

## The Myth of Influence of Social Media in the 2024 Presidential Election: Insight from Indonesian Voters in India and Turkiye

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Received: 20/8/2024

Revised: 10/10/2024

Accepted: 24/11/2024

Published online: 1/12/2025

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Citation: Harahap, R., & Mujiburrahman. (2025). The Myth of Influence of Social Media in the 2024 Presidential Election: Insight from Indonesian Voters in India and Turkiye. *Dirasat: Human and Social Sciences*, 53(5), 8792.

<https://doi.org/10.35516/Hum.2026.8792>

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### Abstract

**Objectives:** This study examines the influence of social media on the electoral decisions of Indonesian voters residing in India and Turkey during the 2024 presidential elections. Despite the prevalence of platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter/X, YouTube, and WhatsApp as primary sources of political information, the findings reveal a complex and nuanced impact.

**Methods:** A mixed-methods approach was employed, surveying 87 respondents—university students, homemakers, and professionals—via Google Forms distributed through WhatsApp groups. Data collection spanned March to April 2024 in India and October 2024 in Turkey. Semi-structured Zoom interviews provided deeper insights into political preferences and emotional connections to presidential candidates. Results were cross-referenced with credible sources, including academic journals, to align with national trends.

**Result:** The survey revealed that 81.6% of respondents believed social media did not influence their voting decisions, while 17.2% felt it did. Students, the most active social media users, maintained stable political preferences, often citing dissatisfaction with Indonesia's political landscape over the past decade. Homemakers emerged as the most influenced group, whereas professionals expressed skepticism toward social media content, preferring trusted sources. The study highlights the multifaceted nature of media influence, shaped by educational background, professional status, and political experience, offering a comprehensive understanding of the factors driving voter behavior in a global context.

**Conclusion:** The findings challenge the presumed omnipotence of social media in shaping political outcomes, emphasizing the need for a more nuanced evaluation of its influence on electoral decisions.

**Keywords:** Social media; political preferences; Indonesian citizens in India and Turkiye, 2024 presidential election

### خرافة تأثير وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي في الانتخابات الرئاسية لعام 2024: نظرة ثاقبة من الناخبين الإندونيسيين في الهند

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### ملخص

**الأهداف:** تستكشف هذه الدراسة تأثير وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي على القرارات الانتخابية للناخبين الإندونيسيين في الهند وتركيا خلال الانتخابات الرئاسية لعام 2024. على الرغم من انتشار منصات مثل Facebook، Instagram، X، و YouTube و WhatsApp كمصادر أساسية للمعلومات السياسية، تشير النتائج التي توصلنا إليها إلى تأثير معقد ودقيق.

**الأساليب:** باستخدام نهج مختلط الأساليب، قمنا باستطلاع آراء 87 مستجيباً - طلاب جامعيين وربات بيوت وعمال محترفين - عبر نماذج Google، التي تم توزيعها من خلال مجموعات WhatsApp، مستهدفين الإندونيسيين الذين يعيشون في الهند، من مارس إلى أبريل 2024 وفي تركيا في أكتوبر 2024. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، قدمت مقابلات Zoom شبه المنظمة رؤى أعمق حول التفضيلات السياسية والروابط العاطفية مع المرشحين الرئاسيين. كما أشرنا إلى بيانات من مصادر حسنة السمعة مثل المجلات لمواءمة النتائج التي توصلنا إليها مع الاتجاهات الوطنية.

**النتيجة والمناقشة:** أظهر الاستطلاع أن 81.6٪ من المستجيبين شعروا أن وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي لم تؤثر على خياراتهم في التصويت، بينما قال 17.2٪ إنها فعلت ذلك. والجدير بالذكر أن الطلاب، باعتبارهم الأعلى والأكثر نشاطاً بين مستخدمي وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي، ولكنهم ما زالوا قادرين على الحفاظ على تفضيلات تصويت سياسية مستقرة، غالباً ما أشاروا إلى مخاوف بشأن السلالات السياسية وعدم الرضا عن السياسة في إندونيسيا على مدار العقد الماضي. في حين أن ربات البيوت، في الواقع، كن مجموعة الناخبين الأكثر تأثراً بالمحتوى السياسي على وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي. في المقابل، يظهر العمال المحترفون شكوكاً تجاه محتوى وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي ويفضلون المصادر الجديرة بالثقة. تسلط هذه الدراسة الضوء على الطبيعة متعددة الأوجه للتأثير الإعلامي، والتي شكلتها الخلفية التعليمية، والوضع المبي، والاختلافات في الخبرة السياسية، وتقدم فيها شاملاً للعوامل التي تدفع سلوك الناخبين في سياق عالمي.

**الخلاصة:** تتحدى النتائج القدرة المطلقة المفترضة لوسائل التواصل الاجتماعي في الساحات السياسية، مع التأكيد على الحاجة إلى نهج أكثر تمايزاً لتقييم تأثيرها على النتائج الانتخابية.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي، التفضيلات السياسية، المواطنون الإندونيسيون في الهند وتركيا، الانتخابات الرئاسية لعام 2024.

## 1. Introduction

The presence of social media has become an integral force in the democratic landscape, playing a pivotal role in political contests worldwide. It serves as a dynamic public sphere where information, ideas, and discourse are exchanged, often shaping public opinion (Boyne & Habermas, 1986; Edgar, 2018; Habermas, 1985; Sharlamanov & Jovanoski, 2014). Beyond this, social media is a powerful catalyst for the global spread of democratic values (de Zúñiga et al., 2018; Ziliotti et al., 2023), and fundamentally strengthens the principles of democracy (De Gregorio, 2020; Swigger, 2013). The intersection of social media and political competition is one of the most compelling aspects of modern democracy (Ashbridge et al., 2022; Reviglio & Agosti, 2020). Its influence extends far beyond mere discourse; it actively shapes public opinion (Auxier & Anderson, 2021; Laor, 2024), and even sways individual political choices (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016; Sherman & Van Boven, 2024), which is not just a local phenomenon but a global trend, influencing the political landscape in countries around the world. This is evident in the United States with Barack Obama's two consecutive electoral victories (Gupta-Carlson, 2016; Jarvis, 2010; Lin, 2011), Boris Johnson's victory in the United Kingdom (Calvo et al., 2023; Wring & Ward, 2020), and Narendra Modi's two-term win in India (Chhibber & Ostermann, 2014; Kulshrestha et al., 2017; Maiorano, 2019; Sridharan, 2014). In Southeast Asia, the influence of social media on electoral outcomes is evident across multiple countries, including Cambodia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. In Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Sen leveraged social media platforms like Facebook, where he amassed over 14 million followers, alongside Twitter and YouTube, to strengthen his electoral support (Norén-Nilsson, 2022, 2023). Similarly, In Thailand, Pita Limjaroenrat's success in the general election, where he secured 151 out of 500 seats, was heavily attributed to his adept use of social media. With 2.6 million Instagram followers, Pita's regular posts, featuring relatable and engaging family moments, played a crucial role in his campaign's popularity (Alderman, 2024; Sangkhamanee, 2023). In the Philippines, the victory of Marcos Jr. in the 2022 presidential election was closely tied to the strategic use of social media to mobilize voters and polarize public opinion (Arugay & Baquisal, 2022). These situations have led many experts to conclude that social media not only plays a crucial role in modern election campaigns on a global scale but also that various social media platforms have fundamentally changed the way political information is disseminated, the way political campaigns are conducted, and the way voters interact with candidates and issues (Bleiker, 2018; Crilley et al., 2020). Political elites, supporting parties, and campaign teams use platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok to campaign, reach voters, spread their messages, and mobilize support in order to win the Presidential candidates they endorse (Ahn et al., 2023). In this context, it is impossible for any candidate or party to engage in an election cycle without maintaining an online presence in the modern political era (Dimitrova et al., 2014). Therefore, there is little doubt that the effects of internet and internet tools on political campaigns at all levels will grow exponentially (Denton, et., 2019).

