

The Iranian Impact on Iraqi-Jordanian Relations after 2003

Falah Mubarak Bardan * 

Center for Strategic Studies, University of Anbar, Ramadi, Iraq

Received: 28/1/2023
Revised: 20/7/2023
Accepted: 4/1/2024
Published: 30/12/2023

* Corresponding author:
dr.falah_policy@uoanbar.edu.iq

Citation: Bardan, F. M. . (2023). The Iranian Impact on Iraqi-Jordanian Relations after 2003 . *Dirasat: Human and Social Sciences*, 50(6), 276–285.
<https://doi.org/10.35516/hum.v50i6.7082>

Abstract

Objectives: The study aims to examine the possibilities and challenges associated with repairing ties between Jordan and Iraq. Additionally, it explores how Iraq's foreign policy priorities towards other nations are influenced, in part, by Iran.

Methods: The historical evolution of relations between Iraq and Jordan is tracked using the historical technique described in the first section of the article. The second section employs an analytical and descriptive technique to investigate the impact of the Iranian variable on the Iraq-Jordan relationship.

Results: Iranian influence on Iraqi political decision-making has significantly shaped Iraq's political, economic, and security orientations concerning other Arab nations. Iran assesses Iraq's international relations through the zero-sum game theory, viewing alliances between Iraq and its Arab neighbours or nations close to the United States as detrimental to its interests.

Conclusion: Since 2003, Iran has actively interfered in Iraq, directly impacting its foreign policy. The constraints on Iraqi political decision-makers limit their ability to advance Iraq's national interests. Consequently, the post-2003 relationship between Iraq and Jordan serves as a model illustrating the impact of the Iranian component in Iraq, leading to minimal changes in Iraq's foreign policy concerning the Arab regional environment..

Keywords: Iraq, Jordan, Iran, international relations, impact.

التأثير الإيراني في العلاقات العراقية - الأردنية بعد عام 2003 م

فلاح مبارك بردان *

مركز الدراسات الاستراتيجية، جامعة الأنبار، الرمادي، العراق

ملخص

الأهداف: إن دراسة إمكانيات وتحديات إصلاح العلاقات بين الأردن والعراق هو هدف الدراسة، وإن أولويات السياسة الخارجية العراقية تجاه الدول الأخرى تتحدد جزئياً بسبب النفوذ الإيراني في العراق.

المنهجية: لتتبع التطور التاريخي للعلاقات بين العراق والأردن، استخدم الباحث الأسلوب التاريخي الموضح في القسم الأول من البحث. جرى تناول تأثير المتغير الإيراني في العلاقات بين العراق والأردن في القسم الثاني من المقال باستخدام الأسلوب التحليلي والوصفي.

النتائج: مارس النفوذ الإيراني ضغطاً كبيراً على القرار السياسي العراقي في تحديد التوجهات السياسية والاقتصادية والأمنية للعراق تجاه الدول العربية. وتتبنى إيران تقييمها لعلاقات العراق الخارجية وفقاً لنظرية اللعبة الصفيرية في العلاقات الدولية: لأنها ترى أن أي تطور للعلاقة بين العراق وجيرانه العرب يعد خسارة لها، والعكس صحيح.

الخلاصة: منذ عام 2003، تدخلت إيران على نحو فعال في العراق وكان لها تأثير مباشر في سياستها الخارجية. لذا فإن صانع القرار السياسي العراقي محدود الخيارات نتيجة عدم قدرته على تحقيق المصالح الوطنية العراقية. لذلك نجد إن العلاقة بين العراق والأردن بعد عام 2003 تشكل نموذجاً لتأثير المتغير الإيراني في العراق. ولهذا السبب، لم تتغير سياسة العراق الخارجية على نحو كبير مع محيطه العربي بعد العام 2003.

الكلمات الدالة: العراق، الأردن، إيران، العلاقات الدولية، التأثير.



© 2023 DSR Publishers/ The University of Jordan.

This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY-NC) license
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>

Introduction

Iraqi-Jordanian relations have been stable and consistent ever since the modern Iraqi state first began to take shape. This connection between two Arab nations with similar geographical, economic, national, and religious characteristics was defined as a strategic partnership as well as a familial one. However, since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, this relationship has suffered greatly and been severely strained. This is because of the negative effects of the occupation on politics, security, and the economy, the most notable of which is probably the fundamental transformation of the Iraqi political system and the adoption of a new constitution that laid the groundwork for a new political order in light of the unstable occupation environment, the accompanying lack of security stability, and outside interference in Iraqi affairs that resulted in the loss of entire independence.

