

## The Saudi Variable in Chinese-Iranian Relations

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### Abstract

**Objectives:** The research aims to highlight a geohistorical study of Saudi-Chinese relations and their historical content. Additionally, it seeks to emphasize the role and impact of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a variable in Sino-Iranian relations, especially in light of the sectarian, ideological and geopolitical conflict in the Middle East region in general and the Arab region in particular.

**Methods:** The study followed the historical method to analyze the history of Saudi-Iranian relations, as it is considered the closest approach to political geography, geopolitics, and international relations studies. Additionally, the inductive method was used to track positions, statistics, official data, and others. The descriptive method and analytical approach were also relied upon to prove the research hypothesis.

**Results:** The results showed that Saudi Arabia had a direct impact as an obstacle in Sino-Iranian relations. The Saudi influence in Sino-Iranian relations forms a regional strategic triangle in the Arabian Gulf region, with its two sides being the regional powers (Saudi Arabia and Iran) and the third side being China as an emerging global power. Saudi Arabia affects China's relationship with Iran on different levels, including: (the bilateral relations between China and Iran by preventing China's entry into the Gulf region through the Iranian gateway), (the global competition between China and the United States), and (the regional competition and sectarian, ideological, and geopolitical conflict). This conflict has long-term implications for the countries of the region, especially since the conflict has taken on a religious dimension between the two states and among the Arab countries.

**Conclusions:** The relationship between China and Iran has raised concerns among traditional Arab powers, particularly Saudi Arabia, especially with China's entry into the Arabian Gulf via Iran. Saudi Arabia has played a role as a variable in the existing relations between China and Iran through its foreign policy as a regional power. The geopolitical competition and the ideological and identity conflict have played a significant role in the ongoing conflict between the two countries, especially following the outbreak of the revolution in Iran in 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in the country.

**Keywords:** Variable, international relations, China, Iran.

### المتغير السعودي في العلاقات الصينية الإيرانية

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ملخص

**الاهداف:** يهدف البحث الى ابراز دراسة جيوتاريخية العلاقات السعودية الصينية ومضمونها التاريخي، بالإضافة الى ابراز دور المملكة العربية السعودية واثرا كمتغير في العلاقة الصينية الإيرانية، لاسيما في ظل الصراع المذهبي والايديولوجي والجيوبولتيكي في منطقة الشرق الاوسط بشكل العام والمنطقة العربية بشكل الخاص.

**المنهجية:** اتبعت الدراسة المنهج التاريخي لتحليل تاريخ العلاقة السعودية الإيرانية، كونه يعد اقرب المناهج للدراسات الجغرافية السياسية والجيوبولتيكية والعلاقات الدولية، بالإضافة الى المنهج الاستقرائي في تتبع المواقف والإحصائيات والبيانات الرسمية وغيرها، وكذلك الاعتماد على المنهج الوصفي والمقترّب التحليلي لغرض التوصل الى إثبات صحة فرضية البحث.

**النتائج:** أن المملكة العربية السعودية كان لها تأثير مباشر ضمن معوقات العلاقة الصينية الإيرانية. وبشكل التأثير السعودي في العلاقات الصينية الإيرانية مثلثا استراتيجيا إقليميا في منطقة الخليج العربي، يكون إحدى طرفاه قوتان الإقليميتان هما المملكة العربية السعودية وإيران) والطرف الثالث هي الصين كقوة عالمية صاعدة، تؤثر المملكة العربية السعودية على علاقة الصين مع إيران على مستويات مختلفة، هي: (العلاقات الثنائية ما بين البلدين وهما الصين وإيران من خلال رفض المملكة العربية السعودية دخول الصين الى منطقة الخليج من خلال بوابة إيران) وكذلك (المنافسة الإقليمية والصراع المذهبي والايديولوجي والجيوبولتيكي) وما خلفه هذا الصراع من تداعيات بعيدة المدى على الدول المنطقة، لاسيما أن الصراع اخذ بعداً دينياً بين الدولتين وبين الدول العربية.

