to that, the official approval for any project requires targeting at least 30% vulnerable host (Jordanian) under the resilience pillar, and at least 30% refugees under the refugee pillar (Rasheed & Beaujouan, 2020).

Alongside these, Jordan has shown a unique example of leadership and solidarity in hosting refugees, especially with Covid 19. The country is one of the world’s first countries that started COVID-19 vaccinations for every UNHCR-registered refugees including Syrians. By this, the proportion of the refugees affected by Covid 19 remained low, at 1.6 percent in comparison with 3 percent for normal Jordan population (The UN Refugee Agency, 2021c). This reveals how Jordan is not denying those refugees’ rights in having health care and trying to ensure that they have the same right as any Jordanian.

To get benefits under the scheme of relaxed rules of origin, the government has established almost 18 special economic zones to facilitate exporting to EU’s markets. This is a great achievement for the compact which aims at translating refugees to a development asset (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2021).

Hence, more companies have got benefits, contributing to increase Jordan exports to the EU, with a total value of €56 million in 2019, in comparison with 19.2 million in 2016 (Al Nawas, 2020). In addition, the government is working to encourage more small and medium enterprises to reap its benefits (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2021).

More importantly, Jordan is working hard to compile with its commitment. In that respect, the agreement has resulted in a considerable progress for Syrian refugees (Barblet et al, 2018). Considering these children’s right of education, Jordan is committed that every Syrian child would be in school, alongside a promised investment of $97.6 million to have an additional 102 double shift schools (Badarin & Schumacher, 2020). To meet its commitment, the government works to expand the use of double shift schools, with the first morning shift for the Jordanian student, and the afternoon shift mainly for the Syrians. The result, as of April-June 2021, 143,765 Syrian children school age were enrolled in public schools out of the 238,038. This constitutes 60% of the whole registered Syrian children (The UN Refugee Agency, 2021a). This can be seen as a considerable progress, in comparison with the situation prior to the compact.

There is also a progress regarding their labor market access (Barblet et al, 2018). One of these progresses is related to work permits’ fees. Prior to the agreement, those refugees were considered as any labor migrant, who pays almost €900 annually for a work permit. High fees, administration procedures alongside missing official documentation for refugees resulted that only around 3,000 permits were issued before 2016. However, Syrians now pay only JD10 (12 €) administration fees (Badarin & Schumacher, 2020). Moreover, there have been tremendous efforts to facilitate issuing work permits. While In 2017, only 46,000 work permits were issued in sectors authorized for Syrians, this figure has increased dramatically to become 239,024 as of June 2021 (Operational Data Portal Refugee Situations, 2021b).

Additionally, to ensure that all efforts are directed towards similar goals and avoid wasting time and resources, the 3RP response for the Syrian Crisis is harmonized with another national policy, Vision 2025, launched in 2015 to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth (Rasheed & Beaujouan, 2020). These steps make the compact workable and make the government on the right path to resolve the dilemma.

The EU, on the other side, is working to resolve this dilemma. First and foremost, it is trying to translate its vision about resilience on the ground. A key element of this vision is framing refugees as a development opportunity for the host states. This agreement is a perfect embodiment for such a vision (Barblet et al, 2018). Through linking aids and the relaxation of trade regulations to labor market access, the EU, is not only creating development opportunities, but also enhancing the possibility of self-reliance for those refugees.

Another EU ‘scheme is fostering Jordan’s macroeconomic stability. The EU’s Macro- financial assistance is crucial to
reduce the gross public debt, which is stabilized at 91% of Jordan’s GDP in 2021 (Aleassa, 2020). Moreover, the EU contributes to foster Jordan's economic resilience. Instruments, like the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have a great role in supporting Jordan. The (EIB), for instance, helps improving the socio-economic infrastructure as well as private sector development. After the EU-Jordan compact, its support increased to become €2.14 billion. Currently, it is supporting 69 projects in different sectors including water, energy and support to SMEs (European Investment Bank, 2021). This represents an acknowledgement of the challenges posed by the refugees and the importance of helping Jordan to compile with its commitments.

Further, the EU launched the Economic Resilience Initiative in 2016. Its main objective is to enhance the EU’s Southern Neighborhood and Western Balkans countries’ ability to withstand shocks and improve their economic resilience. For Jordan, it has financed projects in different fields. In water and sanitation, for instance, in 2019, it approved the EUR 65 million financing agreement. The project would improve the water supply systems in “Deir Alla and Al-Karamah” in the Jordan valley serving almost 85,000 people in that region (Aleassa, 2020).