Under such condition, social media is something that can no longer be underestimated in its influence in shaping perceptions, and can even determine political choices in the General Election (Gitiyarko, 2023). Political elites have turned to social media to gauge who is most likely to be persuaded by their messages and through what kind of content (Calvo et al., 2023). Candidates, supporting parties, and campaign teams have come to understand seriously that political campaign methods and the way voters interact with candidates and issues must be supplemented with a robust online social media strategy (Swigger, 2013). The ability to disseminate messages quickly and interactively has ushered in a new era of digital politics, where real-time feedback and direct engagement with voters have become crucial (Wring & Ward, 2020). Political elites strive to reach a broader audience than through traditional media such as newspapers and television broadcasts (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2013). In this regard, candidates, supporting parties, and campaign teams tailor their political messages, campaigns, issues, and visions to specific voter groups, which can be more effective than trying to reach a broad audience with a single message (de Zúñiga et al., 2018). Although this micro-targeting brings political benefits, this method creates echo chamber silos within online communities (Coleman et al., 2008; Ziliotti et al., 2023).

The Indonesia's 2024 Presidential Election contest not only shook the domestic democratic landscape but also made waves abroad, particularly in India and Turkiye. The excitement and spectacle of the political festivities and campaigns were so spectacular that they could be followed and enjoyed both directly and through social media and online platforms.

With 106 million people, or about 52 percent of voters in Indonesia, under the age of 40 and relatively tech-savvy, the consumption of information and news about the 2024 Presidential Election is extremely high (Gusfa & Kadjuand, 2020). According to data from Litbang Kompas, 29.6 percent of people frequently rely on television for election information, slightly more than social media (29.4 percent) and significantly more than online media (23.9 percent), while over 45 percent never use online media for election news—higher than those who avoid social media (31.9 percent) or television (23.6 percent) for such information (Sakti, 2023).

The euphoria of Indonesia's democratic festivities was not as widely enjoyed by Indonesian citizens in India and in Turkiye. For them, the excitement of this democratic celebration could not be experienced directly; they could only observe and follow it through the screens of their gadgets, relying on social media platforms rather than television. The great distance meant that Indonesian citizens in India and in Turkiye did not have access to any Indian and Turkiye television channels that specifically broadcast news about the Indonesian Presidential Election. Nevertheless, the vote counts for the three pairs of Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the 2024 election showed positive results. According to [Opendata.go.id](https://opendata.go.id) (2024), the vote counts were as follows: Anis-Muhaimin received 40.971.906 votes (24.9 percent), Prabowo-Gibran received 96.214.691 votes (58.6 percent), and Ganjar-Mahmud received 27.040.878 votes (16.5 percent). Meanwhile, a survey conducted by researchers revealed that over 81.6 percent of respondents stated that social media did not influence their political decisions, 17.1 percent said it did, and 1.1 percent responded with "no comment." Therefore, the high percentage of votes obtained by the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in India was not solely influenced by social media political content. There were other factors at play, hidden amidst the overwhelming digital landscape. This fact presents an interesting debate about what factors influence the political preferences of Indonesian citizens in India in choosing the president and vice president in India and in Turkiye; as well as the extent to which social media works in influencing Indonesian voters in India and in Turkiye in the 2024 presidential election contestation.

This study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating two key questions. First, does social media influence their political preferences (Presidential/Vice-Presidential candidates)? This study examines the percentage of Indonesian citizens in India and in Turkiye who access Presidential Election information by presenting quantitative data. In this context, at least three quantitative data points are highlighted: the duration of social media access, responses to 2024 Presidential Election content, and the age of social media users. Second, the study seeks to reveal the extent to which social media influences Indonesian citizens in India and in Turkiye as the primary source of information in determining their preferred candidates. This focuses on understanding the profile characteristics of three models of Indonesian citizens respondents in India and in Turkiye. The study qualitatively describes the background of Indonesian citizens in India and in Turkiye regarding social media coverage of the Presidential Election and their consistency in maintaining their choices, despite being bombarded with news about the 2024 Presidential Election in Indonesia. The research also investigates how their political choices were determined on voting day. In this regard, the study outlines: that (1) groups of voters with the ability to critically analyse and evaluate information tend not to be easily influenced by social media. They can distinguish between accurate information and hoaxes; (2) groups of voters with extensive experience and knowledge of politics and the democratic process tend to have stronger views and are not easily swayed by social media narratives; (3) groups of voters who seek information from various sources, including traditional media such as newspapers and television, as well as direct discussions within the community, tend to be less dependent on information from social media. Finally, this article concludes by summarizing the findings and their contribution to the broader study of the influence of social media on the electoral political dynamics in Indonesia.

Our study found that social media does not significantly influence the political decisions of Indonesian citizens in India and in Turkiye. On the contrary, all respondents, whether students, housewives, or professional workers in India and in Turkiye, were occupied with their respective activities and were largely unaffected by any candidate. As a result, no matter how extensive and strong the efforts of influencers and buzzers from each Presidential/Vice-Presidential candidate, supporting parties, or campaign teams in creating candidate content, they were unable to influence all voter groups. Indonesian citizens in India and in Turkiye exhibited a high level of rationality. They acknowledged that they responded to

a lot of political content and 2024 Presidential Election content, but they remained steadfast in their decisions. Therefore, it is important to discuss why Indonesian voters in India and in Turkiye, despite their high consumption of social media, were not influenced in their political choices for the 2024 Presidential candidates. This indicates that in the digital era, even though information is easily accessible, the political decision-making process is still influenced by personal factors and broader social contexts.

### **1.1. Social Media and the Influence of Political Choice: A Literature Review**

In the political science discourse, social media has become an important instrument in influencing voters in electoral political contests from time to time. Although, literature on the relationship between social media in the tradition of democratic society was first introduced by Huberman in 1984 (Boyne & Habermas, 1986; Habermas, 1985). However, the use of digital media in political campaigns first occurred in the 1992 United States Presidential Election (Bimber, 2003; Davis, 2004). During the 2000 Presidential Election, websites became a common campaign tool, leading some to declare 2000 as the "first Internet election" (Foot & Schneider, 2002). By 2004, political candidates were no longer using websites as campaign instruments, but had shifted to electronic headquarters (Foot & Schneider, 2006). In 2008, newer online tools such as social networking and blogging gained popularity and were effectively used in the Obama campaign to mobilize and organize supporters (Jarvis, 2010).

Given these conditions, no candidate or political party can enter an election cycle without establishing a digital media presence. Therefore, there is no doubt that the impact of the sophistication of the Internet and Internet devices on political campaigns at all levels continues to grow exponentially (Trent, 2006; Wolfsfeld et al., 2022). So far, we have identified that one of the primary functions of social media during election periods is to exponentially garner voter support. This function becomes crucial during election campaigns, especially when candidates seek to understand who their target voters are and how many they need to reach. However, the question of how candidates use social media to influence voters is fundamentally complex to answer (Baumgartner, 2010). Nonetheless, most studies indicate that social media has a significant impact on influencing voter participation (Boulianne, 2020; Campbell, 2013; de Zúñiga et al., 2019; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2021; Grover et al., 2019; Uwalaka, 2021; Valenzuela et al., 2020).