**الخلاصة:** لقد أثارت العلاقة ما بين (الصين وإيران) مخاوف القوى التقليدية العربية وعلى رأسها المملكة العربية السعودية، لاسيما دخول الصين الى الخليج العربي عبر بوابة إيران. لعبت المملكة العربية السعودية دوراً كمتغير في العلاقات القائمة ما بين الصين وإيران، عن طريق سياساتها الخارجية كقوة اقليمية، ولعب التنافس الجيوسياسي والخلاف حول الايديولوجية والهوية دوراً كبيراً في الصراع الدائر بين البلدين، لاسيما عقب اندلاع الثورة في إيران عام (1979) وتأسيس جمهورية الإسلامية في البلاد.

**الكلمات الدالة:** المتغير، العلاقات الدولية، الصين، إيران.



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## **Introduction**

Variables in international relations are described as a set of relationships linked between countries within a single regional framework or within a unified international system that makes them an effective party in the international policy system. Within the framework of international relations. The Middle East and the Gulf region have constituted a chronic crisis in Chinese-Iranian relations, and this is due to the interests of the two countries in them, as the vast Middle Eastern region and its geopolitical circle is a vital area for the two countries. Given the two countries' comprehensive geographical power (natural, human, economic, and civilizational). China and Iran are linked by (political, economic, and military) relations, and their foreign policies converge in many regional and international positions, especially with regard to US policy towards the two countries. Iran also saw China as an old friend, a rising power, and its best ally in its confrontation with American hegemony, especially since the Gulf region in general, and Iran in particular, has become burdened by many crises in which China seeks to have a field presence and an active role.

### **research importance:-**

The importance of the research arises from the important role that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia plays through its foreign policy as a regional power, in influencing the existing strategic relations between China as a rising global power and its regional competitor (Iran), with an explanation of the most important areas on which this influence is focused, and how China is dealing with this. Influencing and containing it, as well as demonstrating the impact of this existing regional strategic triangle in influencing the security and stability of the Middle East region and its global repercussions.

### **Research problem:-**

The research problem is the extent to which the policies of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia influence the existing strategic relationship between China and Iran, and how China manages this relationship and balances it without disrupting its relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Iran on the other hand. This problem results in a number of questions:

- 1- Is there an influence on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a changing factor in the existing relationship between China and Iran? What is the extent of this influence?
- 2- What are the motives for entering the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a change in the existing relationship between the two countries?..
- 3- Did the ideological conflict and Saudi-Iranian geopolitical competition in the Middle Eastern region in general and the Arabian Gulf in particular have an impact on this?

### **Research hypothesis:-**

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia played a major role in Chinese-Iranian relations, and the ideological dimension, sectarian conflict, and historical regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia had a significant impact on Saudi Arabia's entry as a variable in Chinese-Iranian relations. In addition, China dealt with a balanced strategy in its relations with both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran, which made it able to maintain its interests and relations with both parties despite the existing hostility between them.

### **Research structure:-**

For the purpose of fully covering the research topic, the research was divided into an abstract, an introduction, three axes, and a conclusion. Based on the above, the study attempts to analyze that Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry and its impact on the relations of that strategic triangle on the one hand, and on Iran's relations with China on the other hand, according to the following axes: -

#### **The first axis**

##### **Religious (sectarian) rivalry and its impact on Saudi-Iranian relations:-**

After the Saudi state was founded by its leader, Abdulaziz Al Saud, who succeeded in unifying several regions in the Arabian Peninsula, this state gained its independence and was transformed into a kingdom in the year 1932, and it was called Saudi Arabia. The kingdom possessed an area of 1,945,000 km<sup>2</sup> (Al-Jamil, 2003, p. 39). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia based its ruling ideology and the legitimacy of its regime on two focuses: -

The first: the doctrinal pillar of following the Salafi doctrine, which was founded by Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1703-1791) more than two centuries ago. The second: the historical foundation based on the royal rule inherited among the members of the royal family, starting with King Abdulaziz Al Saud (p. 67-73 (David 1982).

