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Question: Effect Of Corruption In The Nigerian Military On The Fight Against Insurgency In Nigeria (2013-2022)

***Adebajo, Adeola Aderayo*[1] , *Atobatele, Abolaji Jamiu* [2*]**

[1]Department of Political Science, College of Social & Management Sciences, Tai Solarin University of Education, Ijagun

[2]Department of Political Science and International Relations, Covenant University, Ota.

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* *Corresponding author:*
abolaji.atobatele@covenantuniversity.edu.ng

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Abstract

Objective: One of the daunting challenges confronting Nigeria as a nation is terrorism by Boko Haram and the corruption perpetrated in fighting this menace by the military. Therefore, the paper investigated how corruption affected the fight against terrorism in Nigeria.

Method: The study adopted survey research where mixed method was used to gather data from the respondents. Data was gathered from the five Army Divisions in Nigeria. Ordinal Regression Analysis was used to analyze the data.

Result: It revealed that funds meant for the purchase of arms were mismanaged by the security chiefs leading to poor welfare of the soldiers. It further shows that embezzlement of funds meant to take care of the military personnel weakened the morals of the personnel to fight but does not affect the use of fire arm by the insurgency. The study found out that bribery in the military causes unexpected explosion by the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria.

Conclusion: It recommended that socio-economic factors such as poverty, religious extremism, governance deficit, among others, should be combated by the government through economic empowerment programmes, conscious de-radicalization process and institutionalization of structures of good governance at all levels of government.

Key words: Corruption, Terrorism, Boko Haram, Threat, Nigerian Military, Insurgency, Nigeria.

تأثير الفساد في الجيش النيجيري على مكافحة التمرد في نيجيريا (2013-2022)

أديباجو، أديولا أديرايو*[1]*، أتوباتيل، أبولاجي جاميو*[2]

[1]قسم العلوم السياسية، كلية العلوم الاجتماعية والإدارية، جامعة تاي سولارين للتعليم، إيجاجون

[2]قسم العلوم السياسية والعلاقات الدولية، جامعة كوفينانت، أوتا

ملخّص

الأهداف: إن أحد التحديات الصعبة التي تواجه نيجيريا كدولة هو الإرهاب الذي تمارسه جماعة بوكو حرام، والفساد الذي يرتكبه الجيش في مكافحة هذا التهديد. لذلك، تبحث هذه الورقة في كيفية تأثير الفساد على مكافحة الإرهاب في نيجيريا.

المنهجية: اعتمدت الدراسة على البحث المسحي حيث تم استخدام المنهج المختلط لجمع البيانات من المبحوثين. وقد تم جمع البيانات من الفرق العسكرية الخمس في نيجيريا. وتم تحليل هذه البيانات باستخدام تحليل الانحدار الترتيبي.

النتائج: كشفت النتائج أن الأموال المخصصة لشراء الأسلحة أُسيء استخدامها من قبل القادة الأمنيين، مما أدى إلى تدهور رفاهية الجنود. وأظهرت كذلك أن اختلاس الأموال المخصصة لرعاية الأفراد العسكريين أضعف معنوياتهم في القتال، لكنه لم يؤثر على استخدام الأسلحة النارية من قبل المتمردين. كما وجدت الدراسة أن الرشوة داخل الجيش تؤدي إلى حدوث تفجيرات غير متوقعة من قبل متمردي بوكو حرام في نيجيريا.

الخلاصة: أوصت الدراسة بضرورة مكافحة العوامل الاجتماعية والاقتصادية مثل الفقر، والتطرف الديني، وعجز الحكم، من خلال برامج التمكين الاقتصادي، وإجراء عملية واعية لإزالة التطرف، وإضفاء الطابع المؤسسي على هياكل الحكومة الرشيدة على جميع مستويات الحكم.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الفساد، الإرهاب، بوكو حرام، التهديد، الجيش النيجيري، التمرد، نيجيريا.

1.0 Introduction

One of the challenges militating against Nigeria's advancement among the comity of nations is corruption in all its manifestations, be it economic, political, or financial. Corruption manifests in virtually all areas of social life and can take the form of bribery, money laundering, embezzlement, miscarriage of justice, padding of government contracts, among others. Corruption is experienced at both formal and informal levels of economic interaction. According to Faruk and Atobatele (2017), corruption in Nigeria is endemic, as the abundance of resources in the country has little or no effect on the living standards of the citizenry, with the spread of corruption evident in every facet of the Nigerian economy. Corruption manifests in the family, religious organizations, educational institutions, bureaucratic establishments, traditional structures, and even at the street level. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2019), out of all Nigerian citizens who had at least one contact with a public official in the 12 months prior to the 2019 survey, 30.2 per cent paid a bribe to, or were asked to pay a bribe by, a public official. This indicates that, although still relatively high, the prevalence of bribery in Nigeria has undergone a moderate, yet statistically significant, decrease since 2016, when it stood at 32.3 per cent.