In most democratic countries (both developed and developing), voter engagement in the electoral process is crucially for maintaining democratic integrity. Numerous studies have examined the impact of social media influences on political decision making within the electoral process (H. Lee, 2020). Even passive consumption of content can provide invaluable insights for candidates, aiding them in predicting voting outcomes (Kruikemeier, 2014). For instance, during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, Jutel (2018) and Ouyang & Waterman (2020) highlighted the significant role social media, particularly Twitter, played in facilitating Donald Trump's electoral victory. Similarly, Tapsell (2023) found that social media heavily influenced voters behaviour during the 2022 Malaysian general election. In Taiwan, Chen & Chang (2017) highlighted that Facebook emerged as the most dominant social media platform used by political candidates in local election.

A study on micro-blogging services (e.g., Twitter) and social network sites (e.g., Facebook) found that these platforms have a positive impact on increasing political participation (J, 2018; Ji, 2023). Similarly, research by (Tang & Lee, 2013) revealed how Facebook became a medium for youth participation by connecting with political actors and sharing political information in Hong Kong. Lalancette & Raynauld (2019) also identified the direct and positive effects of Instagram use on Justin Trudeau's politics during the Canadian Presidential contest. More recently, a Kompas Research and Development survey conducted before the 2024 Presidential Election indicated that increased exposure to and attention to online news positively correlates with voters' political preferences (Sakti, 2023). These studies demonstrate a positive relationship between the use of digital media in influencing voters, although the forms of digital media being investigated and the sampling frameworks vary widely across studies. However, social media does not always translate directly influencing voter behaviour; it also plays a crucial role in fostering political participation across various context. Empirical studies have shown that the impact of social media on political engagement can vary significantly. For example, studies on national samples of young people in Malaysia and Brazil have revealed noteworthy trends. Shiratuddin et al., (2016) found that

young people in Malaysia who followed political news, debates, and campaigns through social media platforms like Facebook significantly increased their political awareness and participation, both online and offline. Similarly, a study by Mundim et al., (2023) found that using Facebook, WhatsApp, and YouTube as sources of political information nearly doubled the likelihood of voting for Bolsonaro in the 2018 Presidential Election in Brazil. In Indonesia, analogous trends have emerged with Intyaswati & Fairuzza (2023) demonstrating that students' political participation in West Java during the 2019 Presidential Election had a significant impact on their overall engagement. Similarly, Kholid & Nurmandi, (2015) reported the positive effects of the use of social media by university students in Yogyakarta on political participation during the Indonesia's 2014 Presidential Election. Further, Neyazi et al., (2022) and Saud et al., (2020) has delved into the broader implications of digital media on various forms of political engagement among Indonesian youth during the 2019 elections, showcasing how platforms like social media can mobilize and inform young voters. These studies underscore the critical intersection of digital media and youth activism in Indonesia's evolving political landscape.

Traditional media, especially television, also plays a complex role in shaping electoral participation. In the 1950s, the spread of television in American households significantly reduced citizen participation in elections, in line with the decline in radio and newspaper consumption, which contributed to an overall decline in political knowledge (Gentzkow, 2006). This shows that wider access to television, instead of increasing political awareness, is actually triggering a change in information habits that negatively impacts citizens' engagement levels. A similar study from Italy in regional elections between 2005 and 2010 also showed that greater access to free television channels significantly lowered the share of votes for candidates like Berlusconi, assuming that more channels could spread more diverse messages and potentially weaken support for dominant figures (Barone & de Blasio, 2013). However, Himmelroos & von Schoultz (2023) investigated the role of political media consumption in non-resident citizens, and found that both traditional media and social media have a mobilizing effect on voters in their home countries. Citizens who live abroad and continue to follow the politics of their home country through various media are more likely to participate in the election. These results show that consistent access to political news can foster a sense of attachment to the country of origin, even if they do not live within the country, thereby strengthening cross-border political participation. Other empirical studies deepen this understanding, such as Moskowitz (2021) on the election of governors and senators in the US, which revealed that television information helps shape voter decisions; Ellingsen & Hernæs (2018) in Norway, which highlights the influence of the media on local politics; Hutasoit & Gusfa (2020) which explores the role of the media in elections in Indonesia's border areas.

Print media or newspaper further complements this landscape, reinforcing voter turnout through competition and city-level coverage in many countries. A study by Gentzkow et al. (2011) found that in the US, competition in print media has a positive effect on voter participation in presidential and congressional elections. In Switzerland Kübler & Goodman (2019) stated that the presence of well-established newspapers in cities can increase citizen involvement in local elections. Conversely, Drago et al. (2014) observed that increased newspaper entries between 1993 and 2010 boosted voter turnout in Italian city elections, improved incumbent mayors' re-election rates, and increased city government efficiency. Lee & Wei (2008) presents another view by finding that for young U.S. voters aged 17 to 24, exposure to newspapers actually reduces their political interest.

Beyond the sphere of media, electoral regulations and elite manipulation substantially affect the fairness of political representation. Salameh (2023) found that electoral laws in Jordan tends to harm certain demographic groups through disproportionate district divisions, especially in urban areas that support the opposition. This reflects the strategy used to maintain the political dominance of the ruling group by reducing the power of opposition voters. In their follow-up study, Bani Salameh & Aldabbas (2024) found that the Jordanian executive branch deliberately redesigned district boundaries to ensure election results in their favour, leading to a decline in public trust in the electoral process. They found that such a strategy could eliminate opposition groups' opportunities to compete fairly, reduce voter representation and strengthen the political control of the authorities. Furthermore, (Salameh et al., 2023) investigated the role of the "deep state" or non-official forces in Jordan in controlling laws and electoral processes to maintain the political status quo. These findings reveal that these invisible forces allow the political elite to maintain its influence while suppressing significant changes in

the political system. By controlling the electoral process through a hidden network of power, Jordan's political system has become increasingly inaccessible to potential opposition, further strengthening the dominance of the ruling elite, and hindering the emergence of more democratic political reforms. Therefore, the convergence of media, electoral regulations, and strategic manipulation emphasizes the intricate balance between voter influence and control, where the structures governing information and regulation play as pivotal a role as the messages themselves in shaping democratic engagement and political participation.

Nevertheless, there are still remains a gap in research specifically exploring how social media influences voters' political choices and participation in elections. For instance, a study by Chan & Tang (2016) showed that the social media platform "Facebook" did not have a significant impact on political participation in the 2018 Malaysian Presidential Election. Similarly, Valenzuela et al., (2020) found that high dependence on Facebook and Twitter did not directly impact the level of online/offline political participation. Our study found an interesting insight regarding Indonesian voters in India and in Turkiye during the Indonesia's 2024 Presidential Election. Despite the intensive use of social media, but it does not significantly influence their political decisions. On the contrary, our survey found that Indonesian voters in India and in Turkiye occupied with their respective activities and were largely unaffected by any candidate. As a result, no matter how extensive and strong the efforts of influencers and buzzers from each presidential/vice-presidential candidate, supporting parties, or campaign teams in creating candidate content were, they could not influence all voter groups. Indonesian voters in India and in Turkiye exhibited a high level of rationality. They acknowledged that they responded to much political content and 2024 Presidential Election content, but they remained steadfast in their decisions. Therefore, it is important to discuss why Indonesian voters in India and in Turkiye, despite their high social media consumption, were not influenced in their political choices for the 2024 Presidential candidates. This indicates that in the digital era, even though information is easily accessible, but the level of political participation and political decision-making process cannot be explained solely by the influence of social media but is also driven by other factors underlying the political preferences of Indonesian voters in India and Turkiye.