Historically, and during its political era, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia played several roles, especially in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf region, which was characterized by political conflicts starting from the June 1973 war, to the first and second Gulf wars in both the eighties and nineties of the twentieth century, in addition to it constituting a geohistorical problem. Iranians and Arabs suffer from it because of the different names of the Arabian Gulf. Iran shares land and sea borders with the eastern end of the Arab world, its length is estimated at 3160 km, which is the longest border distance between the Arab world and one geographically neighboring country, in addition to being the longest Iranian border with any country. Another national nation (Al-Jamil, 2003, p. 41). Iran possesses ancient historical constants in the issues of legal identity through two interconnected ideological pillars, the first of which is a deep-rooted Iranian political nationalism beginning with multiple histories and a collection of social nationalities from which Iran was united, beginning with the Safavids and moving on to the Naderis, Afsharids, Zendis, and Qajars, all the way to the Pahlavis. The second is a Twelver religious sect that established an Islamic republican doctrinal system in this style, a style that has been considered an official doctrine in Iran since 1501 (Al-Jamil, 2003, p. 43).

### **The second axis**

#### **Features of the Saudi-Iranian geopolitical competition in the Middle Eastern region**

Historically, official relations between Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia began in 1940, and were not at their best due to regional influences, especially after the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. After that, the relationship developed under the influence of two types of Iranian political forces that strongly determined the shape of Iranian policy towards the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. They are: the religious institution affected by sectarian disagreement. As for the other force that seems more present in pursuing the relationship with Saudi Arabia, it is the military and security force, whose evaluation is usually linked to American alliances in the region (Maher, 2021, p. 92). Therefore, Iranian-Saudi relations took different and disparate paths and were affected by factors. Local, regional and international forces forced the two sides of the relationship to move from one stage to another according to what was dictated by the interests of the two countries and the goals of their foreign policy, as well as the interests of international powers that contributed to widening the rift between the two countries and fueled the state of competition and conflict between them. However, this did not push towards direct conflict through confrontation. Military due to both parties' awareness of the consequences of the war and the consequences it could have on the region (Elias, 2019, p. 129). After the leaders of the Iranian Islamic Revolution assumed power in Iran in 1979 and until the present time, Iranian-Saudi relations witnessed intense competition and prolonged conflict, with the exception of the period between the years (1997 - 2005), which was the period of the presidency of the reformist President Mohammad Khatami, when the relationship developed between The two countries in the economic and political fields, as the volume of trade exchange increased slightly and visits were exchanged at high levels between Tehran and Riyadh in a way that has not happened since the Iranian revolution (Al-Amiri, 2012, p. 27).

Therefore, the study believes that interests played a major role in the rapprochement or divergence in relations between the two countries, as well as the American role, which constitutes the decisive role in determining the nature of relations, whether rapprochement or divergence. Iran seeks to be the strongest in the Gulf region and is trying to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia, as it is the largest ally. The United States of America rejects any Western intervention in the region and is trying to break the deadlock in its foreign policies as a result of the isolation that occurred after its war with Iraq. Saudi Arabia is also seeking to improve its relations with Iran for economic reasons represented by oil and trade, and because Iran has political weight that could affect stability. The region, and Khatami's arrival to power created an atmosphere of understanding and cooperation and broke the barrier of fear of Iran, as President Khatami is a reformist and calls for cooperation. All of these events helped to bring about mutual meetings between the two countries and called for turning the page on the existing differences (Dodin, 2019, p. 105).

After the American occupation of Iraq in 2003, talk emerged remarkably about the Iranian regional strategy in the

Middle East, as well as after the overthrow of the Taliban government. This also coincided with the arrival of a pro-Iranian political movement to power in Iraq for the first time, and with Hezbollah's steadfastness in the 2006 Lebanon War and the rebellion. The Houthis in Yemen, and Iran's interference in Bahraini internal affairs (Al-Nasser, 2023, pp. 79-80).

These Iranian measures raised the fears of the traditional Arab powers, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, based on historical and modern evidence, which prompted these powers to accuse Iran of having an expansionist agenda. In the region, it seeks to influence countries with sectarian pluralism, with the aim of destabilizing them and provoking strife and sectarian conflicts (Hareb, 2015, p. 24).