The Iran's ambitions and threats not only to Iraq, but to the Arab Gulf and the whole Middle East. The withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in 2011 and from Afghanistan after 20 years of conflict, is being perceived as waning US security presence in the volatile Middle East. Major regional powers in the Middle East, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel, are seeking to "fill the imminent void in the Gulf" and increase their stake in building the region's new security architecture. Major powers outside the region, including Russia, China, France, and the United States, are actively seeking to claim higher stakes in the future security of the Gulf states.

Iraq's foreign ties with its worldwide environment in general and its Arab regional environment in particular significantly changed as a result of these foreign involvement in Iraqi affairs. After Iran, Iraq was able to take advantage of the political and security vacuum in Iraq in 2003, dominating Iraqi political decision-making and steering it in the direction of Iranian objectives. One of the most significant signs of change in Iraqi-Jordanian relations is the transformation of what was once referred to be a strategic partnership into an official relationship after losing that status in the domains of politics, economy, and security. There is no question that the Iranian factor has had the greatest impact on relations between Jordan and Iraq since 2003.

The First Topic: The Development of Iraqi-Jordanian Relations

There is a relationship between Iraq and its western neighbor, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, that dates back many years. Over time, these relationships experienced significant changes. Due to the numerous and significant political and security upheavals that Iraq has seen since becoming an independent state in 1921, they have also occasionally witnessed setbacks and retreats. From this perspective, we will discuss in this topic a historical overview of the growth of Iraqi-Jordanian relations for two periods of time, namely before 2003 and after. This year represented a turning point and a comprehensive change in Iraq on all political, security, and economic levels as a result of the American occupation, and the Iraqi-Jordanian relations were not at the forefront of this change. Far from it, the level and nature of these ties were badly impacted by political developments. As a result, the research will be split into two sections: the first one will cover the evolution of Iraqi-Jordanian relations prior to 2003, and the second will cover those interactions following 2003.

The First Requirement / Iraqi-Jordanian Relations before 2003

Since King Faisal bin Al-accession Hussein's to the Iraqi throne in 1921 A.D. (who is considered the third son of the Sheriff of Makkah Al-Hussein bin Ali Al-Hashemi and the first king of the Kingdom of Iraq 1921-1933 and the King of Syria March 1920-July 1920). As King (Faisal bin Al-Hussein) backed the independence of (the administration of Transjordan) after the British declaration in 1923, relations between Iraq and Jordan started to move in the direction of collaboration and agreement on many relevant issues. The two sides agreed that their shared boundary would start at the intersection of longitude 39 east and latitude 32 north, proceed northwest in a straight line to the closest point on the border between Syria and the territory of Transjordan at latitude 33 north, and end between them at that juncture. As a result, these restrictions were changed in the early 1990s of the previous century.



Map No. 1 shows the geographical location and the common borders of Iraq and Jordan

https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81:Iraq_Jordan_Locator.svg

Prince (Abdullah bin Al-Hussein) succeeded King Faisal ibn Al-Hussein as head of the Hashemite family in 1933. There is a loose partnership between Transjordan and Iraq, but Britain opposed the success of this alliance, hence these efforts were unsuccessful. Since the 1950s of the previous century, relations between Jordan and Iraq have greatly improved. At the beginning of 1958 AD, both kingdoms (Iraq and Jordan) were able to declare an Arab union between them (the union between the kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq), but this union only lasted for five months before a revolution occurred. On July 14, 1958, King Faisal II of Iraq was assassinated, ending the Hashemite royal family's rule over Iraq and the monarchy there. Jordan initially believed that what had happened was an internal matter for the Iraqis, but tensions between the two countries grew throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s. Because Jordan backed Iraq throughout its eight-year war with Iran, their relations experienced a true collaboration in all areas during the 1980s. The Kingdom of Jordan believed that Iran posed a potential threat to Jordan and the Arabs between 1980 and 1988, when King Hussein at the time provided limitless assistance for Iraq during the war, as Iran supported Jordan Iraq in particular economically and politically. In exchange, Jordan received oil from Iraq at prices much below market value during the eight years of the conflict through the Jordanian port of Aqaba and land links between Jordan and Iraq.