## 2. Research Methods

This study employs a mixed methods approach. According to Teddlie & Tashakkori (2012), mixed methods combined the techniques and characteristics of both quantitative and qualitative paradigms within a single study. In this research, the quantitative method focuses on statistical measurement to identify patterns and relationships using numerical data (Creswell, 2003; Terrell, 2016). A qualitative method aims to understand social phenomena through interpretation and contextual analysis, using non-numerical data such as interviews, observations, and text analysis (Purwanza et al., 2022). Combining these two methods aims to provide a deeper understanding and more comprehensive results (Moleong, 2022). We conducted a survey from Indonesian voters living, studying and working in India and in Turkiye. The total respondents in our study were 87, aged 18 to 65 years, with consideration of demographic attributes such as age, gender, and voter background. This distribution of voters reflects the spread of Indonesian citizens across districts in India and in Turkiye, each of which has a diversity of backgrounds, with three main groups dominating: housewives, professional workers, and students. Housewives play a crucial role in maintaining family life abroad. Professional workers, often employed in sectors such as information technology, trade, and services, contribute significantly to Indonesia and India economically. At the same time, students pursuing higher education at various institutions in India represent a dynamic and educated group that brings a global perspective to the electoral process. Our poll is a post-election survey conducted in approximately two months since March until April 2024. Due to the expanding sample size, our survey in Turkiye conducted in October 2024. Then, we analyse data through multivariate regression analysis to see the correlation and influence between existing variables and social media influence towards voter preference. The data collection process is conducted in three important stages (Dianna, 2020). The first stage involves distributing questionnaires using simple random sampling techniques via Google Forms. The choice of Google Forms is based on India's vast geographic area and time and resource constraints for face-to-face surveys. The second stage involves qualitative research through follow-up interviews via Zoom meeting applications to delve deeper into the phenomenon under study. The third stage is the parallel or concurrent mixed methods design, where qualitative and quantitative data are collected and analyzed simultaneously to complement each other (Sugiyono, 2021).

This study incorporated socio-economic background variables such as gender, age, education, and occupation (table 1 and tabel 3) as supplementary dimensions for analysis. Additionally, we explored social media usage patterns, including platform preferences and the time spent online. Respondents were provided with a list of popular social media platforms in a response column and were asked to select the one they used most frequently, aligning with their perspectives and habits (Figure 1). A similar approach was applied to gauge the extent of time spent on social media, where respondents selected the platform most reflective of their daily usage (tabel 2). Further, respondents were asked the level of frequency access of political information encountered on social media (table 4). This variable explored how often respondents found the content credible and its potential influence on voter behaviour before and during the Indonesia' 2024 Presidential Election. The trustworthiness of political content was measured using a four-point scale ranging from "Very Often" (4) to "Often" (3), "Fairly Often" (2), "Occasionally" (1), and "Never" (0).

Additionally, respondents were asked eight questions to assess their reactions to political campaigns on social media (Table 5). When encountering political content or campaign materials on their platforms, they were given the following options to express their behaviour: (1) like and comment; (2) like and share; (3) like only; (4) comment and share; (5) comment only; (6) share only; (7) view without interacting; and (8) ignore entirely. After collecting data from 81 respondents, we recalculated the reliability and validity of our two key variables—social media usage and political preferences. The results of these tests are presented in the subsequent sections. Similarly, we also examined the degree to which social media platforms impacted voting decisions (Table 6), using a scale from "Strongly Influences", "Influences", "Slightly Influences", "Does Not Influence", and "Don't Know". A further question assessed whether social media encouraged political participation (Figure 2), respondents were asked to rate their experience on a scale from "very encouraging" (4) to "no encouragement" (1), with an additional option for "do not know" (0).

Beyond the quantitative analysis, we also conducted semi-structured interviews with a subset of respondents via Zoom to gain deeper insights into their political preferences and emotional connections with the three presidential candidates. One of the central questions asked was whether they felt an emotional connection to any of the candidates. This allowed us to assess further voters' emotional attachment to specific political figures, which could influence their political choice. Additionally, it would be useful to explore how social media content resonates with voters on an emotional level, which could further explain the observed skepticism and selective engagement. This could help illuminate the complex motivations behind expatriates' political choices. The results of these interviews and the quantitative findings are discussed in the upcoming sections.

### **3. Result and Discussion**

#### **3.1. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents**

In the Indoensia's 2024 Presidential Election contest held in India and in Turkiye, the patterns and characteristics of social media usage by Indonesian citizens in accessing news and content related to the election vary widely. Statistical methods such as Mean, Median, Standard Deviation, Coefficient of Kurtosis, and Coefficient of Skewness are used to evaluate the collected data. The primary aim of this analysis is to understand and assess the patterns and characteristics of Indonesian voters in India in accessing election content via social media, which ultimately shapes and influences their behaviour. In examining the impact of social media on the political preferences of Indonesian citizens in India, the researcher categorizes voters based on their occupational backgrounds. First is students (university students); second is housewives; and third is professional workers.

**Table 1. Background Voter**

| <b>Categories</b>  | <b>Score Range</b> |
|--------------------|--------------------|
| Student            | 42                 |
| House Wife         | 33                 |
| Profesional worker | 12                 |

Source: Authors' computation (2024)

Based on the table 1, it shows that among the 87 respondents, there are 42 voters ((52.5%) who are students, 33 voters (41.3%) who are housewives, and 12 voters who are profesional worker, consisting civil servants/diplomats (6.3%), and private employees (6,3%). The selection of these three groups in the election represents a broad spectrum of Indonesian citizens' participation abroad. Housewives, professional workers, and students each bring unique interests and perspectives that enrich the democratic process. Housewives may be more focused on family and social issues, professional workers might be interested in economic policies and bilateral relations, while students may be more concerned with education and career opportunities. Additionally, the Average Social Media Usage Time of Indonesian citizens in India is also highly varied, as detailed in the table below:

**Table 2. Duration Time using Social Media**

| <b>Duration of Use Social Media (Hours)</b> | <b>Sum</b> |
|---------------------------------------------|------------|
| < 1 Hours                                   | 4          |
| 1 – 2 Hours                                 | 22         |
| 2 – 4 Hours                                 | 30         |
| 4 – 6 Hours                                 | 19         |
| > 6 Hours                                   | 12         |

Source: Authors' computation (2024)

From the table 2, it observed that 4 respondents access social media for approximately 1 hour. 22 respondents spend 1-2 hours accessing social media. There are 30 respondents who use social media for 2-4 hours. This figure is higher compared to 19 respondents who spend 4-6 hours accessing social media to view or read election content. More than 12 respondents acknowledge spending over 6 hours. From this data, it can be concluded that the majority of respondents spend between 2 to 4 hours per day on social media, particularly in the context of election content. This indicates that social media is a significant source of information for many in understanding and following election developments. A deeper analysis of the survey results from voters in India shows that younger voters aged 18-24 spend an average of 1 to 2 hours per day on social media. Voters aged 25-34 spend an average of 2 to 4 hours per day. Voters aged 34-44 also spend an average of 2 to 4 hours per day. Meanwhile, voters aged 45-54 spend an average of 1 to 2 hours per day and are more selective in receiving information and verifying news before making decisions. They use social media to read political articles, follow political figures, and engage in online discussions. Voters aged 55-64 also spend an average of 1 to 2 hours per day on social media, tending to access news from trusted sources and share political articles with their network.