In addition, Iran possesses the strings of the political game in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, and attempts to employ them politically and strategically to serve its regional project. Iran has retreated from the goal of exporting the revolution through violent means. Its diplomacy is still working to achieve the same goal through soft power through the economy, media, and religion, as it aims behind this to establish an Iranian Islamic political model in politics and governance to control the Arabian Gulf, as it is the only way. For the establishment of a global government in their belief (2018 p33. Firas)

In addition, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia focused greatly on the issue of Iran's relations with Iraq, especially after the American occupation, and the resulting increase in Iranian influence in the Middle East.

Iran's relationship with Iraq has made the Gulf region a common threat, given that Iraq is influential in the Gulf security equation and occupies an important position in the accounts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran alike, as this country represents an important strategic depth for both parties, which makes it a background. As a scene of current and subsequent events, it is a vital field and a necessary extension of sectarian Iran, and with its fall, an essential part of Iranian national security will be lost (Atwan, 2012, p. 39).

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also warns against Iran, due to its possession of nuclear weapons, which is considered a security threat to the stability of the Arab region, and threatens Saudi national security, in addition to the fact that the American presence in the region has also contributed to the tension in Iranian-American relations and this has also affected Iranian-Gulf relations (Hadi, 2003, p. 147).

Therefore, the study believes, according to these data, that it was necessary for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront a balance of power strongly tilted in favor of Iran in the Middle East, offset by the great growing superiority in Iranian military capabilities, which prompted Saudi Arabia to continue confronting Iranian influence and its increasing power, and to seek to gain allies. To confront this increasing growth in capabilities, the study also indicates that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believes that China's arrival to the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf must come from the gateway to the Arab countries and not from Iran, in addition to the most prominent factor represented by the support of international powers for its efforts to limit Of the Iranian power in the Arabian Gulf, led by the United States of America and the Atomic Energy Agency, which raised the possibility that Saudi Arabia might be the one with the greatest effort in confronting Iran, the rising regional power in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf in particular. Therefore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia chose China and established relations with it according to cooperation and a strategic ally. In addition, China headed to West Asia to strengthen cooperative relations and partnerships with the countries of the Middle East on various political, economic and cultural levels. This is an important point for China, through which it strengthens its position globally. It also established... Limits to American hegemony (Al-Halbousi, 2022, p. 98).

Although historically the two countries signed the first friendship treaty in 1946 in the city of Jeddah, and diplomatic relations began (1949-1979) on intermittent tracks, the actual beginnings of official relations were delayed until 1990, and the visit of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, when... He was Crown Prince, to China in 1998, which was the highest level visit in terms of the official delegation of the Saudi side to China (Saudi Arabia and China, 2012, p. 3).

After this visit, China's dependence on Saudi Arabia to secure oil increased. By looking at the data in Table (1), oil exports to China from Saudi oil increased starting with a small amount in 2002 (100,000/thousand barrels) per day and began to increase until it reached (1,070,000/million barrels) in 2018. This continuous increase in the rise of Saudi oil exports to China increases the value of Saudi Arabia in relation to China: Saudi Arabia, in the opinion of Chinese decision-

makers, “is a very good and reliable oil supplier, unlike Nigeria, which has many ambiguous factors leading to a sharp fluctuation in the supply of oil, and it also differs.” About Iraq and Iran, whose supply of oil is affected by the unstable political situation” (Al-Fiqhi, 2018, p. 35).

**Table (1) Saudi Arabia’s oil exports to China per day from (2002-2020)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>One thousand barrels per day</b>
2002	200000
2003	370000
2004	400000
2005	425000
2006	5010000
2007	600000
2008	800000
2009	1000000
2010	940000
2011	1000000
2012	1050000
2013	1050000
2014	1060000
2015	1060000
2016	1060000
2017	1060000
2018	1070000

The table is based on the researcher’s work:

1- Scobell and Nader (2016)

2- Global oil conditions (2023).