Also, as Jordan is limited in natural resources, saving energy is essential. In that respect, the ERI supports Jordan to have a green and sufficient energy. Its efforts are directed particularly to support Jordanian governates which host the highest share of those refugees; its main goal is reducing the high energy bill of those governates. Thus, the EIB last loan provided €45 million to Cities and Villages Development Bank to support municipalities’ investments in energy efficiency infrastructure. Taking streets lightening as an example, it would decrease its bill to the half (Elnimr, 2019).

The role of the private sector, along small and medium enterprises (SME) to obtain inclusive and sustainable growth cannot be ignored. Accordingly, the ERI has funded many projects supporting SMEs. One of these is Jordanian Action for Development of Enterprises’ (JADE). A 3 years project that was launched in 2017. Its purposes are supporting over 160 SMEs, startups and entrepreneurs and creating new employment opportunities for Jordanians (Jordanian Action for Development of Enterprises, 2017).

Besides, the Regional Trust Fund is making the EU’s approach workable as much as possible. It contributes to build the capacities of those refugees and realize sustainable development goals for them and their hosts. Up to now, it finances 36 projects in Jordan's sectors; in education, 99,314 girls & boys have access to primary education; 72,145 Syrians and Jordanians have access to improved water services; 79,891 benefit from livelihoods & resilience support; 37,458 benefit from protection services; 144,015 have access to medical care; 1,309 have access to higher education or vocational training and finally 172,500 have access to social cohesion services (European Commission, 2020).

In parallel, resilience building of the host countries has been in line with improving the EU’s potentials as a host. The 2015 migration crisis has revealed that the EU lacks a clear comprehensive policy to deal with large inflows of migrants. Further, it reveals that the acceptance of new arrivals depends on the willingness of each member state to accept them. What’s more, it illustrates that the reception condition standards remarkably vary among the EU members (Karageorgiou, 2021).

This underscores the necessity for a better harmonization of asylum procedures and standards. While the Common European Asylum System puts common standards for the treatment of asylum seekers (European Council, 2021), however, they are not treated likewise and recognition rates differ among member states. As a result, many asylum seekers move within the EU searching for the best country to apply for asylum. This required reforming the current asylum system. Thus, in 2016 and 2019, the Commission put forward a new legislative proposal, as part of a new pact on migration and asylum (European Council, 2021). The new pact emphasizes on flexible solidarity, which implies that each EU member states is bound to act in solidarity in time of crises (Bruycker, 2020).

At the same time, it implies that the EU is taking the international community’s calls and criticism of its migration policy seriously. More importantly, the EU acknowledges that relying on resilience building will not be enough to respond to refugee crisis without taking in consideration the EU inner crises, the internal division among the EU member states and its need to find a better strategy to respond to large flows of migrants, otherwise, its solidarity will be in vain in time of crises.
Conclusion

The final conclusion is that the EU resilience building is not only maintenance, marginal or reflexive, rather more than one type together, at least two types can be found in Jordan. The EU-Jordan compact is reflexive resilience that transfers the policy utterly leading to a new policy. This policy represents refugees as a development asset for the first time, yet, more research is needed to show how they really contribute to the local communities’ development.

Maintenance resilience can also be found in Jordan. Different initiatives contribute to Jordan's social cohesion and its stability, beside the macro-economic assistance that fosters Jordan's economic resilience. These come within maintenance resilience that aims to preserve the status quo. Maintenance resilience enables Jordan's institutions to function properly, till now, and preserve its stability.

The study also concludes that resilience might be a dilemma for Jordan and the EU, yet, they are trying to resolve this and make it workable. Moreover, there are different scenarios that can make it even more workable. The first scenario is related to Jordan considering the relaxation of trade regulations. As illustrated, this scheme has contributed to increase Jordan's exports to the EU market, yet, to get its full potentials, it is possible for Jordan to raise the awareness of the business community about the scheme, particularly, for manufacturers in remote areas.

The second scenario is Jordan working to get advantage of its stability within the region. This stability is a main factor to attract local and external investments, however, high taxes make investors prefer other destinations like Turkey or Egypt. Hence, if Jordan identifies and addresses the challenges businesses face, it would gain much benefits. For instance, decreasing taxes or improving infrastructure, addressing these challenges would be of a great interest to investors and eventually lead to growth.

The final scenario is that the EU balances its humanitarian and political efforts in the region. This is not to say, it is the EU's responsibility alone, to bring an end to the conflict and promote peaceful political transition. Yet, by doing this, it would make its resilience building in the region more workable.

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