At workplaces, corruption rears its ugly head in the form of sex-for-promotion, money-for-justice, inflated procurement processes, financial embezzlement, to mention a few. The reason for these prevalent corrupt practices cannot be divorced from the fact that individuals desire to get rich quicker than expected when they find themselves in a position to perpetrate illegal activities. Despite the efforts of successive governments and administrations to stamp out the menace by establishing anti-corruption agencies such as the Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offences Commission (ICPC), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), and Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT), all efforts have proved abortive, as corruption continues to entrench itself even within the rank and file of the anti-corruption agencies (Adebusuyi, 2019).

Corruption permeates every sector and level of the Nigerian government, including the Nigerian police, Nigerian military, National Assemblies, Local Governments, Ministries, Federal and State Executive Councils, Federal Road Safety Corps, Nigerian Customs Service, and the health and educational systems. Concerns abound regarding the high level of corruption in the Nigerian military, perpetrated by top military officers and a few political elites at the helm of leadership. The increasing level of corruption has led Nigeria to be ranked the 154th country among 180 countries in 2021, with South Sudan as 180th, the most corrupt, while Denmark is the least corrupt (Isa, 2010).

Since the return to democratic rule, Nigeria has faced serious internal security challenges. The most critical ones currently include the Jama'a Ahl as-Sunna Li-da'wa waal-Jihad, the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) insurgency, predominantly in the North-East states; the "Fulani Herdsmen" attacks in states such as Benue, Plateau, Zamfara, Taraba, and Kaduna; Niger-Delta militancy; and spates of kidnappings across the country. Different tactics, such as unexpected explosions, firearms, and voodoo, are used to indoctrinate recruits.

It is important to note that corruption affects the provision of a secure environment, particularly in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency, which has claimed the lives of many Nigerians and affected neighboring countries. The pervasiveness of corruption in every fabric of social life makes combating terrorism particularly difficult in Nigeria, thereby intensifying its impact and negative consequences. According to Ekiyor (2009), the Nigerian state has, over time, been characterized by unmitigated despotism, capricious government policies, fiscal crises, a debt-ridden economy, inequalities and injustices, bad governance, large-scale corruption, fractionalization of the ruling class, weak political and economic institutions, and a near absence of security for lives and property.

The seemingly complacent manner in which the state manages the emerging threats posed by militant Islamic groups highlights the inability of the ruling class to effectively manage state affairs. The prevalent corrupt practices in the military, including bribery, embezzlement, and lack of welfare provisions, are among the primary causes of corruption within the armed forces. Greed and lack of contentment drive military personnel, who are expected to protect the country, to accumulate ill-gotten wealth, thereby undermining Nigeria's economic development. This desire for primitive accumulation

of wealth is further intensified by the fact that some ethnic or cultural groups do not fully condemn the hijacking of state economic resources for personal gain.

Cases abound in which public looters remain unprosecuted or are even awarded national honors and chieftaincy titles. Consequently, individuals feel emboldened to engage in economic illegalities due to the lack of prosecution for those previously found culpable. As noted by Adebusuyi (2019), the government's and anti-corruption agencies' inability to successfully prosecute culprits has encouraged many Nigerians, including military personnel, to participate blindly in this social menace. Further emphasizing the impact of corruption on public perception in Nigeria, Adebusuyi (2019) stated that prevalent corruption within the rank and file of anti-corruption agencies has motivated Nigerians to regard corruption as a way of life.

Rather than addressing the problem, individuals at all levels of the military continue engaging in financial corruption. Many military officers, desiring to emulate the extravagant lifestyles of wealthy individuals in society, indulge in financial corruption without regard for its negative implications on the public good. It is against this backdrop that this study seeks to examine the effect of corruption in the Nigerian military on the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency. The specific objectives are to:

a. Determine the effect of bribery on the fight against unexpected explosion in Nigeria
b. Investigate the effect of embezzlement on the fight against unauthorized use of fire-arm in Nigeria.
c. Examine the effect of poor welfares in the military on the fight against disappearance of a classified documents in Nigeria.