Jordan experienced severe economic and political consequences after the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait in 1990 as a result of King Hussein's moderate position on the conflict. They are a significant economic, social, and financial burden on a nation with limited resources because they labor in Kuwait and the Arab Gulf states. The Jordanian-Iraqi relations, however, reached a new turning point during the period of the economic blockade on Iraq between 1991 and 2002. During this time, Iraq supported the Jordanian economy by giving it oil at reduced prices or even for free at times. As a result, Jordan became Iraq's only economic outlet. Iraq cannot give up its only outlet to the outside world as Jordan welcomes Continuing the policy of subsidized oil, which lifted some of its economic burdens. When the son-in-law of Iraqi President Hussein Kamel fled to Jordan, in addition to receiving a portion of the Iraqi opposition, which infuriated former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

The Second Requirement: Iraqi-Jordanian Relations after 2003.

Following the United States' leadership of a coalition to occupy Iraq in particular in 2003, the Middle East and Iraq saw a significant political and security shift. As one of the issues with the new Iraqi political system, Iraq's foreign policy after 2003 stands out because it was subjected to factors that were different from those used in other nations to determine the country's foreign policy. What caused Iraq's foreign policy to lose its bearings? This depends on the perspective of the person in charge of carrying out public policy, which may be influenced by ideological, national, or even personal concerns (Al-Shammari 2022). In terms of the relationship between Iraq and Jordan, the new foreign policy philosophies adopted

after 2003 directly affected the relationship's level and strength as a result of outside influences on the country's ability to make its own foreign policy decisions on the one hand, and the emergence of a political class that formerly identified as the "political opposition to the regime" on the other.

The former politician" to take over the leadership of the Iraqi state, with what this class has to offer in terms of memories and stories about some Arab countries that have close political and economic ties to Iraq, and on which this political class has relied for support from nations that backed the previous political regime. (Badran 2014, p. 45). These parties, which stood in for the new political power, arrived with views that they claimed betrayed the Jordanian queen's unfavorable role in her interactions with the existing political order. The fact that the majority of this political power is connected to regional nations with their own political initiatives in Iraq further exacerbated the situation. It took advantage of the opportunity to fill the political and security void and saw it as a chance to carry out its long-term plans, which led the Arab countries (particularly Jordan) to treat it as a key factor in their ties with Iraq. Jordan's leadership was concerned about these new political power dynamics following the occupation, and their anxiety increased when the US government chose to disregard the worries of its regional allies and partners. And its refusal to act on recommendations made to it to address the complicated situation in Iraq before it is too late, such as delaying the elections that were held in February 2005 for a period of six months and delaying approval of the constitution in light of the ongoing boycott of significant Iraqi parties that represent significant segments of the Iraqi people (Abdul Karim 2011, p. 94).

Despite the complexity of the previously unheard-of Iraqi political and security landscape and the extent of its impact on Iraq's relations with Jordan, this did not deter the Jordanian government from opening up to Iraq and attempting to play a significant role in it because of the shared interests that can be achieved for both parties. As a result, Jordan has worked to train thousands of security forces. In addition, Jordan has consistently worked to persuade some Iraqi parties to engage in political discourse as well as cooperate in information gathering with American and succeeding governments in light of the subsequent rise in violence in the nation. (Abu Rumman, 2008, p.34). During this time, Jordan's stance in its interactions with Iraq was quite similar to the Arab viewpoint as a whole.

The Jordanian participation was restricted to observing the situation from a distance without becoming involved in unanticipated risks of outcomes and consequences because it was fully aware of the reality of what was happening in Iraq due to history and geography and was able to draw its own interests. And doing it in a way that is appropriate, but to a large part its restricted capabilities prevent this from happening. The constitutional monarchy movement, which was active at the time and called for the return of the Hashemite throne to rule Iraq, may have been Jordan's attempt to revive its previous partnership with that country, but it failed and did not find widespread approval or support. (Rajab 2010, pp. 22-24). King Abdullah II visited Iraq in August of the same year (2008), marking the beginning of Jordanian and Arab openness to Iraq and reflecting Jordan's desire to maintain a strong relationship with Iraq following the change of the previous political regime. This visit was the first by an Arab leader at the time.