From Table 2, the Standard Deviation obtained in this study is 8.90, with a mean of 16.20 and a median of 18.00. These findings indicate that social media plays a crucial role in obtaining presidential election information. The high mean and median, along with a relatively large Standard Deviation, suggest that the dissemination of information via social media has significant potential to influence political orientation and shape voter behaviour abroad. The significant variation in the data underscores the varying impact of social media among individuals, highlighting its importance as a primary tool in political campaigns and diaspora voter mobilization.

**Table 3. Age of Voter**


| <b>Range Age</b> | <b>Score Range</b> |
|------------------|--------------------|
| <18              | 2                  |
| 18 – 24          | 16                 |
| 25 – 34          | 32                 |
| 35 – 44          | 21                 |
| 45 – 54          | 13                 |
| 55 – 64          | 3                  |
| >65              | 0                  |

Source: Authors' computation (2024)



In terms of age, most respondents were between 25 and 34 years old (37.5%), comprising 68.8% female, 31.3% male. We also found that the statistical analysis results are as follows: a mean value of 11.571 with a standard error of 4.275, and a standard deviation of 11.312. These data indicate that the social media users among Indonesian citizens in India for the 2024 presidential election exhibit significant variation in their behaviour. The high standard deviation relative to the mean suggests that there is a wide dispersion in the data, indicating that the impact of social media on voter behaviour varies greatly among individuals. This is important because it shows that social media functions as an inclusive platform, accessed by voters from various generations. Furthermore, when analysed by age, it is found that the 2024 simultaneous election is not the first election for the majority of Indonesian voters in India and in Turkiye.

In the context what social media the respondent has? We asked two questions about respondents' (1) 'What social media are you using currently?'



**Figure 1. Types of Social Media Used**

Source: Authors' computation (2024)

Based on Figure 1, our survey result shows quite interesting data. 96.3% of the respondents acknowledge having social media What's App (96.3%), YouTube (90.1%), Instagram (87.7%), Facebook (71.6%), and X/Twitter (29.6%).

### **3.2. Convergence in Accessing Social Media Among Indonesian Citizens**

In the 2024 presidential election contest, social media has played a crucial role in reaching voters. Platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter/X, YouTube, and WhatsApp have become primary sources of political information for voters in India. They use social media not only to stay updated with the latest news but also to engage in digital dialogues about political issues. This interaction provides voters with more detailed information on political matters. However, the influence of social media on Indonesian citizens in India appears to be relatively minor. Data reveals that 56.7% of respondents acknowledge a moderate impact, 27% believe it has a significant impact, while 9.9% claim that social media has a profound effect on their decision-making process regarding presidential candidates in the 2024 election. These results, as outlined in the table above, demonstrate that the impact of social media on Indonesian citizens in India is not overwhelmingly significant. Simultaneously, the 2024 presidential election in India shows that social media plays a substantial role, affecting various demographics from youth to older adults. Social media has become an essential platform for political campaigns, information dissemination, and voter mobilization. Consequently, this research identifies patterns of voter behaviour influenced by exposure to social media. Data from diaspora voters in India is analysed to assess the extent of deviation, distribution, and data trends. The use of kurtosis and skewness coefficients provides a deeper insight into data dispersion and distribution, reflecting the impact of social media.

These data reveal that different groups of Indonesian citizens in India access, process, and respond to political information from social media in distinct ways. Students tend to use social media intensively and diversely, while housewives may focus more on content related to household and community activities. Employees, on the other hand, use social media primarily for professional purposes and job-related information. This analysis provides insight into the role of social media in influencing voter behaviour, illustrating how users interact with political content across various social media platforms and the extent of its impact and frequency of access.

**Table 4. Frequency of Accessing Presidential Election Content**

| Frequency of Access | Social Media Platform |          |             |          |           |
|---------------------|-----------------------|----------|-------------|----------|-----------|
|                     | Facebook              | WhatsApp | Twitter / X | You Tube | Instagram |
| Very Often          | -                     | -        | -           | 11%      | 19,7%     |
| Often               | -                     | -        | 12,5%       | 19,2%    | 11,3%     |
| Fairry Often        | 29,3%                 | 9%       | 20,8%       | 20,5%    | 31%       |
| Occasionally        | 34,5%                 | 34,6%    | 33,3%       | 26%      | 19,7%     |
| Never               | 29,3%                 | 48,7%    | 29,2%       | 23,3%    | 18,3%     |

Source: Authors' computation (2024)

From the table 4, the use of Facebook for accessing presidential election content is mostly at a "Occasionally" frequency (34.5%), with nearly one-third of users accessing it "Fairly Often" (29.3%) or "Never" (29.3%). The majority of WhatsApp users never access presidential election content through this platform (48.7%). The frequency of "Fairly Often" and "Often" is very low, indicating that WhatsApp is not a primary media for presidential election content. Twitter users show a more even distribution, with "Sometimes" being the most common category (33.3%). The percentage of those who never access presidential election content is also relatively high (29.2%). YouTube has users who are fairly active in accessing presidential election content, with "Very Often" (11%) and "Often" (19.2%) categories being relatively high. Most users access presidential election content "Fairly Often" (20.5%) or "Sometimes" (26%). Instagram shows a high frequency in accessing presidential election content, with "Very Often" (19.7%) and "Fairly Often" (31%) being the top two categories. Only 18.3% of users never access presidential election content through Instagram. Platforms with High Access Frequency are Instagram and YouTube, where users frequently or very frequently access presidential election content. In contrast, platforms with low access frequency include WhatsApp, which has the highest percentage of users who never access presidential election content, followed by Facebook and Twitter. Therefore, users tend to access presidential election content more frequently on visually oriented platforms such as Instagram and YouTube, while text-based platforms like WhatsApp and Facebook tend to have lower access frequencies.

Moreover, the table above also illustrates the frequency of user access to presidential election content across various social media platforms. Instagram and YouTube have a higher percentage of users who frequently access election-related content compared to other platforms. In contrast, Facebook and WhatsApp have a high percentage of users in the "Never" category for accessing presidential election content. This table depicts how often social media users engage with presidential election content across different platforms. Specifically, Instagram and YouTube show a high percentage of users in the "Very Often" and "Fairly Often" categories, with 19.7% and 31% respectively for Instagram. Additionally, WhatsApp and Facebook tend to have more users in the "Never" category, with percentages of 48.7% and 29.3% respectively.