1.1 Hypotheses

H0i: There is no significant effect between bribery and fight against unexpected explosion in Nigeria.

H0ii: Embezzlement does not have a significant effect on the fight against unauthorized use of fire-arm in Nigeria

H0iii: There is no significant effect between poor welfares in the military and fight against disappearance of a classified documents in Nigeria.

2.0 Conceptualizing Corruption

Corruption is a nebulous and multidimensional concept and attempts to define it often verge on futility. Lawal, George, Oseni, and Okuneye (2020) conceptualize corruption as the prevalent use of power or influence by public officials to enrich themselves or others at the expense of the public.

Vian and Cable (2017) argue that empirical evidence shows corruption is far worse than commonly described, as it undermines socio-economic development, weakens the rule of law, and erodes public trust in government. This implies that corruption has negative consequences that extend across national borders, as it involves the abuse of public roles or resources or the illegitimate use of political power and influence by public or private parties (Transparency International, 2019).

From the perspective of the United States Department of Defense (2007), corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, which includes the subversion or illegitimate use of resources intended for a specific purpose to further another goal. Corruption involves obtaining benefits that should not have been acquired, as well as causing harm to someone entitled to a benefit they did not receive. In the public sector, corruption entails flouting expectations and norms to misuse public systems for private, individual, or group gain instead of for the public advantage (United States Department of Defense, 2007).

2.1 Concept of Insurgency

Folarin and Oviasogie (n.d.) define insurgency as an organized movement that aims to overthrow a constituted government through subversive means and armed conflict. This definition suggests that insurgent groups employ unlawful methods to achieve an end, which could be political, religious, social, or ideological. The goal of insurgency is to confront and overthrow an existing government in order to gain control of power, resources, or influence in power-sharing (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014).

One significant issue in contemporary times is the growing menace of terrorism, which has shifted the focus of governments worldwide toward collective security and the global war on terror (Chidozie, Oluwatobi, & Oluwaseyi, 2020).

In July 2009, the Boko Haram uprising began in Bauchi and spread to other northern states, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of followers, Nigerian law enforcement officers, and civilians (Joseph, 1996). At its inception, the primary aim among its followers was regime change in Nigeria, as they believed that democratic and secular governance was in contradiction to Sharia law (Joseph, 2013).

2.2. Theoretical Framework

The paper adopts the prebendal theory as its analytical framework, providing a deeper understanding of corruption in the Nigerian military and its impact on the fight against terrorism in the country. The major proponent of the theory is the American scholar Richard A. Joseph, who applied it in a groundbreaking 1987 study to analyze the patron-client relationships that have historically characterized Nigerian politics (Oghuvbu & Oghuvbu, 2020). The term "prebend" was initially used in reference to the church, where a chapter member was entitled to a portion of a cathedral's income. In political terms, prebendalism refers to the widespread consensus regarding the use of state offices and the proceeds accruing to them. It is characterized by political competition for, and exploitation of, the perks of office (Duke, Agbaji, & Bassey, 2017).

According to prebendal theory, governmental posts are considered prebends that officeholders can claim and use to generate financial gains for themselves, their constituents, and kin groups. Members of the ethnic and religious groups to which they belong, as well as elected officials, believe they are entitled to a share of government revenues. The officeholder's ability to appropriate the office or transform it into a personal portion of the state, is a crucial element of prebendalism, often referred to as "power stealing" (Duke et al., 2017).

The patron-client approach has fostered corruption in Nigeria to the extent that decisions regarding hiring, admissions, contract awards, and promotions are often based on a person's group membership, ethnicity, or religion (Cannon & Iyekekpolo, 2018). As is the case in Nigeria, government funds allocated to combat terrorism are frequently diverted for private gain due to pervasive economic corruption. A notable example is the $2.1 million arms deal scandal involving the former National Security Advisor (NSA), (Rtd.) Col. Sambo Dasuki, along with other prominent military and political figures. As later revealed, the funds intended for procuring military hardware to combat Boko Haram insurgents were misappropriated for personal use, exposing the depth of corruption within the social fabric of Nigerian society (Oriola, 2023).

2.3. A brief evolution of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria.

Boko Haram, as a nomenclature, means "Western education is evil" or unlawful. The group, however, did not limit its opposition to Western education; it also rejected the Western way of life and any form of colonial organization in its entirety. Additionally, Boko Haram viewed other religious adherents as infidels who should be exterminated to fulfill Islamic injunctions on fighting a holy war against the perceived "enemies of Allah."