Due to Iraq's transformation of some of its regions, particularly those on its western border with Jordan, into a regional hub for the terrorist Al-Qaeda organization, particularly during the years (2005 and 2006) led by the terrorist "Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi," Jordan has been exposed to one of the most significant sources of threat and security danger from its eastern borders with Iraq. The Amman bombings in November 2005 marked a turning point in Jordan's security cooperation with Iraq as the Jordanian Intelligence Service took part in the security operations to combat terrorism inside Iraqi territory, which led to the arrest of one of the most wanted men in the eyes of both the Jordanian General Intelligence Service and the American Intelligence. One of al-most Qaeda's well-known members, named "Ziyad al-Karbouli". (Lasensky 2006, p.6) . The signing of a security cooperation agreement between Jordan and Iraq in the military and security sectors. This agreement covers the sharing of knowledge, skills, and information on border security and countering international terrorism, as well as joint military exercises, the development of intelligence capabilities, and research and technology development. It is known as (2018 Agreement on Security Cooperation Between Iraq and Jordan). From the aforementioned, it is evident that the relationship between Iraq and Jordan did not significantly change in line with their respective geopolitical realities because both countries complement one another. While Jordan, on the other hand, struggles

with a lack of oil and natural gas but has people energies and serves as a vital strategic market for Iraq's exports, Iraq, with its oil and natural gas, suffers from repeated political and security crises. Iraq's needs include oil, consumer and building supplies, as well as Jordanian expertise in dealing with terrorist organizations and instructing its security forces in contemporary campaigns against terrorism. These regional players have an impact on Iraq's politics, economy, and security.

The Second Topic: The Variable Impact of the Iranian on Iraqi-Jordanian Relations

Since the region, taken broadly, is an interconnected geographical unit, it is impossible to separate any influence from any country on the geographical neighboring countries or within the scope, making the international and regional variables among the most significant factors that directly or indirectly affect the political stability of any country within a specific regional scope. Influences from the region as a whole, including those with good or negative features; the latter is a result of the conflicting and divergent interests of two or more countries. (Al-Labbad 2006, p. 89). Since 2003, the region has witnessed geostrategic shifts represented in the imbalance of regional powers after the absence of the important regional actor in the region, which is Iraq. In favor of the emergence of Iran as a regional power that possesses effective tools of influence on regional and international interactions between the countries of the Middle East, and the pattern and nature of Iranian influence emerges directly through its policy. Intersecting with most of the countries of the region or through its regional agents, whether states or non-states (militias). (Al-Ghunaimi 2021, p. 51). The aforementioned had a clear impact on the overall Iraqi-Jordanian relations because of the regional actor that has come to dominate the political decisions of some countries in the region, including (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen).

The most notable of these countries that were impacted by the Iranian actor after 2003 is Iraq, after the Iraqi political decision became dependent on the Iranian will and its interests, and this explains the reason for the decline in the levels of Iraqi-Jordanian relations after 2003. The foreign policies of these countries, their relationships with other countries, and the levels of trade exchange and security cooperation are also factors. (Al-Louizi 2008, p. 124) We will address each component of this topic in a separate request as we work to determine the influence of the Iranian actor on the political, security, and economic contacts between Iraq and Jordan:

The First Requirement: The Impact of the Iranian Variable on the Iraqi-Jordanian Relations in the Political Fields

Following the overthrow of the Iraqi political system in 2003 by an international coalition led by the United States, which came in second in the calculations of the balances of international and regional power, were a number of countries that were able to consolidate their influence at all levels and in all forms. Among these countries was the United Kingdom, which managed to consolidate its influence in all of its levels and forms at the expense of the majority of international and regional powers, including the United States, which came in third place in the calculations of the balances of the international and regional powers affecting Iraq. (Jasim, K. 2009, p. 20). Iran turned from a country relatively isolated from its regional environment for a long time due to the regional balance of power before 2003, as Iraq represented one of its pillars and was considered one of the most important strategic determinants that impede the implementation of the Iranian project in the Middle East region. But the imbalance of power after the occupation of Iraq and the failure of the American strategy In Iraq, after it faced an "Iraqi quagmire" similar to the "Vietnamese quagmire." In return, Iran was able to exploit the opportunity that it found convenient for it to realize its old project, which dates back to 1979, which stipulates what Iran calls "exporting the Islamic revolution in Iran" to the countries of the East. Islamic Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. (Salama 2017, p. 26).