**Table 5. Response Model to Presidential Election Content 2024**

| Model Reaction           | Social Media Platform |          |             |          |           |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|----------|-------------|----------|-----------|
|                          | Facebook              | WhatsApp | Twitter / X | You Tube | Instagram |
| Like, Comment and Share  | -                     | -        | -           | -        | 7%        |
| Like and Comment         | -                     | -        | -           | -        | -         |
| Like and Share           | -                     | -        | 8,3%        | -        | -         |
| Like Only                | 52,4%                 | 12,8%    | 20,8%       | 20,5%    | 22,5%     |
| Comment and Share        | -                     | -        | -           | -        | -         |
| Comment only             | -                     | -        | -           | -        | -         |
| Share only               | -                     | -        | -           | -        | -         |
| See without any reaction | 13,8                  | 53,8%    | 45,8%       | 53,4%    | 50,7%     |
| Ignore                   | 17,2%                 | 23,1%    | 25%         | 13,7%    | 9,9%      |

Source: Authors' computation (2024)

The table 5 shows various models of voter reactions to the 2024 Presidential Election content on different social media platforms, such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter / X, YouTube, and Instagram. In this context, the majority of Facebook users are more likely to only give a "Like" without further interaction, while WhatsApp and YouTube users tend to view the content without reacting. Instagram shows a relatively high proportion of users engaging in a combination of "Like, Comment, and Share." The data in this table shows various voter reactions to the 2024 Presidential Election content on major social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter / X, YouTube, and Instagram. In this context, "Like Only" is the most common reaction on Facebook, with 52.4% of users only giving a "Like" without further interaction. Instagram also shows a high rate of "Like Only" at 22.5%. On the other hand, WhatsApp and YouTube users tend to view content without reacting, with percentages of 53.8% and 53.4%, respectively. Ignoring content is also quite high across all platforms, with the highest percentage on Twitter (25%). Additionally, Facebook users are more likely to give a "Like Only" (52.4%) on political campaign content. Most others choose to view without reacting (13.8%) or reject the content (17.2%). On WhatsApp, the majority of users prefer to view the content without reacting (53.8%), with a significant percentage rejecting it (23.1%). Only a few give a "Like Only" (12.8%). Twitter users are more inclined to view without reacting (45.8%) or reject the content (25%). Some give a "Like Only" (20.8%) or "Like and Share" (8.3%). On YouTube, the majority of users view without reacting (53.4%), while some give a "Like Only" (20.5%) and others reject the content (13.7%). Instagram users tend to view content without reacting (50.7%), with some giving a "Like Only" (22.5%) and others engaging in "Like, Comment, and Share" (7%). The rejection rate on Instagram is the lowest among the platforms (9.9%). In this context, the "Like Only" reaction occurs most frequently on Facebook (52.4%), followed by Instagram (22.5%), Twitter (20.8%), and YouTube (20.5%). WhatsApp has the lowest percentage (12.8%). Viewing Without Reaction is the most common response across all platforms except Facebook. WhatsApp (53.8%), YouTube (53.4%), Instagram (50.7%), and Twitter (45.8%) have users who prefer to view content without reacting. Meanwhile, Rejection (Denial): The highest rejection rate occurs on Twitter (25%), followed by WhatsApp (23.1%), Facebook (17.2%), YouTube (13.7%), and Instagram (9.9%). Therefore, this distribution of reactions indicates that user engagement with presidential election content varies significantly depending on the social media platform used.

**Table 6. The Data of Social Media**

| Variabel            | Social Media Platform |          |             |          |           |
|---------------------|-----------------------|----------|-------------|----------|-----------|
|                     | Facebook              | WhatsApp | Twitter / X | You Tube | Instagram |
| Strongly Influences | 1%                    | 15,5%    | 19%         | 39,7%    | 22,4 %    |
| Influences          | 1%                    | 9%       | 15,4 %      | 53,8%    | 16,7%     |
| Slightly Influences | %                     | 1%       | 41,7%       | 33,3%    | 20,8%     |
| Does Not Influence  | 12,3%                 | 17,8%    | 26%         | 27,4%    | 16,4%     |
| Don't Know          | 1%                    | 1%       | 41,7%       | 33,3 %   | 20,8 %    |

Source: Authors' computation (2024)

This table 6, shows that the majority of Facebook users feel that presidential election content does not influence them (12.3%). Only a small percentage feel strongly influenced or influenced (1% each). There is no data for "Slightly Influences." WhatsApp users tend to feel a greater influence compared to other platforms, with 15.5% feeling strongly influenced. However, there are still 17.8% who feel that the content does not influence them, and 1% who do not know. Twitter users show diverse perceptions. Some feel the content strongly influences (19%) or influences (15.4%), but 41.7% feel slightly influenced or not influenced at all. A significant portion also feels uncertain (41.7%). YouTube shows a significant influence with 39.7% feeling strongly influenced and 53.8% feeling influenced. However, 27.4% feel not influenced and 33.3% feel uncertain. Instagram users have diverse perceptions, with 22.4% feeling strongly influenced and 16.7% feeling influenced. Around 20.8% feel slightly influenced, and 16.4% feel not influenced. Additionally, 20.8% are uncertain. Therefore, the impact of social media on presidential election content perception varies greatly across platforms: YouTube and Twitter are platforms where users tend to feel a greater influence from the election content. WhatsApp shows a higher level of influence compared


to Facebook but is still lower compared to YouTube and Twitter. Meanwhile, Instagram shows diverse perceptions, while Facebook shows the lowest influence, with most users feeling unaffected. Thus, social media influences users in the context of the 2024 presidential election. YouTube seems to be the platform that most influences voter decisions, followed by Instagram and Twitter. WhatsApp has a significant influence but not as much as YouTube, while Facebook has the least influence among the other platforms. This table also indicates the extent to which social media influences users' political views. In this regard, YouTube shows the greatest influence, with 39.7% of users feeling strongly influenced and 53.8% feeling influenced. Instagram and Twitter / X also show significant influence, although not as much as YouTube. Meanwhile, Facebook has the least influence, with only 1% of users feeling strongly influenced.

From the three tables above, we gain deep insights into voter interactions with presidential election content across various social media platforms. Instagram and YouTube stand out as platforms with users who frequently access and interact with election content, significantly influencing users' political views. Conversely, Facebook and WhatsApp tend to have users who are more passive in terms of reactions and access frequency. This information is crucial for designing effective social media campaign strategies, focusing on the most influential and interactive platforms. In this context, Reaction to Content: Facebook is more likely to only receive "Likes," while WhatsApp and YouTube are often viewed without reaction. Social Media Influence: YouTube is the most influential platform, while Facebook has the least influence. Access Frequency: Instagram and YouTube are frequently accessed for election content, while WhatsApp has many users who never access election content.

### 3.3. Always Online: Voters Unaffected by Presidential Election Content

As mentioned above, the Indonesia's 2024 Presidential Election in India is receiving particular attention, given the role of social media platforms as primary sources of political information for Indonesian voters in India, keeping up with developments in Indonesian politics. Despite this interest, the impact of social media on influencing voters' political choices, particularly in determining the President and Vice-President candidates, is not uniform. However, social media significantly impacts voter participation in the 2024 elections in India. This is due to the fact that the differences in characteristics and motivations between the three groups of voters become more apparent, especially when viewed from the background of the work that affects the way they participate in the political process.

Have you ever changed your choice for the 2024 presidential election due to the influence of social media?  
87 jawaban



**Figure 2: Percentage of Influence of Social Media on Presidential Election 2024**

Source: Google Form, 2024

From the survey conducted with 87 respondents, we found that 81.6% of voters were not influenced by social media in determining the candidate they will vote for, 17.2% were influenced by social media, and 1.1% were somewhat influenced in casting their votes (Figure 2). This indicates that the influence of social media is not aligned with the level of voter participation in the 2024 elections in India. This fact is not particularly surprising, especially considering the differences among voters based on age groups and professional categories. Student voters exhibit high usage intensity, while

housewives voters show a more average usage pattern. On the other hand, professional worker voters are more selective and cautious in accessing social media content related to the 2024 presidential election.