In tracing its origin, some scholars suggest that the sect emerged from the Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation, founded by Lawan Abubakar in 1995. Abubakar later traveled to Saudi Arabia to pursue his education at the University of Medina (Oriola, 2023). Ustaz Yusuf Mohammed eventually became the leader of the youth wing of the organization. Accounts indicate that extremist doctrine was injected into Boko Haram by Yusuf Mohammed. Upon assuming leadership, he abandoned Abubakar's original views, emphasizing that Western education is evil and rejecting Western culture and science (Oriola, 2023).

Yusuf Mohammed began the movement in 2002 in Girgir village to propagate the core tenets guiding the Sharia government in Borno State. He established an Islamic school that attracted Muslims from neighboring states and across Nigeria. The school became a breeding ground for Boko Haram adherents, instilling the belief that fighting corrupt practices was a religious duty. Later, the group was co-opted into the political ambitions of then-governorship candidate Ali Modu Sheriff, who sought their support by promising full implementation of Sharia law in Borno State. When these promises failed to materialize, the relationship between the sect and the government soured, and Boko Haram began openly criticizing government corruption.

As Boko Haram gained prominence in Borno, its recruitment and activities spread to other northeastern states in Nigeria. The sect became more daring and destructive after the suspicious killing of its leader, Yusuf Mohammed, while in police custody. Boko Haram maintains close ties with other Islamic extremist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, for multidimensional support in executing its agenda. Some members are not Nigerian; French-speaking West Africans and Arabs also constitute part of the force, contributing to its transnational nature (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

In executing attacks against the Nigerian state, Boko Haram employs both Western and indigenous methods, including sophisticated weapons and voodoo. For instance, confrontations with Nigerian soldiers often proved difficult because sect members, enmeshed in voodooism, were determined to die for Allah (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Since 2009, clashes have occurred regularly between Boko Haram and the Nigerian police. The sect frequently engages in violent confrontations with Nigerian troops, resulting in the loss of military personnel due to inadequate modern weaponry, though Boko Haram also suffered casualties.

Despite several measures adopted by the Nigerian government, the insurgency has persisted, partly due to the federal government's failure to meet demands such as releasing imprisoned members and rebuilding places of worship (Duke, Agbaji, & Etim, 2016). Terrorism has caused extensive destruction of lives and property, leading to massive displacement and protection challenges. The activities of Boko Haram and its splinter groups have resulted in numerous deaths and significant waste of public and private property. Coordinated attacks have been carried out by Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in high-profile locations, including the Kuje prison attack in the Federal Capital Territory, which led to the escape of hundreds of prisoners; the killing of forty worshippers in Ondo State; an attack on a train traveling from Abuja to Kaduna that killed eight people; and the kidnapping of seventy-two individuals (Elujekwute, Umar, Audu, & Nnome, 2022).

2.4. Financial Corruption in the Nigerian military: Multicausal factors

Lack of contentment with their earnings, although not always aligned with the broader economic realities in Nigeria, often drives military officers to engage in various forms of corruption to augment their income. Numerous cases illustrate how greedy military officers misappropriate and embezzle funds intended for national security and development for personal gain. A notable example is the $2.1 million arms deal scandal, known as "Dasukigate," involving the former National Security Advisor (NSA), (Rtd.) Col. Sambo Dasuki, alongside other senior military personnel and politicians. This scandal exposed how funds allocated for military purposes were diverted for partisan and personal interests, reflecting greed-driven corruption at the highest levels of the military and government (Yetunde, 2009). It highlights a broader pattern of looting funds meant for national development projects due to personal aggrandizement.

Another motivating factor for corruption among military officers, which has negatively impacted their effectiveness in combating insurgency, is the poor incentives during active service and upon retirement. Military personnel often receive low salaries and wages while in service, and in the event of misfortune, their immediate family members are left to navigate hardships alone. Those who retire are frequently unable to access even their meager pension allowances promptly, further exacerbating financial pressures.

Family and ethnic pressures also contribute to corruption within the military, though such pressures do not justify unethical behavior. The prevalence of corruption is partly attributable to degraded societal values and a politically manipulable environment, which makes illegal practices easier to perpetrate. Public admiration for ill-gotten wealth, a societal urge for quick fortunes, and the display of flamboyant affluence reinforce corrupt behavior as a measure of success (International Centre for Investigative Reporting, 2014). In this context, corruption can be understood as a motivated response to social pressures, with strong family obligations sometimes incentivizing rule-breaking behavior (Nweze, 2022).