The intertwining of roles and interests between regional and international forces in Iraq reflects these new data brought about by regional power imbalances. As a result, Iran's perceptions of its national interests and of its power within its regional context have evolved into guidelines for its regional policy, support for the implementation of its expansion project, and translation of those goals into goals within the Iranian post-war strategy. In 2003, therefore, these regional changes revealed the reality of Iranian slogans with a religious-revolutionary dimension after the Iranian external pragmatic behavior proved its opposite, which includes achieving its narrow national interests. The most prominent of which are: regional

hegemony in all its political, economic and cultural dimensions. Expanding its sphere of influence after the occupation of Iraq, creating a suitable regional environment for the implementation of Iranian goals and limiting foreign influence in the region for its sole hegemony over the region and its remaining a major regional power in the Middle East. (Aishoun and Abdul Karim 2017, pp. 81-82). The nature of this connection, which has been severely harmed by the shift in the Iraqi political system, has had a direct bearing on how the Iranian variable has affected the relations between Iraq and Jordan. First and foremost, and it's nearly universally acknowledged that the Iraqi-Jordanian political relations are the most damaged, is the rise of Iranian influence in Iraq. The negative effect was evident in the character of Iraqi-Jordanian ties, which changed from a strategic alliance to restricted official bilateral contacts, in comparison to Iraq's foreign relations.

Jordan realized from an early age the danger of the Iranian role in Iraq on its interests and relations with Iraq since the beginning of 2003. And this became clear after Iran was able to consolidate its influence in Iraq through stages until it was able to influence the Iraqi-Jordanian relations in its political aspect, as despite the existence of diplomatic exchange between the two countries. But we often find political intersections between them with regard to Arab and regional issues. The most important of which is the Iraqi position, which contradicts the positions of most Arab countries on the Syrian crisis, as Iraq supports the current Syrian political system, and this is consistent with the Iranian project. The situation applies to the events in Yemen, Bahrain and Lebanon, as we find a wide discrepancy between the Jordanian and Iraqi foreign policy, which reflects the reality of the Iranian political influence on the Iraqi-Jordanian relations. Jordan and some other Arab and international nations are aware of Iran's political influence over Iraq, hence Jordanian diplomacy has been working in tandem with global and regional initiatives to bring Iraq back into the Arab fold. The "New East Project" is one of the most significant of these initiatives that Jordan vehemently backed. Political projects with economic names were therefore created.

The stated goal of the "New East Project" is coordination and economic cooperation between Iraq, Egypt and Jordan, the reality of the project indicates that there are many strategic dimensions indicated by this project and the interests and goals it can achieve, as Iraq's tendency to find a formula of cooperation with other countries Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states constitute in and of themselves an Iraqi recognition of Iranian political interference in its affairs, And Iraq's desire to return to the Arab ranks after the Iraqi-Iranian relations had outweighed the Arab-Iraqi relations, until Iran became the most influential and effective regional country in the Iraqi arena, on the political, economic and security levels. The "New East" project may constitute a step towards "rebalancing" Iraq's Arab and regional relations. (Al-Obaidi 2021) Iran activated its resources in Iraq to halt this initiative at its beginning after realizing the threat it posed to its interests there. Iraqi foreign policy places a high priority on relations with Jordan..

The Second Requirement / the Iranian impact on Iraqi-Jordanian Cooperation in the Economic Fields

As nations frequently use their economies as a way of bridging political and security gaps, it is well known that the economy plays a significant role in international relations. This is especially true given that the world is currently experiencing a revolution in the form of massive economic blocs that encourage international cooperation rather than conflict, which is exactly how it should be. If the economic were to be used in the political interactions between Iraq and Jordan, benefits and interests would be realized for both parties. However, the reality of the Iraqi-Jordanian relations after 2003 contradicts the previous principle that assumes that the world of the twenty-first century is influenced by the economy more than politics. As we see that the influence of politics is overriding economic interests in the Iraqi-Jordanian relations. Where Jordan moved from being the first commercial and economic partner of Iraq, from 1991-2003, to a significant decline in the volume of trade exchange between the two countries for reasons some of which were security, such as the control of terrorist organizations over the regions of western Iraq and the cutting of the international highway linking Iraq with Jordan. Additionally, there are political factors at play, the most significant of which is probably the entry of Iran as a significant political, security, and economic player in comparison to the other nations, which reduced Jordan's status as a true economic partner to the level of limited economic relations in contrast to the volume of trade and commerce between Iraq and its neighbors, including Iran and Turkey.