The relationship has also witnessed continuous development in recent years, especially in the field of trade. Trade between Saudi Arabia and China has recorded a major jump. Table (2) shows that development as we see the growth in the value of this trade from the year (2008-2018), which started (4,055,983/Saudi riyals) in 2008 and reached (6,138,322/Saudi riyals) in 2018, and thus China is considered the most important trading partner for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the year 2018.

**Table (2) Trade exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and China (2008-2018)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Value in US dollars</b>
2008	4055983
2009	3226712
2010	4241047
2011	6274543
2012	6996973
2013	7130287
2014	6607109
2015	4918417
2016	4138742
2017	4648002
2018	6138322

The table is the work of the researcher based on: Saudi Arabia and China: Partnership Limits and Horizons, Monitoring and Analysis Unit, Strategic Thought Center for Studies: 2021, p. 7.

Cooperation between China and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was not limited only to the commercial field, but the activities of Chinese investment companies also multiplied. The total Chinese investments in Saudi Arabia until 2010 amounted to \$9,319 million, i.e. 5.5% of the total foreign investments. For the rest of the countries in the Kingdom. Table (3) shows the distribution of these investments.

**Table (3) Chinese investments in the Kingdom until the end of 2017**

No.	investments	Value in US dollars
1	Mining, petroleum extraction and gas services	563
2	Industry	698
3	Contracting	7401
4	Transportation, storage and communications	79
5	Education and training	227
6	Other activities	351

Source: Al-Fiqhi (2018), p. 15.

The cooperative desire between China and the Kingdom also led to the signing of treaties and agreements in the field of economy and investment, as Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding with China between the years (2017, 2019) at two values, the first (\$65/billion) in 2017, and the second at (\$28/billion). In 2019, including a memorandum of understanding on the Silk Road Economic Belt, a memorandum on cooperation in science, technology, and energy, a memorandum on satellite navigation, and a memorandum on establishing a mechanism on combating terrorism (Zahran, 2019, pp. 93-94).

In 2020, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also signed (12) trade and joint investment agreements with China, worth (\$28 billion), and the share of Aramco alone amounted to ten billion dollars, as the company signed an agreement to establish a complex for oil refining and petrochemical industries in China (Abdul Hai, 2022, p. 10).

### **The third axis**

#### **Motives for the Saudi orientation towards China and its impact on Chinese-Iranian relations**

There is no doubt that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has political and economic motives for developing its relationship with China, and there is also no doubt that the Iranian file and its political behavior in the region have formed one of the motives behind developing relations with China, which is one of the major countries that has distinguished relations with Iran.

The features of the Saudi-Chinese consensus appeared to be developing continuously and positively, as the two sides agreed on the necessity of strengthening joint peaceful cooperation between Iran and the countries of the region, as well as ensuring the peacefulness of Iran, especially in the field of Iran's nuclear program. The two sides also called on Iran to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to maintain... The non-proliferation system, and they stressed respect for the principles of good neighborliness and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries (Saudi Arabia and China, 2022).

In addition, the development of the relationship with China sends messages to some allies, especially the United States of America, and specifically the Democratic Movement, which pursues a strict policy towards the Kingdom. Which has increased in intensity since the killing of Saudi journalist (Jamal Khashoggi\*); That Saudi Arabia does not mortgage its interests to the choices of a specific country, even if it is of the status of the United States, but rather it has alternatives to its international alliances, albeit at varying levels that enable it to protect its interests. The Kingdom found the relationship with China through which it could put pressure on Tehran on issues of regional dispute (Saudi Arabia and China 2022).

In addition to that, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has preferred China in the recent period, as a result of its dissatisfaction with the political behavior of the United States of America in the Middle East recently, including its lack of seriousness in

resolving the Syrian issue, as well as the issue of the Iranian nuclear program, and these issues together have raised doubts. Riyadh has concerns about Washington's long-term credibility as an ally (Andrew, 2022, p. 26).

The Saudi position also changed in light of its feeling abandoned by the United States and not being relied upon, especially after the attacks on its oil facilities during 2019 and the failure to read the political scene correctly during the rule of former US President Donald Trump. (Mabon and Westendge, 2023, p. 44).