The secrecy surrounding military procurements further facilitates corruption. Most defense acquisitions are conducted on a single-source basis rather than through competitive, committee-based processes, allowing manipulation and falsification of figures to siphon funds from the system. This situation has worsened the military's capacity to combat insurgency, as substandard military hardware, often refurbished without quality components or spare parts, is procured (Oriola, 2023). As noted by the United States Department of Defence (USDD) (2007), high levels of secrecy in defense

and security expenditures in some West African states create opportunities for opportunistic purchases, rather than acquisitions based on actual sectoral needs. Consequently, the USDD advocates for legislation ensuring that defense and security procurements are carefully assessed, planned, and executed in accordance with published policies (USDD, 2007). Oriola (2023) also argued that public oversight in defense procurement is minimal, enabling inflated contracts and poor service delivery within the military.

2.5 Corruption in the Nigerian Military affecting the combat of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

Since the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the military has made significant efforts to combat its spread and potentially eradicate the group. However, what began as a localized insurgency in the Northeast gradually entrenched itself and expanded into other parts of the country, manifesting in forms such as banditry, militancy, kidnapping, and abduction of civilians. Despite the herculean efforts demonstrated by the Nigerian military, its operations have been marred by numerous allegations of financial corruption, which in some instances have allowed Boko Haram to gain ground beyond expectations.

Corrupt practices within the Nigerian military have affected frontline troops directly engaged in the fight against Boko Haram. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2022), corruption manifested in various ways, including the inflation of soldier deployment numbers, racketeering of food and water supplies, graft in the procurement of arms and ammunition, non-procurement of uniforms, boots, and other essential kits, provision of substandard accommodation for troops, illegal deductions of soldiers' allowances, irregular payment of allowances, financial mismanagement in troop transportation, manipulation of military postings by highly connected civilians, and graft in the release of arrested Boko Haram suspects.

Racketeering, for instance, involved inflating the number of soldiers deployed to war fronts while siphoning the allowances meant for the supposed extra troops. Consequently, the actual number of deployed troops was often insufficient compared to the large numbers of Boko Haram insurgents (HRW, 2022). Alonge and Osimen (2021) observed that soldiers' initial allowances of N30,000 were later reduced to N15,000 despite the protracted nature of the conflict. Allegedly, army commanders benefitted from the reduction in allowances; however, the Director of Defense Information, Major General Olukolade, clarified that the government had delayed full payment and that partial payments were made after military authorities borrowed funds to meet obligations.

Furthermore, some soldiers perceived that corruption in the fight against terrorism extended beyond field commanders, involving systemic operational deficiencies known to the defense high command in Abuja (Alonge et al., 2021). Another mechanism of corruption involved the merging of operational units and areas of deployment. For example, three separate army units, the Special Operations Battalion (SOB), Forward Operation Battalion (FOB), and Task Force Mike (TFM), were consolidated into a single base along Mubi Road in Mubi Local Government Area, Adamawa State. Although the federal government had allocated funds for the units to operate separately, the merger created an opportunity for army commanders to divert the "savings" into their private accounts, ignoring the negative consequences on soldiers' morale, welfare, and the overall counter-terrorism campaign (Alonge et al., 2021).

Due to the poor welfare of military personnel, some soldiers were compelled to resign to avoid being killed by insurgents, while others voluntarily deserted their posts due to inadequate support and welfare provisioning. Corrupt practices within the military have significantly undermined the general welfare of combatants, thereby making the fight against terrorism increasingly difficult. For example, the siphoning of the $1 billion approved by President Muhammadu Buhari in 2018 for the purchase of weapons to combat terrorism attracted national condemnation, yet the culprits were not held accountable. Despite calls from the Senate for the removal of the service chiefs under whose tenure the funds went missing, these officials were subsequently appointed as ambassadors under the same administration.

In another notable case, former military and security personnel were investigated by the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) for embezzling funds allocated to combat insecurity. One instance involved a former head of the military arms depositing N4 billion from the military budget into two companies' accounts, in which he was the beneficial owner and sole signatory (Premium Times, 2021). Although the government has claimed that Boko Haram insurgents have been technically defeated in the Northeastern region of Nigeria, this assertion is questionable. The country continues to

experience high levels of violent deaths caused by both Boko Haram terrorists and Fulani herdsmen, who employ hybrid warfare strategies in the Northeast (Premium Times, 2021).