Therefore, Jordan is one of the most prominent countries that have been economically affected by the political change in Iraq after 2003. And the reason is not due to the removal of a political regime that supports Jordan only, but also because the Iraqi-Jordanian relations are no longer based on the logical reciprocal interest. The economy is no longer directed by the economic dimension or transparent competition, but the presence of influential regional powers on Iraqi soil. And they have political influence represented by the presence of some political parties that own weapons and are linked to them. It is certain that these influential forces will work to remove every competitor or political and economic partner that affects their influence in Iraq, and there are no regional or even international forces that have more influence in Iraq than Iran possesses in terms of elements and supportive elements for this influence. And that among the most important Iranian interests in the region is to ensure the existence of markets for the disposal of its products, which are subject to economic and financial sanctions, which make it difficult for the task of exporting them to obtain difficult currency. Therefore, the Iranian strategic perception considers Iraq as the first market for the disposal of goods and the “lung” through which it breathes to evade Harsh sanctions on the Iranian economy.

He referred to the former Iraqi ambassador to Jordan as "timid" while acknowledging the drop in indicators of the volume of commercial exchange between Iraq and Jordan. Al-Athari said in a speech during a meeting with the Masarat Development Organization in Jordan, that the volume of trade exchange between the two countries is small compared to the ambition between the two countries, adding that the numbers are shy and do not rise to the level of the relationship between the two countries. Jordan exported to Iraq with 616 million dollars, while it imported Jordan 83 million dollars from Iraq. (Nabad, 2022)


There are numerous potential to improve relationships between the two nations, which would be profitable for both. However, in order to take advantage of these financial and economic prospects, a sensible political decision must be made that balances the interests and benefits of the decision. If such a decision cannot be made, Iranian political influence in Iraq must be taken into account. And this explains why the majority of the numerous agreements reached between Iraq and Jordan remain on paper with little to no actual implementation. The combined industrial city project, which has been agreed upon since 2019, may be the most significant of them all, but no serious steps have been taken to implement it. To this day, every economic endeavor between Iraq and its Arab neighbors has been abandoned because of the existence of Iranian-friendly political views.

The Third Requirement / Iranian Influence on Iraqi-Jordanian Cooperation in the Field of Energy

Because Jordan and Iraq are neighbors and Iraq has vast oil reserves while Jordan has not, cooperation in the energy sector is a key pillar in the foundations of the two countries' ties. In particular, oil is a key component of this cooperation. It makes sense that a relationship of collaboration would develop in this area, especially since Jordan has ports that can receive enormous oil tankers and is close to the Suez Canal, which is used to transport about 2 million barrels of oil per day to Europe and America, while Iraq does not. (Hassan 2019, p. 289). Not only that, since the eighties of the last century, trade with Iraq represented the most important pillars of the Jordanian economy. As Iraq secured most of Jordan's energy needs at prices below market prices. As Iraq sold oil to Jordan at prices below the level of market prices after the implementation of the oil-for-food program. (2000) When oil prices were about \$30 a barrel, Jordan got Iraqi oil at a price of \$9.5 a barrel. (Kitan 2019, p. 3)

Jordan's oil imports from Iraq were frequently interrupted when the United States and its allies conquered Iraq in the spring of 2003 as a result of the military actions that went along with the occupation. The number of tanks transporting crude oil decreased from (600) tanks per day until it witnessed an almost complete interruption of this movement, which had an impact on the Jordanian land transport sector in addition to the lack of oil supplies, as more than (2600) Jordanian trucks stopped working, or because of the spread of terrorist organizations on the roads for trucks loaded with oil to Jordan. (Dannon 2006, p. 179). In this context, Jordan represents a potential competitor for it. So it was able to obstruct the implementation of many projects and the many agreements concluded with Iraq, whether before or after 2003. Perhaps one of the most important of these strategic projects that serve the interests of Iraq and Jordan is the oil pipeline from Basra to