Among student voters, most of whom are between the ages of 18 and 34 and are pursuing a bachelor's or master's degree, are more often exposed to politics through social media. They generally live and studied in major cities in various states in India and in Turkiye, where internet access is relatively stable, allowing them to stay abreast of political developments in Indonesia. The high use of social media should make them more vulnerable to the influence of political content compared to other voter groups. However, despite their intensive access to political information, Indonesia's political dynamics, which are characterized by political polarization (Jati, 2022; Syahputra et al., 2024; Warburton, 2020), declining party ideology (Pohlman, 2023; Setiawan & Tomsa, 2022), populism (Adiwilaga et al., 2019; Hatherell & Welsh, 2020; Mietzner, 2015; Wicaksana, 2022; Wicaksana & Wardhana, 2021), and declining democracy (Aspinall et al., 2020; Asrinaldi & Yusoff, 2023; Baker, 2023; Habibi, 2022; Schäfer, 2019; Setiawan, 2022; Warburton, 2020), have made many students inclined to be skeptical of sudden changes in their political preferences. They are more interested in substantive political issues that focus on programs and policies than debates that are personal or symbolic. Nonetheless, their rational and analytical attachment to politics in Indonesia has developed over time, especially in the last decade, where political ideological shifts and the rise of populism (Pohlman, 2023; Setiawan & Tomsa, 2022) have caught their attention. In the context of the Indonesia's 2024 Presidential Election, though they have been actively participating in political discourse through social media, but most of them are reluctant to change their political preferences towards presidential candidates. In this context, student voters reflecting a more rational and analytical approach to making political decisions.

Housewives, on the other hand, form a group of voters with unique characteristics. Generally, they have been married to Indian citizens and settled in India for more than five years, raising a family, and are heavily dependent on their husband's income. With the largest composition of respondents compared to other groups of respondents, they reached 41.3%. In terms of education, they are mostly secondary education, with 3.8% of junior high school graduates and 13.5% of high school graduates. Their involvement with Indonesian politics is relatively indirect, as the policies of the Indonesian president have had a limited impact on their daily lives in India. However, they continue to monitor political and social developments in the country through digital platforms, especially YouTube, which is the main source of political information. The lack of access to local Indian media, especially television, that reports on the Indonesian Presidential Election makes them dependent on social media. Interestingly, although their involvement in political discussions was not intense, 83% of them stated that they were "always" or "quite often" involved in accessing the 2024 Presidential Election campaign content, and this shows their interest in political developments in Indonesia. YouTube is their main means of accessing political information, and one of the main driving factors of their political preferences is the "Jokowi effect", which reflects their satisfaction with the Jokowi administration. As many as 42.7% of housewives in this group expressed satisfaction with Jokowi's performance and therefore chose the Prabowo-Gibran pair, because they believe that this pair will continue and strengthen the achievements that Jokowi has pioneered. Their political participation is driven by the hope of better progress for Indonesia. Although their involvement in politics is passive, they still hope that the election of the Prabowo-Gibran pair will bring significant changes, similar to the transformation brought by Jokowi during his leadership. Housewives in this group see politics as a means to achieve stability that can improve the well-being of them and their families in Indonesia, even though they now live far away in other countries.

Meanwhile, the professional worker voter showed a different dynamic from student voters and housewives. Most of them work as civil servants, especially at the Indonesian Embassy, and their political choices are heavily influenced by the strict neutrality rules of the state civil apparatus. Based on Law No. 5 of 2014 concerning State Civil Service Neutrality, civil servants are prohibited from engaging in practical politics, participating in political campaigns, or showing political preferences on social media. Violations of this neutrality, such as responding to political posts on social media, can be considered a violation of the code of ethics and lead to serious sanctions, including dismissal. As a result, their role in elections is more administrative, ensuring that the democratic process runs smoothly without partiality, rather than as active participants in practical politics. In the face of the 2024 Presidential Election campaign content, professional workers show

minimal reactions on social media. They tend to spend less time engaging in political discussions on these platforms. Based on the survey, about 39.7% of them only spend 2 to 4 hours per day accessing social media, with YouTube being the most used platform. This low involvement reflects their neutral and cautious position in responding to political issues that could affect their professionalism. More so, the group tends to be skeptical of the accuracy of political information on social media, with 35% stating that political content during presidential elections is often inaccurate or unreliable. This is very different from other groups of voters. 59.3% of professional workers specifically stated that they do not trust information related to the Presidential Election circulating on social media, especially due to the prevalence of biased or unfactual news. This view is reinforced by their experience and generally higher education, with the majority having a master's degree, as well as an age range between 34 and 54 years old. With a deeper knowledge of politics, they are more resistant to manipulative narratives on social media, in contrast to student voters who are more vulnerable to digital influences, or housewives who are more emotionally connected to leadership figures like Jokowi. Their professionalism in managing information and long experience in the bureaucratic work environment give them a more objective and critical perspective on presidential candidates. For them, social media is not the main source for political decision-making, but rather a place to passively monitor political developments that do not directly affect their choices. Therefore, professional groups of workers consider political content on social media to be less reliable, and this makes them rely more on personal understanding and professional experience in determining their political stances, in contrast to the group of housewives and students who are more influenced by emotional sentiment or information in the digital world.

A study from Intyaswati & Fairuzza (2023), Mundim et al., (2023); Shiratuddin et al., (2016); and Uwalaka (2021) found that political conversations and political campaigns on social media significantly increased political participation among young voters in several countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, and Nigeria. However, our study found that political campaigns on social media do not have the same impact on Indonesian voters living in India. Our results also show that, especially among Indonesian voters in India, different occupational statuses play a more important role compared to gender, age, and religion at the national level (Muhtadi, 2019; Saud et al., 2020). This difference is also evident in terms of voter behavior, where our study shows that the preferences of Indonesian voters in India are shaped by a combination of rationality and emotionality in the 2024 presidential election, while other studies voter behavior were strongly shaped by the academic attainment (Sirait et al., 2022), manipulation of electoral districts (Bani Salameh & Aldabbas, 2024; Salameh, 2023).

### **3.4. Voter engagement in electoral decision-making**

Speaking about voter engagement between three groups of Indonesian voters in India and in Turkiye, more apparent when viewed from their engagement in political electoral decision making. This trend reveals a striking variation in how each group responds to political dynamics, particularly regarding the 2024 Presidential Election. From the results of interviews conducted with several respondents from each voter group, around 42.7% of respondents admitted that they were not too much influenced by social media. However, the way they respond to politics remains varied. Among student voters, there is a more critical response to the candidacy of the Prabowo-Gibran pair. As many as 73.5% of students stated that they rejected Gibran's candidacy because it was considered a form of political dynasty, which they thought could damage democracy in Indonesia. This phenomenon of political dynasties has become a sensitive issue among students, who generally have strong ideals about the importance of meritocracy and openness in politics. The close alliance between Jokowi and the Prabowo-Gibran pair has been a major spotlight in Indonesia's political landscape, especially given their fiercely competitive backdrop in the previous two presidential elections. This unexpected partnership caught the attention of students, making them very sensitive to the electoral implications of this coalition. Jokowi's effect, which is still strong among voters, is the main consideration for students in assessing the Prabowo-Gibran pair. However, many student voters felt that Jokowi's support for his son reflected the practice of political dynasties, leading to dissatisfaction and rejection. This confirms that for most students, their political preferences are based on a rational analysis of the long-term impact on democracy, not just personal or emotional loyalty. On the other hand, support for the Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar couple came more from student voters, who were fascinated by Anies' personal attributes. Anies' impressive academic

qualifications and track record as Governor of DKI Jakarta are considered indicators of competence and leadership ability, which attracts the attention of student voters who are more oriented towards individual achievements. These qualities align with the vision and mission of the Anies campaign, which emphasizes the importance of strong government experience and capacity, which most students see as the main basis for providing support. Meanwhile, political rationality plays a big role in student voter decision-making. Most of them chose Anies-Muhaimin because they considered this pair to be more in line with their expectations regarding transparency, professionalism, and policy innovation. They prefer candidates they see as capable of bringing about structural change, rather than simply operating within the framework of dynastic politics that they perceive as hindering further democratization in Indonesia.