Given these trends, it is critical to examine the root causes and effects of corruption in Nigeria, particularly within the military. Addressing corruption in the armed forces would not only mitigate unwholesome practices but also help curb the Boko Haram insurgency, which has caused substantial loss of lives, escalated security expenditures, destroyed valuable government infrastructure, and negatively impacted sustainable economic growth and development in the country (Premium Times, 2021). Ordinarily, government funds earmarked for essential public services, such as road construction, water supply, schools, and hospitals, have been diverted to security matters due to corruption, further exacerbating developmental deficits (Premium Times, 2021).

3.0 Methodology

The survey method was employed for this investigation, which included the use of interviews and questionnaires. To draw deductions and conclusions, researchers can generalize findings from a sample to the population, which justifies the use of survey research. The Nigerian Army was the primary focus of this study. Using the sample size calculation approach proposed by Krejcie and Morgan (1970), the sample population for this study was determined. The population size of the Nigerian Army used in this study comprised the 1st Mechanized Division, 2nd Mechanized Division, 3rd Armored Division, 81st Mechanized Division, and 82nd Mechanized Division, which is estimated to be 223,000 (Guardian Newspaper, 2021). Therefore, the sample size was calculated to be 385, meaning that 385 respondents were required.

Isreal (2013) recommends increasing the sample size by 10 to 30% to account for potential errors that may arise during survey administration. In this study, the population was purposively distributed across Kaduna, Ibadan, Jos, Lagos, and Enugu. Purposive, cluster, and simple random sampling techniques were employed. Furthermore, because the population is homogeneous and of limited size, a simple random sampling technique was used. This approach was chosen to minimize bias and ensure systematic variance. With this sampling method, each member of the population had an equal and independent probability of being selected for the sample.

The data obtained during the research constituted the primary source for testing the hypotheses. Both primary and secondary data were used. The authenticity and reliability of the secondary data, which supplemented the field data, provided additional justification for its use. To obtain a representative sample, a total of 493 questionnaires were distributed. Data from 417 (four hundred and seventeen) returned questionnaires were analyzed using ordinal regression. Additionally, eleven (11) informants were interviewed purposively and stratified.

Table 1 Model Fitting Information

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	1740.147			
Final	690.701	1049.446	3	.000
Link function: Logit.				

The model fitting data, or goodness-of-fit statistics, is presented in Table 1 above. The table clearly indicates that the model fits the data significantly better than the null (intercept-only) model. Since our alpha level (0.05) is higher than the p-value, this indicates a significant difference between the null model and the final model, demonstrating a strong model fit. This suggests that corruption in the military, manifested through greed, materialism, and inadequate welfare, is significantly associated with the effectiveness of the fight against insurgency in Nigeria, as measured by factors such as use of firearms, theft of classified documents, and other operational behaviors.

Table 2 Goodness-of-Fit

	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Pearson	1857.660	3227	1.000
Deviance	613.218	3227	1.000
Link function: Logit.			

Table 2 above indicates a satisfactory match between because the P-value (1.00) is higher than the Alpha level (0.05). This indicates that the fitted (assumed) model and the observed data are significantly different.

Table 3 Pseudo R-Square

Cox and Snell	.919
Nagelkerke	.928
McFadden	.544
Link function: Logit.	

Table 3 above shows the Nagelkerke R-Square value to be 0.92, indicating a 92% improvement in predicting the outcome based on the predictors—greed, materialism, and welfare—compared to the null model. This means that 92% of the variation in the dependent variable (use of firearms, theft of classified documents, and use of firearms) is explained by the variation in the independent variables (modern slavery, discriminatory abuse, acts of omission, and institutional abuse).

Table 4 Parameter Estimates

		Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Threshold	[INS = 1.00]	10.280	1.113	85.304	1	.000	8.099	12.462
	[INS = 1.20]	13.426	1.040	166.598	1	.000	11.387	15.464
	[INS = 1.40]	17.321	1.176	216.813	1	.000	15.016	19.627
	[INS = 1.60]	19.700	1.265	242.381	1	.000	17.220	22.180
	[INS = 1.80]	21.389	1.347	252.092	1	.000	18.749	24.029
	[INS = 2.00]	23.567	1.452	263.274	1	.000	20.721	26.414
	[INS = 2.20]	25.926	1.548	280.630	1	.000	22.893	28.960
	[INS = 2.40]	27.521	1.622	287.897	1	.000	24.342	30.700
	[INS = 2.60]	29.074	1.726	283.691	1	.000	25.691	32.457
	[INS = 2.80]	29.758	1.789	276.638	1	.000	26.252	33.265
	[INS = 3.00]	31.134	1.959	252.685	1	.000	27.295	34.972
	[INS = 3.20]	33.418	2.198	231.208	1	.000	29.111	37.726
	[INS = 3.40]	34.240	2.260	229.533	1	.000	29.810	38.669
	[INS = 3.60]	36.466	2.322	246.597	1	.000	31.915	41.017
	[INS = 3.80]	37.018	2.316	255.382	1	.000	32.478	41.558
	[INS = 4.00]	38.161	2.330	268.170	1	.000	33.594	42.728
	[INS = 4.20]	41.127	2.512	267.975	1	.000	36.203	46.052
	[INS = 4.40]	43.966	2.659	273.402	1	.000	38.755	49.178
	[INS = 4.60]	45.309	2.687	284.353	1	.000	40.043	50.576
Location	GREE	9.669	.568	290.136	1	.000	8.556	10.781
	MAR	.086	.333	.067	1	.796	-.567	.740
	WEL	1.324	.304	18.911	1	.000	.727	1.921
Link function: Logit.								