the port of Aqaba . According to the agreement concluded in 2019 and reaffirmed at the beginning of 2022, this pipeline will be extended from Basra to the Jordanian Aqaba. Currently on the Gulf and through the Ceyhan pipeline with Turkey, and the project also includes the possibility of supplying oil to Egypt. In return, Egypt will supply Iraq with electric power, and Jordan will supply Iraq with oil derivatives, given that Jordan has refineries at the port of Aqaba, and Iraq suffers from a shortage of oil derivatives due to its inability Strainers to meet your daily needs. The construction of an oil pipeline between Jordan and Iraq was agreed upon in 2019. The pipeline's design capacity is one million barrels per day, of which 150,000 barrels will be used to power the Zarqa refinery in Jordan. Iraqi crude oil will be transported through the Kingdom's territory to export ports on the Red Sea coast at Aqaba. Additionally, the project calls for the construction of a natural gas transportation line with a planned capacity of 358 million cubic meters per day. (Terminal 2022).



Map (3) shows the Basra-Aqaba oil pipeline project and the additions that may be added to the line
Source (Hadi 2020, on the authority of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil)

However, this project did not escape political criticism and attempts by higher-ups in Iraq to block its execution. In particular, Iranian-friendly Iraqi political groups believed that this project would provide Israel with Iraqi oil. And several members of the Iraqi Parliament publicly or in an untruthful manner declared as much. Nuri al-Maliki, the head of the "State of Law" alliance and a former prime minister, joined the chorus of the project's detractors and asked in a statement that the project be put on hold right away until its economic viability and the election of a new Iraqi government were determined. He is a prominent figure in the "coordinating framework" that makes up the current Iraqi government. The "framework" announces its reservation regarding the "Basra-Aqaba" pipeline project as a matter of transparency, adequate information, and appropriate guarantees that preserve Iraq's rights, showing that the current government lacks the necessary legal authority. becoming the government's daily caregiver. (Tarfi 2022)

Additionally, "regional difficulties" that slowed down the project's progress were discussed in a 2020 article in the Jordanian (government) newspaper Al-Rai, particularly "the tensions in the region as they relate to their impact on the Iraqi choice." Even though Jordanian and Iraqi officials have often stated that an extension of the pipeline connecting the two nations is imminent, "the situation did not progress beyond making comments to achieve a visible reality." In this regard, the same newspaper quotes Hashem Aqel, a Jordanian expert in the oil industry, as saying that "the main obstacle to the oil pipeline project for years has been due to political rather than economic considerations, which stand in the way of extending

the Iraqi-Jordanian oil pipeline," adding that "the completion of this project It requires agreement with regional countries that have influence on the Iraqi scene." (SITA Center 2021). As a result, the Iranian sway over Iraqi politics will render this strategic objective unworkable under the excuse that it supplies Israel with Iraqi oil, one of the most significant justifications that might incite unrest on the Iraqi street. (2022 Al-Arab newspaper) After 2003.

Conclusion

The persistence of cooperation in all spheres has been a defining feature of Iraqi-Jordanian ties throughout history. As opposed to Iraq's regional neighbors, who experienced setbacks, conflicts, and occasionally wars and military operations. With the exception of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the regime, the mutual interests fostered by the continuation of this partnership are characterized as beneficial. Instability in politics and security resulted from the former, the establishment of a new political order based on party and sectarian quotas, and a rise in foreign meddling in Iraqi affairs. And this had a significant impact on Iraq's international relations, especially with its Arab neighbors as opposed to how its relations with its non-Arab neighbors developed (Turkey and Iran). Iran was the most significant external political actor in terms of influencing Iraqi political, economic, and security decision-making, and this is something the United States did not accomplish in Iraq despite being the global dominant power and the occupying country that led an international coalition to change the pre-existing political system.

This was due to the availability of a group of political, religious, and geographical factors. The general Iraqi-Jordanian relationship, which had previously been a strategic collaboration in the areas of trade, industry, and energy, reflected this before 2003. Additionally, perhaps Iranian influence comes from its resources This was reflected in the relations between Iraq and Jordan, which saw a substantial downturn, with Iran emerging as the first economic, political, and security partner. It all started with political, religious, and intelligence-security pressure methods used inside Iraq. This came at the expense of the deterioration of relations between Iraq and Jordan, which is caused by the Iranian will, which began to push itself on Iraqi political decisions after 2003. The following could serve as a summary of the study's findings:

1-In terms of the structure of its political system, its relationships with the outside world, the kind of threats it faces, and the degree to which it can uphold its independence and sovereignty, Iraq has undergone virtually a complete transformation since 2003.