On the other hand, among housewife voters, the majority do not see Gibran's candidacy as a threat to democracy or a form of political dynasty. The poll results showed that 35% of housewives-voters in India supported the Prabowo-Gibran pair, indicating that their decision was driven by confidence in the couple's ability to continue Jokowi's vision and leadership over the next five years. This support reflects a strong emotional attachment to the "Jokowi effect", where Jokowi's achievements as president for two terms are the dominant determining factor for this group of voters. For housewives who are very satisfied with Jokowi's leadership over the past 10 years, Jokowi's support for her son, Gibran, is not considered a negative political dynastic practice. Instead, they see it as a step to ensure the continuity of Jokowi's programs and vision, which they feel have brought significant benefits to Indonesia. This evidence shows that for housewife voters, the Jokowi effect is the main reason for determining their political choices. Their support for Prabowo-Gibran was not based on a rational analysis of the risks of a political dynasty, but rather on the belief that Gibran would strengthen his father's achievements and continue the policies they considered successful. In addition, this phenomenon is interesting because many of the housewife voters who supported Prabowo-Gibran are also supporters of Jokowi-Ma'ruf in the 2019 Presidential Election. This shows that there is consistency in political preferences driven by Jokowi's personal influence. They see Jokowi as a leader who is able to bring real change to the welfare of their families, so his support for Gibran is seen as an extension of their hopes for the continuation of stable and progressive leadership.

Although Jokowi's political dynasty and effects have the potential to give rise to debate, for housewives, aspects of Jokowi's pragmatism and policy sustainability are more important than more abstract democratic issues. Their choice to support the Prabowo-Gibran pair shows that Jokowi's influence in shaping voter preferences is still very strong, especially among voters who are more connected to aspects of daily welfare than to broader political dynamics. This phenomenon highlights how the Jokowi effect continues to play an important role in shaping a significant segment of voters, despite the presence of political dynastic elements in Gibran's candidacy. Housewives' support for Prabowo-Gibran shows that they prefer stability and the continuation of the leadership they have trusted during Jokowi's two terms, rather than considering major changes in the direction of national politics.

In contrast to the two groups of voters mentioned earlier, the group of voters who supported the Ganjar-Mahfud pair showed a firm rejection of support for Prabowo-Gibran. Although in the 2019 Presidential Election they supported the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair, in the 2024 Presidential Election they remain loyal to Ganjar-Mahfud. This support is largely due to its affiliation with the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), which continues to be a key cornerstone of their political decisions. However, while still supporting the PDIP, they expressed discomfort with the enduring popularity of Jokowi, who for two terms has been the dominant force in Indonesian politics. This consistency of support for Ganjar-Mahfud shows that despite doubts about Jokowi's influence, voters remain loyal to the party and candidates who are considered to have a close relationship with PDIP's values. A significant proportion of support for the Ganjar-Mahfud pair comes from various voter groups, including housewives, professional workers, and some students. However, this transition reflects not only party loyalty, but also the result of a complex interaction between dissatisfaction with the status quo and the attractiveness of alternative political options.

In an interview, Ganjar-Mahfud voters revealed that dissatisfaction with the potential political dynasty in Gibran Rakabuming Raka's candidacy was one of the main reasons they turned away from Prabowo-Gibran. Concerns about the preservation of power in Jokowi's family circle have raised resistance among voters who feel it is important to maintain

democratic integrity and prevent the concentration of power in one family. Although Jokowi's effect is still strong in influencing certain segments of voters, especially housewives, Ganjar-Mahfud supporters see Ganjar as a symbol of the sustainability of the values that PDIP stands for, without the risk of forming a political dynasty. The shift also reflects a broader trend among professional and student voters who judge candidates based on personal qualities and experience. Ganjar Pranowo, with his track record as Governor of Central Java and his close relationship with Jokowi, is seen as able to continue the pro-people policies and infrastructure development that are characteristic of Jokowi's leadership. Mahfud MD, as an intellectual and legal expert, gives additional trust to voters who are looking for a leader with integrity and able to strengthen the rule of law in Indonesia.

In this context, Indonesian voter engagement in India reflects the significant impact of political elites in shaping voter perspectives and preferences. Not only are these political elites able to influence campaign narratives and shape political discourse, but their authority also exerts a strong influence on voter opinion. In Jordan, by contrast, voter engagement is heavily influenced by structural manipulation, where elites actively interfere with the electoral process (Salameh, Al-Rfouh & Hamad, 2023). This manipulation, particularly through the arbitrary division of electoral districts, erodes voters' trust in democracy, leading many to see elections as a tool to perpetuate elite control rather than as a platform for genuine representation. Such practices deepen systemic injustice, creating widespread political alienation among voters who increasingly see no benefit from their participation. Our findings show that in the context of the 2024 presidential election in India, political elites, especially presidential candidates, have a dominant influence on the preferences of Indonesian voters across various groups. Although, social media is the main source of political information for Indonesians in India, it plays only a secondary role in shaping political opinion, and is not the main driver of voter behaviour. Instead, factors such as historical political loyalties, personal appeal of candidates, and dissatisfaction with existing political trends shape voter motivations in complex ways. Voter behaviour and their engagement in the 2024 elections is, therefore, driven by considerations such as upholding democratic integrity, rejecting political dynasties, and ensuring national policy continuity. This diverse political landscape underscores that political engagement among Indonesian voters, both in India and abroad, is influenced by a complex mix of elite-driven factors and personal values linked to broader national concerns.

#### **4. Conclusion**

The Influence of social media on Indonesian voter in India during the Indonesia's 2024 Presidential Election reveals a diverse and nuanced landscape. While platforms like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter/X, YouTube, and WhatsApp serve as primary sources of political information, their impact on voters' decisions is neither direct nor uniform. The majority of voters 81.6% reported that social media did not influence their choice of presidential candidate, although 17.2% acknowledged its role in motivating them to vote. This discrepancy highlights selective and critical engagement with digital content across various demographic groups. Young voters, particularly students, displayed high social media usage yet maintained consistent electoral preferences, driven by concerns over political dynasties. Conversely, professional workers exhibited skepticism towards the accuracy of social media content and relied more on credible sources. These findings suggest that the influence of social media is shaped by educational background, professional status, and political experience. Thus, the assumption of social media's omnipotence in shaping election outcomes is challenged, emphasizing the importance of considering multiple factors that drive voter behaviour in an increasingly interconnected world. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of the complexity of social media's influence on voter behavior, especially among the diaspora. As such, it is important to consider local context and traditional factors that may be more dominant in influencing political participation, even in an increasingly digital era. The findings also open up opportunities for further research exploring the interaction between social media and traditional factors in influencing political participation across different groups of people.



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