Table 4 above shows a positive parameter estimate between bribery and unexpected explosions. This indicates that for every one-unit increase in acts of greediness, there is a predicted increase of 9.669 in the log odds of a higher level of unexpected explosions in Nigeria. Furthermore, the P-value (0.00) is less than the Alpha level (0.05), indicating a significant effect of bribery on unexpected explosions by Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Table 4 also shows a positive parameter estimate between embezzlement and the unauthorized use of firearms by Boko Haram in Nigeria. The coefficient value indicates that for every one-unit increase in materialism, there is a predicted increase of 0.086 in the log odds of a higher level of unauthorized firearm use by Boko Haram. However, the P-value (0.79) is greater than the Alpha level (0.05), suggesting that embezzlement of funds does not have a significant effect on Boko Haram's use of firearms in Nigeria.

Lastly, Table 4 reveals a positive parameter estimate between poor welfare and the stealing of classified documents by Boko Haram in Nigeria. For every one-unit increase in poor welfare, there is a predicted increase of 1.324 in the log odds of a higher level of stealing classified documents. The P-value (0.00) is less than the Alpha level (0.05), indicating a significant effect of welfare on the theft of classified documents by Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Table 5 Test of Parallel Lines[a]

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Null Hypothesis	690.701			
General	.000[b]	690.701	54	.000

The parallel line test is shown in Table 5 above. According to the null hypothesis, the location parameters (slope coefficients) in the table are the same for all answer categories. Consequently, this test explains why the odds for each explanatory variable remain constant across different thresholds of the outcome variable.

Findings

The study found that bribery within the military contributes to unexpected explosions by Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria. This occurs because resources intended for purchasing arms, ammunition, and welfare provisions for personnel are often diverted into private accounts, making it difficult to monitor or prevent the sect's nefarious activities. In the context of the Boko Haram insurgency, many of the group's operations, including suicide bombings targeting civilian gatherings and military facilities, are linked to the greediness of some senior military officers. According to interviewees across the study areas, the military exhibits greediness in performing their duties, particularly in countering Boko Haram insurgents. They described behaviours such as the inflation of the number of soldiers deployed to different locations in the North East, racketeering of food and water supplies, graft in the procurement of arms and ammunition, inflation of costs for uniforms, boots, and other kits, illegal deduction of personnel allowances, actions that diminish soldiers' morale in prosecuting the war, and even intentionally prolonging the conflict in order to increase budgetary spending on security.

According to HumAngle (2023), the root causes of inefficiency in the Nigerian Army have not been adequately addressed. The magazine noted that corruption begins as early as the admission process into the Nigeria Defence Academy (NDA), where students are admitted based on connections rather than merit. Children of affluent families, who are unable to survive on a regular salary alone, may seek to augment their income through illegal means, including selling weapons to bandits and terrorist groups. The magazine emphasised that returning to merit-based admissions would allow committed and genuinely interested students to train as officers and defend the nation effectively.

Furthermore, the National Security Adviser, Babagana Monguno, recently raised concerns that large sums allocated for arms procurement were missing, though his office later clarified that no money was missing but that some ordered military equipment had not been delivered. Nevertheless, these statements failed to reassure the public, as they highlighted inadequate or delayed equipment provision for the Nigerian Armed Forces, especially amid ongoing security challenges. This situation is particularly worrisome in light of media reports showing soldiers bearing the brunt of Boko Haram insurgency in the North East.