The Saudi-Chinese relationship entered a clearer curve, changing the economic course, but rather in the field of international diplomacy and resolving issues of dispute, and the Saudi variable entered Chinese relations prominently, especially after the Chinese President's visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which sparked debate. Inside Iran, it was reflected in its official speech within the limits of bilateral agreements. However, what disturbed the Iranian political leaders came when the Chinese President signed the final statement of the joint summit that brought him together with the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The statement indicated "the participation of the countries of the region to address the Iranian nuclear file and the destabilizing regional activities." For regional stability, he also affirmed support for "all peaceful efforts, including the initiative and efforts of the United Arab Emirates to reach a peaceful solution to the issue of the (three islands) of the Emirates, which raised the Iranians about the reasons for China's signing, the meanings of the signing, and the consequences of the relationship with Beijing because of "China's support." The UAE's claims about the islands" on the one hand, and because of China's departure from the norm in the friendly relationship between it and Tehran on the other hand (Ahmadian, 2023, p. 8).

Therefore, the study believes that China did not give its relationship with Iran the right of a strategic ally in the region, nor did China show interest in Iran's sensitivity to the issue. It is possible that Iranian leaders will go so far as to accuse China of betraying its old and close friend in the Middle East, and we can explain the view of Chinese behavior. For several reasons, including China's preference for economic and trade work with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries over cooperation with Iran, which is largely forced to continue cooperation with China due to American sanctions, and China's attempt to distance the Gulf Cooperation Council from the United States, which is something it does not need regarding Iran, which is far from Washington originally.

## **Results**

In conclusion, the research, through its three axes and the presentation and analysis of the various official positions and statements, reached a number of important conclusions that represent adequate answers to the main questions raised by the research problem, which were used to prove the validity of the research hypothesis, the most prominent of which are the following: -

1- The study found that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a direct role as a variable in Chinese-Iranian relations, and that geopolitical competition and disagreement over ideology and identity played a major role in the ongoing conflict between the two countries, and the long-term repercussions this conflict had on Islamic countries, especially since the conflict took on a religious dimension. Between the two countries and between the Arab countries as well, in addition to the threat to the nationalities that live within the borders of the Arab countries.

2- Iran's relationship with Iraq played a prominent role in the entry of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a variable in the relationship between China and Iran, as it made the Gulf region a common threat, given that Iraq is influential in the Gulf security equation and occupies an important position in the calculations of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well as The same applies to Iran.

3- The study also concluded that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believes that China's arrival to the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf must come from the Arab countries' gate and not from Iran, based on historical evidence, that Iran has an expansionist agenda in its foreign policy in the Arabian Gulf region, It seeks to influence the Arab countries with sectarian pluralism in the Gulf in particular and the Middle East in general.

4- The study also found that Saudi Arabia preferred China's policy in the recent period, as a result of its dissatisfaction with the political behavior of the United States of America in the Middle East recently, including its lack of seriousness in resolving the Syrian issue, as well as the issue of the Iranian nuclear program, and raised these issues together. Riyadh has

doubts about Washington's long-term credibility as an ally, and the Saudi position has also changed in light of its feeling abandoned by the United States and not being relied upon, especially after the attacks on its oil facilities during 2019 and the failure to read the political scene correctly during the rule of former US President Donald Trump.

5- It was also shown through the study that China has proven its presence in the Middle East region as one of the international powers supporting the peace axis in the region, and the agreement concluded between (Saudi Arabia and Iran) at the beginning of 2023 was the best evidence of that. This is China's first unilateral intervention in arranging peaceful files in the Middle East region, by a major power other than the United States since the end of the Cold War in 1990. It is also considered a Chinese bypass from the economic files to the security file, which was exclusively an American responsibility. China's desire for this The agreement comes from a desire launched by China to preserve its interests with the oil powers in the region, and it seems that China is keen to market the agreement as not against anyone, and at the same time market Chinese diplomacy as adopting the most stable tools, compared to the American role, which it describes as military.

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