2-Before 2003, relations between Iraq and Jordan stood out because they had always been marked by cooperation and partnership, in contrast to those between Iraq and its neighbors in the area (Arab and non-Arab).

3- After 2003, the relationship between Jordan and Iraq had a notable downturn, changing from one of collaboration and extensive cooperation to one of limited formal connections, with only trade, security cooperation, and political agreement.

4- The Iranian influence on Iraqi political decision-making played a significant role in determining the country's political, economic, and security trajectories in relation to its surrounding countries. Iran bases its analysis of Iraq's foreign relations on the zero-sum game theory because it thinks that any alliance that Iraq forms with its Arab neighbors or other nearby nations will benefit both parties. Its relationship with Jordan has suffered as a result, and vice versa, with the United States, which Iran views as a danger to its economic interests in Iraq.

References

- Abu Rumman, M. (2008). Jordan and Iraq... Containment vs. Chaos. *International Politics Journal*, 172.
- Abdul Karim A. (2011). Iraqi-Jordanian relations after 2003 and their future prospects. *Center for International and Strategic Studies, Journal of International Studies, Baghdad*, 50.
- Al-Arab Newspaper, Year 41, Issue 12391, accessed on April 18th, 2022.
- Al-Ghunaimi, P. (2012). Militia Conflict and Iranian Influence in Iraq. *Journal of Iranian Studies, International Institute for Iranian Studies*, 14.
- Al-Labbad, M. (2006). Iranian-Turkish Relations and their Implications for the Region. *Arab Affairs Magazine, Cairo*, 127.
- Al-Lawzi, F. (2008). *Jordanian foreign policy towards the third Gulf crisis 2003-2008. Unpublished master's thesis*, University of Jordan, Amman.
- Badran, F. (2014). *Iraq and the balance game after the American invasion*. (1st ed.). Amman: Dar Amna for Publishing and Distribution.
- Hassan, N. (2019). The Suez Canal in Egypt: Between Reality and Ambition. *Scientific Journal of Economics and Trade, Cairo*, 2.
- Jassim, K. (2009). *The political process in Iraq and the problems of reaching the state of law*. (1st ed.). Baghdad: Al-Bayyinah Press.
- Lasensky, S. (2006). *Jordan and Iraq Between Cooperation and Crisis: Special Report*. Washington, DC: United State Institute of Peace.
- Abdul Karim, C. (2017). Iraqi-Turkish relations and the factors influencing them. *Journal of the Kufa Studies Center, Iraq, Kufa*, 45.
- Ragab, E. (2010). *The Arab Regional System in the Post-American Occupation of Iraq*. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies.
- Salameh, M. (2017). Patterns of Iranian Threat to Arab National Security. *Journal of Iranian Studies, International Institute for Iranian Studies*, 2.
- Thanoun, F. (2006). Oil in the Iraqi-Jordanian Relations from 1982-2003. *Journal of Education and Science, University of Mosul*, 13(1).
- Al-Shammari, I. (n.d). *Iraqi Foreign Policy... The Fragile Balance, Trends Consulting and Research*. <https://trendsresearch.org/ar/insight/iraq-policy>
- Al-Obaidi, M. (2021). *Rebalancing: The Economic and Political Motives for the "New Orient" Project*. <https://futureuae.com/ar-AE/Mainpage/Item/6431>
- Al-Tarfi, M. (2022). *Basra Pipeline: Iran's allies consider it the beginning of relations with Israel*. <https://www.independentarabia.com/node/322736>
- Hadi, J. (2020). *Did Iraq abandon the Basra-Aqaba pipeline?*. Al-Bayan Center for Studies and Planning. <https://www.bayancenter.org/2020/07/6206/>
- Jordanian-Iraqi Relations. (2011). *Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation*. <http://www.expojordan.com.jo/iraq2007/COORDINATION%20OFFICE.pps>.
- Kitan, A. (2019). *Iraq and Jordan: A New Phase of Joint Economic Cooperation*. Al-Nahrain Center for Strategic Studies. <https://www.alnahrain.iq/post/372>
- Nabd website. (2022). *Iraq's exports to Jordan represent only 11% of the total trade volume*. <https://nabd.com/s/105044251-78a670/>