The study revealed that there is a significant effect between poor welfare and the stealing of classified information. At the inception of the fight against Boko Haram insurgents, the conflict took many dimensions and became increasingly fierce, with numerous soldiers losing their lives due to the leakage of classified information to the enemy. Interviews conducted with members of the Nigerian Army revealed sentiments such as: "The welfare is poor, and the little that we are meant to enjoy is being siphoned," and, "Even those soldiers who died on the battlefield, their families were not adequately compensated."

According to Bassey and Oshita (2010), the Nigerian Army has denied reports that 25 soldiers resigned due to poor welfare and corruption. An online publication alleged that the soldiers, who were part of the Army Armoured Corps and responsible for operating war vehicles, resigned in protest against financial corruption and poor welfare conditions. However, the Army, through its spokesperson Onyema Nwachukwu, maintained that the soldiers resigned voluntarily and stressed that retirement in the service is routine. In his statement, Nwachukwu rejected the insinuation that the soldiers' departure was connected to corruption, describing it as an implausible attempt to dampen the morale of loyal and patriotic troops, create disaffection within the ranks, and place the Nigerian government in a state of panic.

Supporting this perspective, Taiwo-Hassan (2021) recounted the experience of Femi Adegboyega, who joined the Nigerian Army about 15 years ago. He was among the first set of soldiers deployed from various parts of the country to combat Boko Haram insurgents in Borno State, North East Nigeria. Despite enduring poor conditions such as sleeping in classrooms and being owed operational allowances on multiple occasions, Adegboyega has remained in the military and is now engaged in combating armed separatist groups in the South East. He explained, "After losing many of our colleagues to attacks in Maiduguri, some of my friends left the Army. But I still remain to prove the love I have for my fatherland." He also alleged that "People keep leaving the military because of lack of adequate welfare, and it appears that is not going to change. People even get punished for talking to the press and expressing their displeasure publicly."

About three months prior, a Nigerian newspaper reported that a soldier had been detained for exposing the welfare challenges faced by troops on the frontlines. Soldiers noted that the Official Secret Act of 1962—originally intended to punish those who leaked sensitive military information—is frequently used to penalise personnel who speak to the press about irregularities. The Act prohibits government workers from transmitting classified material to unauthorized persons, and Section 7 prescribes penalties of up to 14 years' imprisonment for violations.

Lastly, the study found that embezzlement of funds does not significantly affect the fight against the unauthorized use of firearms in Nigeria. According to interviewees, the love of money among military officers does not directly encourage Boko Haram insurgents to use arms and ammunition. However, Adebusuyi (2019) expressed a contrary view, arguing that materialism within the military can contribute to the proliferation of arms. He noted that during peacekeeping missions involving the Nigerian military in the West African sub-region, many small arms and light weapons (SALWs) entered the country. It is widely believed that some discharged soldiers from conflict zones in Liberia and Sierra Leone returned with wartime ammunition and sold these weapons cheaply in Nigeria. Indeed, some weapons later seized by the police from criminals, migrants, and militia members were traced back to such peacekeeping deployments.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The paper concludes that corruption in the Nigerian military has significantly undermined efforts to successfully combat the Boko Haram insurgency. Despite the Buhari administration's campaign promise of zero tolerance for corruption, a lack of political will to confront this social menace hampered the overall performance of combatants, even with substantial financial resources allocated to fighting terrorism. The administration's inability to record remarkable success in curbing corruption can be attributed to the appointment of individuals with questionable character and integrity to political positions, as well as shielding such individuals from investigation and prosecution (Ejekwonyilo, 2021).

The persistence of corrupt practices is largely driven by individuals' desire to amass wealth quickly when given the opportunity to engage in illegal activities. Despite the efforts of successive governments to eradicate corruption—through the establishment of anti-corruption agencies such as the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), and the Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT)—these measures have proven ineffective, as corruption continues to thrive, even

within the ranks of the anti-corruption bodies themselves (Adebusuyi, 2019).

To address this challenge, it is recommended that the government review and strengthen the procurement processes for acquiring arms and ammunition for the Nigerian Army and other security agencies operating in the country. The legislature should ensure that budgetary allocations for arms procurement are implemented transparently and in full. Corrupt leaders and officers in the Nigerian military should be appropriately sanctioned if found guilty of any corrupt act, particularly in relation to the fight against Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria. A more radical approach, including severe sanctions and the introduction of the death penalty for corrupt security leaders and officers, should be considered, as terrorism cannot be fully defeated without decisive action against corruption.

Finally, Nigerian Army personnel, especially those serving on the frontline, should be adequately remunerated and promoted to boost their morale. This would also instill a sense of assurance that their families will be properly cared for in the event of any unfortunate incident.

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